View source for Carl von Clausewitz

{{Short description|Prussian general and military theorist (1780–1831)}}
{{redirect|Clausewitz|the part of defence of Berlin during World War II|Operation Clausewitz|the Paradox computer strategy games engine|Clausewitz Engine}}

{{Infobox military person
| birth_name    = Carl Philipp Gottlieb Clauswitz
| image         = Clausewitz.jpg
| image_size    = 225px
| caption       = Carl von Clausewitz in Prussian service; portrait by [[Wilhelm Wach]], early 1830s
| birth_date    = {{Birth date|1780|07|01|df=y}}
| birth_place   = [[Burg bei Magdeburg]], [[Kingdom of Prussia]], [[Holy Roman Empire]]
| death_date    = {{Death date and age|1831|11|16|1780|06|01|df=y}}
| death_place   = [[Breslau]], [[Province of Silesia]], Kingdom of Prussia
| placeofburial = 
| allegiance    = {{ubl|[[Kingdom of Prussia|Prussia]]|[[Russian Empire]] (1812–1813)}}
| branch        = [[Prussian Army]]
| serviceyears  = 1792–1831
| rank          = [[Major general]]
| unit          = [[Russian–German Legion]] (III Corps)
| commands      = ''[[Prussian Military Academy|Kriegsakademie]]''
| battles       = {{tree list}}
* [[French Revolutionary Wars]]
**[[Siege of Mainz (1793)|Siege of Mainz]]
* [[Napoleonic Wars]]
**[[Battle of Jena–Auerstedt]]
**[[Battle of Borodino]]
**[[Battle of Ligny]]
**[[Battle of Wavre]]{{tree list/end}}
| awards        = 
| spouse        = {{marriage|[[Marie von Brühl]]|1810}}
| relations     = 
| laterwork     = 
}}

'''Carl Philipp Gottlieb von Clausewitz'''{{refn|group=note|{{German title von}}}} ({{IPAc-en|ˈ|k|l|aʊ|z|ə|v|ɪ|t|s}} {{respell|KLOW|zə|vits}}, {{IPA|de|ˈkaʁl fɔn ˈklaʊzəvɪts|lang|De-Carl von Clausewitz.ogg}}; born '''Carl Philipp Gottlieb Clauswitz'''; 1 July 1780 – 16 November 1831)<ref name=Clausewitzstudies.org>{{cite web|title=Clausewitz and His Works|url= https://www.clausewitzstudies.org/mobile/Works.htm | website=Clausewitz.com |access-date=July 9, 2018 |last=Bassford |first=Christopher |date=March 8, 2016}}</ref> was a [[Kingdom of Prussia|Prussian]] general and [[Military theory|military theorist]] who stressed the "moral" (in modern terms meaning [[Military psychology|psychological]]) and political aspects of waging war. His most notable work, {{lang|de|[[Vom Kriege]]}} (''About War''), though unfinished at his death, is considered a seminal treatise on [[military strategy]] and [[military science|science]].

Clausewitz stressed the multiplex interaction of diverse factors in war, noting how unexpected developments unfolding under the "[[fog of war]]" (i.e., in the face of incomplete, dubious, and often erroneous information and great [[fear]], doubt, and excitement) call for rapid decisions by alert commanders. He saw history as a vital check on erudite abstractions that did not accord with experience. In contrast to the early work of [[Antoine-Henri Jomini]], he argued that war could not be quantified or reduced to mapwork, geometry, and graphs.  Clausewitz had many [[aphorism]]s, of which one of the most famous is, "War is the continuation of policy with other means."<ref name=":0">{{cite book |last=Clausewitz |first=Carl von |author-link=Carl von Clausewitz |editor1-first= Michael |editor1-last=Howard |editor1-link=Peter Paret |editor2-first=Peter |editor2-last= Paret |title= On War |trans-title=Vom Krieg |edition=Indexed |year=1984 |orig-year=1832 |publisher=Princeton University Press |location=New Jersey |isbn=978-0-691-01854-6 |page= 87}}</ref>{{rp|page=87}}

==Name==
Clausewitz's Christian names are variously given in English-language sources as "Karl", "Carl Philipp Gottlieb", or "Carl Maria." He spelled his own given name with a "C" in order to identify with the classical Western tradition; writers who use "Karl" are often seeking to emphasize his German (rather than European) identity. "Carl Philipp Gottfried" appears on Clausewitz's tombstone.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://clausewitz.com/mobile/tombsite.htm |title=Clausewitz's tombstone |website=Clausewitz.com |access-date=July 9, 2018 }}</ref> ''[[Encyclopædia Britannica]]'' continues to use Gottlieb instead of Gottfried based on older sources, such as military historian [[Peter Paret]], and historian [[Michael Howard (historian)|Sir Michael Howard]] originated the use of "Carl Maria." However, more modern scholars like [[Christopher Bassford]] (editor of ''ClausewitzStudies.org'') and Vanya Eftimova Bellinger (who wrote the 2016 [[Marie von Clausewitz: The Woman Behind the Making of On War|biography]] of Carl's wife [[Marie von Brühl|Marie von Clausewitz]]) consider his tombstone a more reliable source than the hand-written birth records used by Paret.<ref>{{cite encyclopedia |url=https://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/120545/Carl-von-Clausewitz |title=Carl von Clausewitz |encyclopedia=Encyclopædia Britannica|date=22 February 2024 }}</ref>

==Life and military career==
Clausewitz was born on 1 July 1780 in [[Burg bei Magdeburg]] in the Prussian [[Duchy of Magdeburg]] as the fourth and youngest son of a family that made claims to a noble status which Carl accepted. Clausewitz's family claimed descent from the Barons of Clausewitz in [[Upper Silesia]], though scholars question the connection.<ref>{{cite book|last= Aron|first= Raymond|title= Clausewitz: Philosopher of War|year= 1983|publisher= Taylor & Francis|pages= 12–14|url= https://books.google.com/books?id=KPI9AAAAIAAJ|isbn= 978-0710090096}}</ref> 

His grandfather, the son of a [[Lutheranism|Lutheran]] pastor, had been a professor of theology. Clausewitz's father, once a lieutenant in the army of [[Frederick the Great]], [[List of monarchs of Prussia|King of Prussia]], held a minor post in the Prussian internal-revenue service. Clausewitz entered the Prussian military service at the age of twelve as a [[lance corporal]], eventually attaining the rank of major general.<ref name=ClausewitzDotComBio>{{cite web|title=Clausewitz and His Works|url= http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Bassford/Cworks/Works.htm |website=Clausewitz.com |access-date=July 9, 2018 |last=Bassford |first=Christopher |date=March 8, 2016}}</ref>

Clausewitz served in the [[War of the First Coalition|Rhine campaigns]] (1793–1794) including the [[Siege of Mainz (1793)|siege of Mainz]], when the [[Prussian Army]] invaded France during the [[French Revolution]], and fought in the [[Napoleonic Wars]] from 1806 to 1815. He entered the ''[[Prussian Staff College|Kriegsakademie]]'' (also cited as "The German War School", the "Military Academy in Berlin", and the "Prussian Military Academy," later the "War College") in Berlin in 1801 (aged 21), probably studied the writings of the philosophers [[Immanuel Kant]] and/or [[Johann Gottlieb Fichte]] and [[Friedrich Schleiermacher]] and won the regard of General [[Gerhard von Scharnhorst]], the future first chief-of-staff of the newly reformed Prussian Army (appointed 1809). Clausewitz, [[Hermann von Boyen]] (1771–1848) and [[Karl von Grolman]] (1777–1843) were among Scharnhorst's primary allies in his efforts to reform the Prussian army between 1807 and 1814.{{citation needed|date=June 2017}}

Clausewitz served during the Jena Campaign as [[aide-de-camp]] to Prince [[Prince Augustus Ferdinand of Prussia|August]]. At the [[Battle of Jena-Auerstedt]] on 14 October 1806—when Napoleon invaded Prussia and defeated the Prussian-Saxon army commanded by [[Charles William Ferdinand|Karl Wilhelm Ferdinand]], [[Duchy of Brunswick|Duke of Brunswick]]—he was captured, one of the 25,000 prisoners taken that day as the Prussian army disintegrated. He was 26. Clausewitz was held prisoner with his prince in [[France]] from 1807 to 1808. Returning to Prussia, he assisted in the reform of the Prussian army and state.<ref name=ClausewitzDotComBio />  Johann Gottlieb Fichte wrote ''On Machiavelli, as an Author, and Passages from His Writings'' in June 1807. ("''Über Machiavell, als Schriftsteller, und Stellen aus seinen Schriften''" ). Carl Clausewitz wrote an interesting and anonymous Letter to Fichte (1809) about his book on ''Machiavelli.'' The letter was published in Fichte's ''Verstreute kleine Schriften'' 157–166. For an English translation of the letter see ''Carl von Clausewitz Historical and Political Writings'' Edited by: Peter Paret and D. Moran (1992).

[[File:Marievonclausewitz.jpg|thumb|left|upright|Marie von Clausewitz (née, Countess von Brühl)]]
On 10 December 1810, he married the socially prominent [[Countess]] [[Marie von Brühl]], whom he had first met in 1803. She was a member of the noble German [[Brühl family]] originating in [[Thuringia]]. The couple moved in the highest circles, socialising with Berlin's political, literary, and intellectual élite. Marie was well-educated and politically well-connected—she played an important role in her husband's career progress and intellectual evolution.<ref>Bellinger, Vanya Eftimova. ''Marie von Clausewitz: The Woman Behind the Making of On War''. New York/London: Oxford University Press, 2015. {{ISBN|978-0-19-022543-8}}</ref> She also edited, published, and introduced his collected works.<ref name="5 Things">{{cite journal|last1=Bellinger|first1=Vanya Eftimova|title=Five Things You Didn't Know About Carl von Clausewitz|journal=Real Clear Defense|date=January 6, 2016|url=http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2016/01/06/five_things_you_didnt_know_about_carl_von_clausewitz_108863.html|access-date=7 January 2016}}</ref>

Opposed to Prussia's enforced alliance with [[Napoleon]], Clausewitz left the Prussian army and served in the [[Imperial Russian Army]] from 1812 to 1813 during the [[French invasion of Russia|Russian campaign]], taking part in the [[Battle of Borodino]] (1812). Like many Prussian officers serving in Russia, he joined the [[Russian–German Legion]] in 1813. In the service of the [[Russian Empire]], Clausewitz helped negotiate the [[Convention of Tauroggen]] (1812), which prepared the way for the coalition of Prussia, Russia, and the [[United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland|United Kingdom]] that ultimately defeated Napoleon and his allies.<ref name=ClausewitzDotComBio />

In 1815 the Russian-German Legion became integrated into the Prussian Army and Clausewitz re-entered Prussian service as a colonel.<ref>See Timothy McCranor, "On the Pedagogical Intent of Clausewitz's On War", ''MCU Journal'' vol. 9, no. 1, Spring 2018, pp.133-154.</ref> He was soon appointed chief-of-staff of [[Johann von Thielmann]]'s III Corps. In that capacity he served at the [[Battle of Ligny]] and the [[Battle of Wavre]] during the [[Waterloo campaign]] in 1815. An army led personally by Napoleon defeated the Prussians at [[Ligny]] (south of [[Mont-Saint-Jean, Belgium|Mont-Saint-Jean]] and the village of [[Waterloo, Belgium|Waterloo]]) on 16 June 1815, but they withdrew in good order. Napoleon's failure to destroy the Prussian forces led to his defeat a few days later at the [[Battle of Waterloo]] (18 June 1815), when the Prussian forces arrived on his right flank late in the afternoon to support the Anglo-Dutch-Belgian forces pressing his front. Napoleon had convinced his troops that the field grey uniforms were those of Marshal Grouchy's grenadiers. Clausewitz's unit fought heavily outnumbered at [[Battle of Wavre|Wavre]] (18–19 June 1815), preventing large reinforcements from reaching Napoleon at Waterloo.  After the war, Clausewitz served as the director of the ''Kriegsakademie'', where he served until 1830. In that year he returned to active duty with the army. Soon afterward, the outbreak of several revolutions around Europe and [[November Uprising|a crisis in Poland]] appeared to presage another major European war. Clausewitz was appointed chief of staff of the only army Prussia was able to mobilise in this emergency, which was sent to the Polish border. Its commander, [[August Neidhardt von Gneisenau|Gneisenau]], died of [[cholera]] (August 1831), and Clausewitz took command of the Prussian army's efforts to construct a {{lang|fr|cordon sanitaire}} to contain [[1826–1837 cholera pandemic#Origins of the second pandemic|the great cholera outbreak]] (the first time cholera had appeared in modern heartland Europe, causing a continent-wide panic). Clausewitz himself died of the same disease shortly afterwards, on 16 November 1831.<ref name=ClausewitzDotComBio />

His widow edited, published, and wrote the introduction to his ''[[Masterpiece|magnum opus]]'' on the [[philosophy of war]] in 1832. (He had started working on the text in 1816 but had not completed it.)<ref name=smith57>Smith, Rupert, ''The Utility of Force'', Penguin Books, 2006, p. 57; Paul Donker, "[https://www.clausewitzstudies.org/bibl/DonkerP-TheEvolutionOfClausewitzsVomKriege.pdf The Evolution of Clausewitz's ''Vom Kriege'': a reconstruction on the basis of the earlier versions of his masterpiece]," trans. Paul Donker and Christopher Bassford, ClausewitzStudies.org, August 2019.</ref> She wrote the preface for ''On War'' and had published most of his collected works by 1835.<ref name="5 Things"/> She died in January 1836.

==Theory of war==
Clausewitz was a professional combat soldier and a staff officer<ref>
{{cite book
 |last1                = Beyerchen
 |first1               = Alan
 |editor-last1         = Langston
 |editor-first1        = Richard
 |editor-last2         = Adelson
 |editor-first2        = Leslie A.
 |editor-last3         = Jones
 |editor-first3        = N.D.
 |editor-last4         = Wilms
 |editor-first4        = Leonie
 |date                 = 11 November 2019
 |chapter              = Kluge and Clausewitz. Chance and Imagination in the Real World
 |title                = The Poetic Power of Theory
 |url                  = https://books.google.com/books?id=DJfkEAAAQBAJ
 |series               = Alexander Kluge-Jahrbuch 6 (2019)
 |publisher            = V&R Unipress
 |page                 = 48
 |isbn                 = 9783847010395
 |access-date          = 6 July 2024
 |quote                = [...] Clausewitz was a staff officer for nearly his entire field career, due to his excellent analytical abilities, and he was very often at the commander's side.
}} 
</ref> who was involved in numerous military campaigns, but he is famous primarily as a military theorist interested in the examination of war, utilising the campaigns of [[Frederick the Great]] and [[Napoleon]] as frames of reference for his work.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Paret|first1=Peter|year=2012|title=Clausewitz and Schlieffen as Interpreters of Frederick the Great: Three Phases in the History of Grand Strategy|journal=Journal of Military History|volume=76|issue=3|pages=837–845}}</ref> He wrote a careful, systematic, philosophical examination of war in all its aspects. The result was his principal book, ''[https://clausewitzstudies.org/readings/VomKriege1832/TOC.htm Vom Kriege]'' (in English, ''[[On War]]''), a major work on the philosophy of war. It was unfinished when Clausewitz died and contains material written at different stages in his intellectual evolution, producing some significant contradictions between different sections. The sequence and precise character of that evolution is a source of much debate as to the exact meaning behind some seemingly contradictory observations in discussions pertinent to the tactical, operational and strategic levels of war, for example (though many of these apparent contradictions are simply the result of his dialectical method). Clausewitz constantly sought to revise the text, particularly between 1827 and his departure on his last field assignments, to include more material on "people's war" and forms of war other than high-intensity warfare between states, but relatively little of this material was included in the book.<ref name=smith57 /> Soldiers before this time had written treatises on various military subjects, but none had undertaken a great philosophical examination of war on the scale of those written by Clausewitz and [[Leo Tolstoy]], both of whom were inspired by the events of the [[Napoleonic Era]].

Clausewitz's work is still studied today, demonstrating its continued relevance. More than sixteen major English-language books that focused specifically on his work were published between 2005 and 2014, whereas his 19th-century rival [[Antoine-Henri Jomini|Jomini]] has faded from influence. The historian [[Lynn Montross]] said that this outcome "may be explained by the fact that Jomini produced a system of war, Clausewitz a philosophy.  The one has been outdated by new weapons, the other still influences the strategy behind those weapons."<ref>Lynn Montross, ''War Through the Ages'' (2nd ed. 1946) p. 583.</ref> Jomini did not attempt to define war but Clausewitz did, providing (and dialectically comparing) a number of definitions. The first is his dialectical thesis: "War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will." The second, often treated as Clausewitz's 'bottom line,' is in fact merely his dialectical antithesis: "War is merely the continuation of policy [or politics—the German original is ''Politik'', which encompasses both of those rather different English words] with other means." The synthesis of his dialectical examination of the nature of war—and thus his actual definition of war—is his famous "trinity," saying that war is, "when regarded as a whole, in relation to the tendencies predominating in it, a strange trinity, composed of the original violence of its essence, the hate and enmity which are to be regarded as a blind, natural impulse; of the play of probabilities and chance, which make it a free activity of the emotions; and of the subordinate character of a political tool, through which it belongs to the province of pure intelligence."<ref>Carl von Clausewitz, ''On War'', originally ''Vom Kriege'' (3 vols., Berlin: 1832–34). The first two quotations (i.e., the lines regarding war as an act of force and as a continuation of ''Politik'') are from the version edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton University Press, 1984, pp. 75, 87, 605. The quotation regarding the components of the trinity cited here, however, is from the translation made by O.J. Matthjs Jolles at the University of Chicago in 1943 and published by Random House, p.18. The latter version is used here because the trinity language provided by Howard and Paret has become rather controversial and is increasingly regarded as misleading. For a broad general discussion of the trinity, including the translation issues, see Bassford, "[https://www.clausewitzstudies.org/mobile/trinity8.htm Tiptoe Through the Trinity]"</ref>{{Synthesis inline|date=October 2020}} Christopher Bassford says the best shorthand for Clausewitz's trinity should be something like "violent emotion/chance/rational calculation." However, it is frequently presented as "people/army/government," a misunderstanding based on a later paragraph in the same section. This misrepresentation was popularised by U.S. Army Colonel [[Harry G. Summers Jr.|Harry Summers']] Vietnam-era interpretation,<ref>Summers, Harry G., Jr. ''On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War'' (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1982).</ref> facilitated by weaknesses in the 1976 Howard/Paret translation.<ref>{{cite book|first=Christopher |last=Bassford |chapter=The Primacy of Policy and the "Trinity" in Clausewitz's Mature Thought. |editor1-first=Hew |editor1-last=Strachan |editor2-first=Andreas |editor2-last=Herberg-Rothe |title=Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century: Proceedings of a March, 2005 conference at Oxford |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=2007 |pages=74–90}}</ref>

The degree to which Clausewitz managed to revise his manuscript to reflect that synthesis is the subject of much debate. His final reference to war and ''Politik'', however, goes beyond his widely quoted antithesis: "War is simply the continuation of political intercourse with the addition of other means. We deliberately use the phrase 'with the addition of other means' because we also want to make it clear that war in itself does not suspend political intercourse or change it into something entirely different. In essentials that intercourse continues, irrespective of the means it employs. The main lines along which military events progress, and to which they are restricted, are political lines that continue throughout the war into the subsequent peace."<ref>{{cite book|editor=Evan Luard|title=Basic Texts in International Relations: The Evolution of Ideas about International Society|url=https://www.google.com/books/edition/_/V_S-DAAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&pg=PA244|year=2016|publisher=Springer|page=244|isbn=978-1349221073}}</ref>

{{blockquote|A prince or general who knows exactly how to organise his war according to his object and means, who does neither too little nor too much, gives by that the greatest proof of his genius. But the effects of this talent are exhibited not so much by the invention of new modes of action, which might strike the eye immediately, as in the successful final result of the whole. It is the exact fulfilment of silent suppositions, it is the noiseless harmony of the whole action which we should admire, and which only makes itself known in the total result.|author=Clausewitz |source=''On War'', Book III, Chapter 1<ref name=OnWar1873>{{cite book |last=von Clausewitz |first=Carl |author-link=Carl von Clausewitz |translator-last=Graham |translator-first=J.J. |title= On War |trans-title=Vom Krieg |year=1873 |orig-year=1832 |publisher=N. Trübner & Co. |location=London |url=https://www.google.com/books/edition/_/PQY4AQAAMAAJ}}</ref>{{rp|Vol. I pgs. 85–86}}}}

Clausewitz introduced systematic philosophical contemplation into Western military thinking, with powerful implications not only for historical and analytical writing but also for practical policy, military instruction, and operational planning. He relied on his own experiences, contemporary writings about Napoleon, and on deep historical research. His historiographical approach is evident in his first extended study, written when he was 25, of the [[Thirty Years' War]]. In ''On War'', Clausewitz sees all wars as the sum of decisions, actions, and reactions in an uncertain and dangerous context, and also as a socio-political phenomenon. He also stressed the complex nature of war, which encompasses both the socio-political and the operational and stresses the primacy of state policy. (One should be careful not to limit his observations on war to war between states, however, as he certainly discusses other kinds of protagonists).<ref name="Paret">Paret, ''Clausewitz and the State: The Man, His Theories, and His Times''</ref>{{rp|viii}} Clausewitz, according to [[Azar Gat]], expressed in the field of military theory the main themes of the [[Romanticism|Romantic]] reaction against the worldview of the [[Age of Enlightenment|Enlightenment]], rejecting universal principles and stressing historical diversity and the forces of the human spirit. This explains the strength and value of many of his arguments, derived from this great cultural movement, but also his often harsh rhetoric against his predecessors.<ref name=":2">{{Cite book |last=Gat |first=Azar |title=A history of military thought: from the Enlightenment to the Cold War |date=2001 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-924762-2 |location=Oxford; New York}}</ref><ref name=":1" />

The word "[[strategy]]" had only recently come into usage in modern Europe, and Clausewitz's definition is quite narrow: "the use of engagements for the object of war" (which many today would call "the operational level" of war). Clausewitz conceived of war as a political, social, and military phenomenon which might—depending on circumstances—involve the entire population of a political entity at war. In any case, Clausewitz saw military force as an instrument that states and other political actors use to pursue the ends of their policy, in a dialectic between opposing wills, each with the aim of imposing his policies and will upon his enemy.<ref>{{cite book|first=Beatrice |last=Heuser |chapter=Clausewitz' Ideas of Strategy and Victory |editor1-first=Hew |editor1-last=Strachan |editor2-first=Andreas |editor2-last=Herberg-Rothe |title=Clausewitz in the 21st Century: Proceedings of a March, 2005 conference at Oxford |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=2007 |pages=132–163}}</ref>

Clausewitz's emphasis on the inherent superiority of the defense suggests that habitual aggressors are likely to end up as failures. The inherent superiority of the defense obviously does not mean that the defender will always win, however: there are other asymmetries to be considered. He was interested in co-operation between the regular army and militia or partisan forces, or citizen soldiers, as one possible—sometimes the only—method of defense. In the circumstances of the Wars of the French Revolution and those with Napoleon, which were energised by a rising spirit of nationalism, he emphasised the need for states to involve their entire populations in the conduct of war. This point is especially important, as these wars demonstrated that such energies could be of decisive importance and for a time led to a democratisation of the armed forces much as [[universal suffrage]] democratised politics.<ref>{{cite book|first=Michael I. |last=Handel|title=Clausewitz and Modern Strategy|url=https://www.google.com/books/edition/_/4A6fCuHGWhcC?hl=en&gbpv=1&pg=PA71|year=1986|publisher=Psychology Press|page=71|isbn=978-0714632940}}</ref>

While Clausewitz was intensely aware of the value of intelligence at all levels, he was also very skeptical of the accuracy of much military intelligence: "Many intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more are false, and most are uncertain.... In short, most intelligence is false."<ref name=OnWar1873 />{{rp|Vol. I p. 38}} This circumstance is generally described as part of the fog of war. Such skeptical comments apply only to intelligence at the tactical and operational levels; at the strategic and political levels he constantly stressed the requirement for the best possible understanding of what today would be called strategic and political intelligence. His conclusions were influenced by his experiences in the Prussian Army, which was often in an intelligence fog due partly to the superior abilities of Napoleon's system but even more simply to the nature of war.  Clausewitz acknowledges that friction creates enormous difficulties for the realization of any plan, and the ''fog of war'' hinders commanders from knowing what is happening. It is precisely in the context of this challenge that he develops the concept of '''military genius''' ({{langx |de| der kriegerische Genius}}), evidenced above all in the execution of operations. 'Military genius' is not simply a matter of intellect, but a combination of qualities of intellect, experience, personality, and temperament (and there are many possible such combinations) that create a very highly developed mental aptitude for the waging of war.<ref>{{cite book|first=Frederick L. |last=Shepherd III|title=The Fog Of War: Effects Of Uncertainty On Airpower Employment|url=https://www.google.com/books/edition/_/lBhvCwAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&pg=PT9|year=2014|publisher=Pickle Partners|page=9|isbn=978-1782896807}}</ref>

===Principal ideas===
[[File:CarlvonClausewitz.jpg|thumb|upright|Clausewitz as a young man]]

Key ideas discussed in ''On War'' include:<ref>This list is from "[https://www.clausewitzstudies.org/mobile/faqs.htm#Ideas Frequently Asked Questions about Clausewitz]," ''ClausewitzStudies.org,'' edited by Christopher Bassford.</ref>
* the [[dialectic]]al approach to military analysis
* the methods of "critical analysis"
* the economic profit-seeking logic of commercial enterprise is equally applicable to the waging of war and negotiating for peace
* the nature of the balance-of-power mechanism
* the relationship between political objectives and military objectives in war
* the asymmetrical relationship between attack and defense
* the nature of "military genius" (involving matters of personality and character, beyond intellect)
* the "fascinating trinity" (''wunderliche Dreifaltigkeit'') of war<ref name=TipToe>[https://www.clausewitzstudies.org/mobile/trinity8.htm Tip-Toe Through the Trinity: The Strange Persistence of Trinitarian Warfare] by Christopher Bassford</ref>
* philosophical distinctions between "[[absolute war]]," "ideal war," and "real war"
* in "real war," the distinctive poles of a) limited objectives (political and/or military) and b) war to "render the enemy helpless"
* the idea that war and its conduct belong fundamentally to the social realm rather than to the realms of art or science
* "strategy" belongs primarily to the realm of art, but is constrained by quantitative analyses of political benefits versus military costs & losses
* "tactics" belongs primarily to the realm of science (most obvious in the development of siege warfare)
* the importance of "moral forces" (more than simply "morale") as opposed to quantifiable physical elements
* the "military virtues" of professional armies (which do not necessarily trump the rather different virtues of other kinds of fighting forces)
* conversely, the very real effects of a superiority in numbers and "mass"
* the essential unpredictability of war
* the "fog of war"{{refn |group=note |"[T]he great uncertainty of all data in war is a peculiar difficulty, because all action must, to a certain extent, be planned in a mere twilight, which in addition not unfrequently—like the effect of a fog or moonshine—gives to things exaggerated dimensions and an unnatural appearance."<ref name=OnWar1873/>{{rp|Vol. I p. 54}}}}
* "friction" – the disparity between the ideal performance of units, organisations or systems and their actual performance in real-world scenarios (Book I, Chapter VII)
* strategic and operational "[[center of gravity (military)|centers of gravity]]"{{refn|group=note|"As the centre of gravity is always situated where the greatest mass of matter is collected, and as a shock against the center of gravity of a body always produces the greatest effect, and further, as the most effective blow is struck with the center of gravity of the power used, so it is also in war. The armed forces of every belligerent, whether of a single state or of an alliance of states, have a certain unity, and in that way, connection; but where connection is there come in analogies of the center of gravity. There are, therefore, in these armed forces certain centers of gravity, the movement and direction of which decide upon other points, and these centers of gravity are situated where the greatest bodies of troops are assembled. But just as, in the world of inert matter, the action against the center of gravity has its measure and limits in the connection of the parts, so it is in war, and here as well as there the force exerted may easily be greater than the resistance requires, and then there is a blow in the air, a waste of force."<ref name="OnWar1873"/>{{rp|Vol. II p. 180}}}}
* the "[[culminating point]] of the offensive"
* the "culminating point of victory"

==Interpretation and misinterpretation==
Clausewitz used a [[dialectical]] method to construct his argument, leading to frequent misinterpretation of his ideas. British military theorist [[B. H. Liddell Hart]] contends that the enthusiastic acceptance by the [[Prussia]]n military establishment—especially [[Helmuth von Moltke the Elder|Moltke the Elder]], a former student of Clausewitz<ref>{{cite book |page=35
|url=https://www.google.com/books/edition/_/bI5CAAAAIAAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&pg=GBS.PA35 |title=Moltke: His Life and His Character: Sketched in Journals, Letters, Memoirs, a Novel, and Autobiographical Notes |translator-first=Mary |translator-last=Herms |publisher=Harper & Brothers Franklin Square |location=New York |year=1892 |last=Moltke |first=Helmuth
}}</ref>—of what they believed to be Clausewitz's ideas, and the subsequent widespread adoption of the Prussian military system worldwide, had a deleterious effect on [[military theory]] and [[warfare|practice]], due to their egregious misinterpretation of his ideas:

{{blockquote|As so often happens, Clausewitz's disciples carried his teaching to an extreme which their master had not intended.... [Clausewitz's] theory of war was expounded in a way too abstract and involved for ordinary soldier-minds, essentially concrete, to follow the course of his argument—which often turned back from the direction in which it was apparently leading.  Impressed yet befogged, they grasped at his vivid leading phrases, seeing only their surface meaning, and missing the deeper current of his thought.<ref>[[B. H. Liddell Hart|Liddell Hart, B. H.]] ''Strategy'' London:Faber, 1967. Second rev. ed.</ref>}}

As described by [[Christopher Bassford]], then-professor of strategy at the [[National War College]] of the United States:

{{blockquote|One of the main sources of confusion about Clausewitz's approach lies in his dialectical method of presentation. For example, Clausewitz's famous line that "War is the continuation of policy with other means," ("{{lang|de|Der Krieg ist eine bloße Fortsetzung der Politik mit anderen Mitteln}}") while accurate as far as it goes, was not intended as a statement of fact. It is the antithesis in a dialectical argument whose thesis is the point—made earlier in the analysis—that "war is nothing but a duel [or wrestling match, the extended metaphor in which that discussion was embedded] on a larger scale." His synthesis, which resolves the deficiencies of these two bold statements, says that war is neither "nothing but" an act of brute force nor "merely" a rational act of politics or policy. This synthesis lies in his "fascinating trinity" [{{lang|de|wunderliche Dreifaltigkeit}}]: a dynamic, inherently unstable interaction of the forces of violent emotion, chance, and rational calculation.<ref name=ClausewitzDotComBio />}}

Another example of this confusion is the idea that Clausewitz was a proponent of [[total war]] as used in the Third Reich's propaganda in the 1940s. In fact, Clausewitz never used the term "total war": rather, he discussed "absolute war," a concept which evolved into the much more abstract notion of "ideal war" discussed at the very beginning of {{lang|de|Vom Kriege}}—the purely ''logical'' result of the forces underlying a "pure," Platonic "ideal" of war.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Bassford |first=Christopher |date=15 February 2022 |title=Clausewitz's Categories of War and the Supersession of 'Absolute War' |url=http://www.clausewitz.com/mobile/Bassford-Supersession5.pdf |access-date=26 October 2022 |website=Clausewitz |archive-date=11 December 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221211092848/https://www.clausewitz.com/mobile/Bassford-Supersession5.pdf |url-status=dead }}</ref> In what he called a "logical fantasy," war cannot be waged in a limited way: the rules of competition will force participants to use all means at their disposal to achieve victory. But in the ''real world,'' he said, such rigid logic is unrealistic and dangerous. As a practical matter, the military objectives in ''real'' war that support political objectives generally fall into two broad types: limited aims or the effective "disarming" of the enemy "to render [him] politically helpless or militarily impotent. Thus, the complete defeat of the enemy may not be necessary, desirable, or even possible.<ref>{{cite book|first1=Hal |last1=Brands|first2=Jeremi |last2=Suri|title=The Power of the Past: History and Statecraft|url=https://www.google.com/books/edition/_/D03DCQAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&pg=PA147|year=2015|publisher=Brookings Institution Press|page=147|isbn=978-0815727132}}</ref>

According to [[Azar Gat]], the opposing interpretations of Clausewitz are rooted in Clausewitz’s own conceptual journey.<ref name=":2" /><ref name=":1">{{Cite book |last=Gat |first=Azar |title=The Clausewitz myth: or the emperor's new clothes |date=2024 |publisher=John Hunt Publishing |isbn=978-1-80341-621-2 |location=Washington}}</ref> The centerpiece of Clausewitz’s theory of war throughout his life was his concept of all-out fighting and energetic conduct leading to the great battle of annihilation. He believed such conduct expressed the very “nature”, or “lasting spirit” of war. Accordingly, Clausewitz disparaged the significance of the [[Maneuver warfare|maneuver]], surprise, and cunning in war, as distracting from the centrality of [[battle]],<ref>''On War'', IV, 3, pp. 228-229; III, 9, p. 198; III, 10, p. 202.</ref> and argued that defense was legitimate only if and as long as one was weaker than the enemy.<ref>''On War'', VI, 1, 2, pp. 358-359; VI, 8, p. 380, and VII, 2, p. 524.</ref> Nevertheless, in the last years of his life, after the first six out of the eight books of ''On War'' had already been drafted, Clausewitz came to recognize that this concept was not universal and did not even apply to the [[Napoleonic Wars]], the supreme model of his theory of war. This was demonstrated by the [[Peninsular War|Spanish]] and [[French invasion of Russia|Russian]] campaigns and by [[guerrilla warfare]], in all of which battle was systematically avoided. Consequently, from 1827 on, Clausewitz recognized the legitimacy of [[limited war]] and explained it by the influence of politics that harnessed the unlimited nature of war to serve its objectives. Clausewitz died in 1831 before he completed the revision he planned along these lines. He incorporated his new ideas only into the end of Book VI, Book VIII and the beginning of Book I of ''On War''. As a result, when published, ''On War'' encompassed both his old and new ideas, at odds with each other.

Thus, against common interpretations of ''On War'', Gat points out that Clausewitz's transformed views regarding the relationship between politics and war and the admission of limited war into his theory constituted a U-turn against his own life-long fundamental view of the nature of war. Gat further argues the readers’ miscomprehension of the theory in ''On War'' as complete and dialectical, rather than a draft undergoing a radical change of mind, has thus generated a range of reactions. People of each age have found in ''On War'' the Clausewitz who suited their own views on war and its conduct. Between 1870 and 1914, he was celebrated mainly for his insistence on the clash of forces and the decisive battle, and his emphasis on moral forces. By contrast, after 1945, during the [[Atomic Age|nuclear age]], his reputation has reached a second pinnacle for his later acceptance of the primacy of politics and the concept of limited war.

Referring to much of the current interpretation of ''On War'' as the [[The Emperor's New Clothes|Emperor's New Clothes]] syndrome, Gat argues that instead of critically addressing the puzzling contradictions in ''On War,'' Clausewitz has been set in stone and could not be wrong.

In modern times the reconstruction of Clausewitzian theory has been a matter of much dispute. One analysis was that of [[Panagiotis Kondylis]], a Greek writer and philosopher, who opposed the interpretations of [[Raymond Aron]] in ''Penser la Guerre, Clausewitz,'' and other liberal writers. According to Aron, Clausewitz was one of the first writers to condemn the militarism of the Prussian general staff and its war-proneness, based on Clausewitz's argument that "war is a continuation of policy by other means." In ''Theory of War,'' Kondylis claims that this is inconsistent with Clausewitzian thought. He claims that Clausewitz was morally indifferent to war (though this probably reflects a lack of familiarity with personal letters from Clausewitz, which demonstrate an acute awareness of war's tragic aspects) and that his advice regarding politics' dominance over the conduct of war has nothing to do with pacifist ideas.

Other notable writers who have studied Clausewitz's texts and translated them into English are historians [[Peter Paret]] of the [[Institute for Advanced Study]] and [[Michael Howard (historian)|Sir Michael Howard]]. Howard and Paret edited the most widely used edition of ''On War'' (Princeton University Press, 1976/1984) and have produced comparative studies of Clausewitz and other theorists, such as Tolstoy. [[Bernard Brodie (military strategist)|Bernard Brodie]]'s ''A Guide to the Reading of "On War,"'' in the 1976 Princeton translation, expressed his interpretations of the Prussian's theories and provided students with an influential synopsis of this vital work. The 1873 translation by Colonel James John Graham was heavily—and controversially—edited by the philosopher, musician, and [[game theory|game theorist]] [[Anatol Rapoport]].

The British military historian [[John Keegan]] attacked Clausewitz's theory in his book ''[[A History of Warfare]]''.<ref>John Keegan, ''[[A History of Warfare]],'' 1993. Second edition 2004, p. 3.</ref> Keegan argued that Clausewitz assumed the existence of states, yet 'war antedates the state, diplomacy and strategy by many millennia.'

==Influence==
Clausewitz died without completing ''Vom Kriege,'' but despite this his ideas have been widely influential in [[military theory]] and have had a strong influence on German military thought specifically. Later Prussian and German generals, such as [[Helmuth von Moltke the Elder|Helmuth Graf von Moltke]], were clearly influenced by Clausewitz: Moltke's widely quoted statement that "No operational plan extends with high certainty beyond the first encounter with the main enemy force" is a classic reflection of Clausewitz's insistence on the roles of chance, friction, "fog," uncertainty, and interactivity in war.<ref name=ClausewitzInEnglish>{{cite book|first=Christopher |last=Bassford|title=Clausewitz in English: The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America, 1815–1945|url=https://www.google.com/books/edition/_/zmCpdoajce0C?hl=en&gbpv=1&pg=PA20|year=1994|publisher=Oxford UP|pages=20–21|isbn=978-0195083835}}</ref>{{rp|20–21}}

Clausewitz's influence spread to British thinking as well, though at first more as a historian and analyst than as a theorist.<ref name=ClausewitzInEnglish /> See for example Wellington's extended essay discussing Clausewitz's study of the Campaign of 1815—Wellington's only serious written discussion of the battle, which was widely discussed in 19th-century Britain. Clausewitz's broader thinking came to the fore following Britain's military embarrassments in the Boer War (1899–1902). One example of a heavy Clausewitzian influence in that era is [[Spenser Wilkinson]], journalist, the first [[Chichele Professor of Military History]] at Oxford University, and perhaps the most prominent military analyst in Britain from {{circa|1885}} until well into the interwar period. Another is naval historian [[Julian Corbett]] (1854–1922), whose work reflected a deep if idiosyncratic adherence to Clausewitz's concepts and frequently an emphasis on Clausewitz's ideas about 'limited objectives' and the inherent strengths of the defensive form of war. Corbett's practical strategic views were often in prominent public conflict with Wilkinson's—see, for example, Wilkinson's article "Strategy at Sea", ''The Morning Post'', 12 February 1912. Following the First World War, however, the influential British military commentator [[B. H. Liddell Hart]] in the 1920s erroneously attributed to him the doctrine of "total war" that during the First World War had been embraced by many European general staffs and emulated by the British. More recent scholars typically see that war as so confused in terms of political rationale that it in fact contradicts much of ''On War.''<ref>{{cite journal | last = Strachan | first = Hew | year = 2011 | title = Clausewitz and the First World War | journal = Journal of Military History | volume = 75 | issue = 2| pages = 367–391 }}</ref> That view assumes, however, a set of values as to what constitutes "rational" political objectives—in this case, values not shaped by the fervid [[Social Darwinism]] that was rife in 1914 Europe. One of the most influential British Clausewitzians today is [[Colin S. Gray]]; historian [[Hew Strachan]] (like Wilkinson also the [[Chichele Professor of Military History]] at Oxford University, since 2001) has been an energetic proponent of the ''study'' of Clausewitz, but his own views on Clausewitz's ideas are somewhat ambivalent.

With some interesting exceptions (e.g., [[John McAuley Palmer (general)|John McAuley Palmer]], [[Robert Matteson Johnston|Robert M. Johnston]], Hoffman Nickerson), Clausewitz had little influence on American military thought before 1945 other than via British writers, though Generals [[Eisenhower]] and [[Patton]] were avid readers of English translations. He did influence [[Karl Marx]], [[Friedrich Engels]], [[Vladimir Lenin]], [[Leon Trotsky]],<ref name=Cormier>Cormier, Youri. War As Paradox: Clausewitz & Hegel on Fighting Doctrines and Ethics, (Montreal & Kingston: McGill Queen's University Press, 2016) http://www.mqup.ca/war-as-paradox-products-9780773547698.php</ref> {{rp|233–260}} [[Võ Nguyên Giáp]],<ref>T. Derbent: Giap et Clausewitz, éditions ADEN, Bruxelles 2006.</ref> [[Ferdinand Foch]],<ref>Shirer, p. 80</ref> and [[Mao Zedong]], and thus the Communist Soviet and Chinese traditions, as Lenin emphasized the inevitability of wars among capitalist states in the age of imperialism and presented the armed struggle of the working class as the only path toward the eventual elimination of war.<ref>Kipp, Joseph W. [https://www.jstor.org/stable/1987539 "Lenin and Clausewitz: the Militarization of Marxism, 1914–1921."] ''Military Affairs'' 1985 49(4): 184–191. {{ISSN|0026-3931}}. In JSTOR</ref> Because [[Vladimir Lenin|Lenin]] was an admirer of Clausewitz and called him "one of the great military writers," his influence on the Red Army was immense.<ref name="Mertsalov, A.N. pages 11-19">Mertsalov, A.N. "Jomini versus Clausewitz" pp. 11–19 from ''Russia War, Peace and Diplomacy'' edited by Mark and Ljubica Erickson, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2004 p. 16.</ref> The Russian historian A.N. Mertsalov commented that "It was an irony of fate that the view in the USSR was that it was Lenin who shaped the attitude towards Clausewitz, and that Lenin's dictum that war is a continuation of politics is taken from the work of this [allegedly] anti-humanist anti-revolutionary."<ref name="Mertsalov, A.N. pages 11-19"/> The American mathematician [[Anatol Rapoport]] wrote in 1968 that Clausewitz as interpreted by Lenin formed the basis of all Soviet military thinking since 1917, and quoted the remarks by [[Marshal of the Soviet Union|Marshal]] [[Vasily Sokolovsky|V.D. Sokolovsky]]:

{{blockquote|In describing the essence of war, Marxism-Leninism takes as its point of departure the premise that war is not an aim in itself, but rather a tool of politics. In his remarks on Clausewitz's ''On War,'' Lenin stressed that "Politics is the reason, and war is only the tool, not the other way around. Consequently, it remains only to subordinate the military point of view to the political."<ref name=Rapoport>Rapoport, Anatol "Introduction" pp. 11–82 from ''On War,'' London: Penguin, 1968.</ref>{{rp|37}}}}

[[Henry A. Kissinger]], however, described Lenin's approach as being that politics is a continuation of war by other means, thus turning Clausewitz's argument "on its head."<ref name=ClausewitzInEnglish />{{rp|198}}

Rapoport argued that:

{{blockquote|As for Lenin's approval of Clausewitz, it probably stems from his obsession with the struggle for power. The whole Marxist conception of history is that of successive struggles for power, primarily between social classes. This was constantly applied by Lenin in a variety of contexts. Thus the entire history of philosophy appears in Lenin's writings as a vast struggle between "idealism" and "materialism." The fate of the socialist movement was to be decided by a struggle between the revolutionists and the reformers. Clausewitz's acceptance of the struggle for power as the essence of international politics must have impressed Lenin as starkly realistic.<ref name=Rapoport />{{rp|37–38}}}}

Clausewitz directly influenced Mao Zedong, who read ''On War'' in 1938 and organised a seminar on Clausewitz for the Party leadership in [[Yan'an]]. Thus the "Clausewitzian" content in many of Mao's writings is not merely a regurgitation of Lenin but reflects Mao's own study.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Zhang|first1=Yuanlin|year=1999|title=Mao Zedongs Bezugnahme auf Clausewitz|journal=Archiv für Kulturgeschichte|volume=81|issue=2|pages=443–471|doi=10.7788/akg.1999.81.2.443|s2cid=183164307}}</ref> The idea that war involves inherent "friction" that distorts, to a greater or lesser degree, all prior arrangements, has become common currency in fields such as business strategy and sport. The phrase ''fog of war'' derives from Clausewitz's stress on how confused warfare can seem while one is immersed within it.<ref>{{cite book | last = Berkun | first = Scott | title = The Art of Project Management | isbn = 978-0-596-00786-7 | year = 2005 | publisher = OŔeilly | location = Beijing | url-access = registration | url = https://archive.org/details/isbn_9780596007867 }}</ref> The term [[Center of gravity (military)|center of gravity]], used in a military context derives from Clausewitz's usage, which he took from [[Newtonian mechanics]]. In U.S. military doctrine, "center of gravity" refers to the basis of an opponent's power at the operational, strategic, or political level, though this is only one aspect of Clausewitz's use of the term.<ref>{{cite book|author=Joseph W Graham|title=What the U. S. Military Can Do to Defeat Terrorism|url=https://www.google.com/books/edition/_/9hxB-FA5a5gC?hl=en&gbpv=1&pg=PA7|date= 2002|page=7|publisher=iUniverse |isbn=978-0595222599}}</ref>

===Late 20th and early 21st century===
The deterrence strategy of the United States in the 1950s was closely inspired by President [[Dwight Eisenhower]]'s reading of Clausewitz as a young officer in the 1920s. Eisenhower was greatly impressed by Clausewitz's example of a theoretical, idealized "absolute war" in ''Vom Kriege'' as a way of demonstrating how absurd it would be to attempt such a strategy in practice. For Eisenhower, the age of nuclear weapons had made what was for Clausewitz in the early-19th century only a theoretical vision an all too real possibility in the mid-20th century. From Eisenhower's viewpoint, the best deterrent to war was to show the world just how appalling and horrific a nuclear "absolute war" would be if it should ever occur, hence a series of much-publicized nuclear tests in the Pacific, giving first priority in the defense budget to nuclear weapons and to their delivery-systems over conventional weapons, and making repeated statements in public that the United States was able and willing at all times to use nuclear weapons. In this way, through the [[massive retaliation]] doctrine and the closely related foreign-policy concept of [[brinkmanship]], Eisenhower hoped to hold out a credible vision of Clausewitzian nuclear "absolute war" in order to deter the Soviet Union and/or China from ever risking a war or even conditions that might lead to a war with the United States.<ref>Gaddis, John Lewis ''We Now Know'', Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998 [1997], pp. 233–234.</ref>

{{blockquote|...Philanthropists may easily imagine there is a skillful method of disarming and overcoming an enemy without causing great bloodshed, and that this is the proper tendency of the art of War. However plausible this may appear, still it is an error which must be extirpated; for in such dangerous things as war, the errors which proceed from a spirit of benevolence are just the worst. As the use of physical power to the utmost extent by no means excludes the co-operation of the intelligence, it follows that he who uses force unsparingly, without reference to the quantity of bloodshed, must obtain a superiority if his adversary does not act likewise. By such means the former dictates the law to the latter, and both proceed to extremities, to which the only limitations are those imposed by the amount of counteracting force on each side.|author= Clausewitz |source= ''On War'', Book I, Chapter 1<ref name=OnWar1873 />{{rp|Vol. I, pp. 1–2}}}}

After 1970, some theorists claimed that [[nuclear proliferation]] made Clausewitzian concepts obsolete after the 20th-century period in which they dominated the world.<ref>{{cite journal | author = Sheppard, John E. Jr. | title = On War: Is Clausewitz Still Relevant? | journal = Parameters | volume = 20 | issue = 3 | date = September 1990 | pages = 85–99 }}</ref> John E. Sheppard Jr., argues that by developing nuclear weapons, state-based conventional armies simultaneously both perfected their original purpose, to destroy a mirror image of themselves, and made themselves obsolete. No two [[nuclear powers|powers]] have used nuclear weapons against each other, instead using [[diplomacy]], [[conventional warfare|conventional means]], or [[proxy wars]] to settle disputes. If such a conflict did occur, presumably both combatants would be [[Mutually assured destruction|annihilated]]. Heavily influenced by the war in Vietnam and by antipathy to American strategist [[Henry Kissinger]], the American biologist, musician, and game-theorist [[Anatol Rapoport]] argued in 1968 that a Clausewitzian view of war was not only obsolete in the age of nuclear weapons, but also highly dangerous as it promoted a "zero-sum paradigm" to international relations and a "dissolution of rationality" amongst decision-makers.<ref name=Rapoport />{{rp|73–77}}

The end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century have seen many instances of state armies attempting to suppress [[insurgency|insurgencies]] and [[terrorism]], and engaging in other forms of [[asymmetrical warfare]]. Clausewitz did not focus solely on wars between countries with well-defined armies. The era of the French Revolution and Napoleon was full of revolutions, rebellions, and violence by "non-state actors" - witness the wars in the French Vendée and in Spain. Clausewitz wrote a series of "Lectures on Small War" and studied the [[War in the Vendée|rebellion in the Vendée]] (1793–1796) and the Tyrolean uprising of 1809. In his famous "Bekenntnisdenkschrift" of 1812 he called for a "Spanish war in Germany" and laid out a comprehensive guerrilla strategy to be waged against Napoleon. In ''On War'' he included a famous chapter on "The People in Arms".<ref>{{cite book|author=[[Reiner Pommerin]]|title=Clausewitz Goes Global: Carl von Clausewitz in the 21st century |url= https://www.google.com/books/edition/_/3UTaAgAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&pg=PA293|year=2014|page=293|publisher=BoD – Books on Demand |isbn=978-3937885780}}</ref>

One prominent critic of Clausewitz is the Israeli military historian [[Martin van Creveld]]. In his 1991 book ''The Transformation of War'',<ref>Martin van Creveld, ''The Transformation of War: The Most Radical Reinterpretation of Armed Conflict Since Clausewitz'' (New York: The Free Press, 1991).</ref> Creveld argued that Clausewitz's famous "Trinity" of people, army, and government was an obsolete socio-political construct based on the state, which was rapidly passing from the scene as the key player in war, and that he (Creveld) had constructed a new "non-trinitarian" model for modern warfare. Creveld's work has had great influence. Daniel Moran replied, 'The most egregious misrepresentation of Clausewitz's famous metaphor must be that of Martin van Creveld, who has declared Clausewitz to be an apostle of Trinitarian War, by which he means, incomprehensibly, a war of 'state against state and army against army,' from which the influence of the people is entirely excluded."<ref>Daniel Moran, "Clausewitz on Waterloo: Napoleon at Bay", in Carl von Clausewitz and Arthur Wellesley, 1st Duke of Wellington, ''On Waterloo: Clausewitz, Wellington, and the Campaign of 1815'', ed./trans. Christopher Bassford, Daniel Moran, and Gregory W. Pedlow (Clausewitz.com, 2010), p. 242, n. 11.</ref> Christopher Bassford went further, noting that one need only ''read'' the paragraph in which Clausewitz defined his Trinity to see <blockquote>"that the words 'people,' 'army,' and 'government' appear nowhere at all in the list of the Trinity's components.... Creveld's and Keegan's assault on Clausewitz's Trinity is not only a classic 'blow into the air,' i.e., an assault on a position Clausewitz doesn't occupy. It is also a pointless attack on a concept that is quite useful in its own right. In any case, their failure to read the actual wording of the theory they so vociferously attack, and to grasp its deep relevance to the phenomena they describe, is hard to credit."<ref name=TipToe /></blockquote>

Some have gone further and suggested that Clausewitz's best-known aphorism, that war is a continuation of policy with other means, is not only irrelevant today but also inapplicable historically.<ref>See for instance John Keegan, ''A History of Warfare'' (New York: Knopf, 1993), ''passim''.</ref> For an opposing view see the sixteen essays presented in ''Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century'' edited by [[Hew Strachan]] and Andreas Herberg-Rothe.<ref>{{cite book |editor1-first= Hew |editor1-last= Strachan |editor2-first= Andreas |editor2-last= Herberg-Rothe |title= Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century: Proceedings of a March, 2005 conference at Oxford |publisher= Oxford University Press |year= 2007 }}</ref>

In military academies, schools, and universities worldwide, Clausewitz's ''Vom Kriege'' is often (usually in translation) mandatory reading.<ref>Giuseppe Caforio, ''Social sciences and the military: an interdisciplinary overview'' (2006) p. 221</ref>

Some theorists of [[management]] look to Clausewitz  - just as some look to [[Sun Tzu]] - to bolster ideas on the concept of [[leadership]].<ref>
For example:
{{cite book
 |last1                = Paley
 |first1               = Norton
 |date                 = 8 May 2014
 |title                = Clausewitz Talks Business: An Executive's Guide to Thinking Like a Strategist
 |url                  = https://books.google.com/books?id=kpt_AwAAQBAJ
 |publication-place    = Boca Raton
 |publisher            = CRC Press
 |page                 = 224
 |isbn                 = 9781482220278
 |access-date          = 29 February 2024
 |quote                = Strategy Guideline 7: Develop Leadership Skills
}} 
</ref><ref>
Compare:
{{cite book
 |last1                = Coker
 |first1               = Christopher
 |author-link1         = Christopher Coker
 |date                 = 15 May 2017
 |title                = Rebooting Clausewitz: 'On War' in the Twenty-First Century
 |url                  = https://books.google.com/books?id=_ispDwAAQBAJ
 |publication-place    = New York
 |publisher            = Oxford University Press
 |page                 = xx
 |isbn                 = 9780190862749
 |access-date          = 29 February 2024
 |quote                = Had [Clausewitz] lived in the twenty-first century he could have expected to [...] have seen his book go into several editions. Perhaps his work would be raided by editors in search of an endless series of quotes. Perhaps while browsing airport bookshops we would find books with titles such as ''Clausewitz's Six Leadership Lessons'' [...].
}} 
</ref>

==See also==
* [[August Otto Rühle von Lilienstern]] – Prussian officer from whom Clausewitz allegedly took, without acknowledgement, several important ideas (including that about war as pursuing political aims) made famous in ''On War''. However, substantial basis for assuming common influences exist, most prominently [[Gerhard von Scharnhorst|Scharnhorst]], who was Clausewitz's "second father" and professional mentor. This provokes skepticism of the claim the ideas were plagiarized from Lilienstern.

{{div col}}
* [[Famous military writers]]
** [[Niccolò Machiavelli]] – ''[[The Prince]]''
** [[Antoine-Henri Jomini]]
** [[B.H. Liddell Hart]]
** [[Sun Tzu]]
** [[Maurice de Saxe]]
* [[Absolute war]]
* [[Operation Clausewitz]]
* [[Philosophy of war]]
* [[Principles of War]]
* [[Strategic studies]]
* [[U.S. Army Strategist]]
{{div col end}}

==References==
===Informational notes===
{{reflist|group=note}}

===Citations===
{{Reflist}}

==Further reading==
{{Refbegin|30em}}
* See massive Clausewitz bibliographies in English, French, German, etc., on [http://www.clausewitz.com/mobile/bibl.htm ''The Clausewitz Homepage'' bibliography section].
* [[Raymond Aron|Aron, Raymond]].  ''Clausewitz: Philosopher of War.'' (1985). 418 pp. {{ISBN|0671628267}} {{OCLC|13702496}}
* [[Christopher Bassford|Bassford, Christopher]]. ''[http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Bassford/CIE/TOC.htm Clausewitz in English: The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America, 1815–1945].'' New York: Oxford University Press, 1994. {{ISBN|0195083830}} {{OCLC|27811623}}
* Christopher Bassford, "[http://www.clausewitz.com/mobile/trinity8.htm Tiptoe Through the Trinity: The Strange Persistence of Trinitarian Warfare]." Working paper.
* Christopher Bassford, "[http://www.clausewitz.com/mobile/Bassford-Supersession5.pdf Clausewitz's Categories of War and the Supersession of 'Absolute War'] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180417141040/http://www.clausewitz.com/mobile/Bassford-Supersession5.pdf |date=2018-04-17 }}" (Clausewitz.com). This is a 'working paper' first posted in 2016."
* {{cite EB1911|wstitle= Clausewitz, Karl von | volume= 06 | page = 467 }}
* [http://www.mqup.ca/war-as-paradox-products-9780773547698.php Cormier, Youri]. "Fighting Doctrines and Revolutionary Ethics" Journal of Military and Security Studies, Vol 15, No 1 (2013) https://web.archive.org/web/20140729225332/http://jmss.synergiesprairies.ca/jmss/index.php/jmss/article/view/519
* {{cite journal|doi=10.1080/07075332.2013.859166|title=Hegel and Clausewitz: Convergence on Method, Divergence on Ethics|year=2014|last1=Cormier|first1=Youri|journal=The International History Review|volume=36|issue=3|pages=419–442|s2cid=143665195}}
* [http://www.mqup.ca/war-as-paradox-products-9780773547698.php Cormier, Youri]. War As Paradox: Clausewitz & Hegel on Fighting Doctrines and Ethics, (Montreal & Kingston: McGill Queen's University Press, 2016) pp.&nbsp;183–232
* {{cite journal|doi=10.1080/01402390.2018.1529567|title=Clausewitz and the politics of war: A contemporary theory|year=2018|last1=Dimitriu|first1=George|journal=Journal of Strategic Studies|volume=43|issue=5|pages=1–41|doi-access=free}}
* Donker, Paul. "[https://www.clausewitzstudies.org/bibl/DonkerP-TheEvolutionOfClausewitzsVomKriege.pdf The Evolution of Clausewitz's ''Vom Kriege'': a reconstruction on the basis of the earlier versions of his masterpiece]." Trans. Paul Donker and Christopher Bassford, ClausewitzStudies.org, August 2019. Originally "Die Entwicklung von Clausewitz' Vom Kriege: Eine Rekonstruktion auf der Grundlage der  früheren  Fassungen  seines  Meisterwerks," in  the Clausewitz-Gesellschaft's Jahrbuch2017, pp.&nbsp;14–39.
* Echevarria, Antulio J., II.  ''After Clausewitz: German Military Thinkers before the Great War.'' (2001). 346 pp. {{ISBN|0700610715}} {{OCLC|44516530}}
* {{cite book|doi=10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231911.001.0001|title=Clausewitz and Contemporary War|year=2007|last1=Echevarria II|first1=Antulio J.|isbn=978-0199231911}}
* Gat, Azar. ''The Origins of Military Thought from the Enlightenment to Clausewitz'' (1989) {{ISBN|0198229488}} {{OCLC|18779344}}
* Gat, Azar. ''A history of military thought: from the Enlightenment to the Cold War'' (2001) {{ISBN|9780199247622}} {{OCLC|47726917}}
* Gat, Azar. ''The Clausewitz Myth: Or the Emperor's New Clothes'' (2024) {{ISBN|9781803416212}} {{OCLC|1414370867}}
* Handel, Michael I., ed.  ''Clausewitz and Modern Strategy.'' 1986. 324 pp. {{ISBN|0714632945}} {{OCLC| 13214672}}
* Handel, Michael I. ''Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought.'' (2001) 482 pages. Based on comparison of Clausewitz's ''On War'' with Sun Tzu's ''The Art of War'' {{ISBN|0714681326}} {{OCLC| 318033033}}
* Heuser, Beatrice.  ''Reading Clausewitz.'' (2002). 238 pages, {{ISBN|0-7126-6484-X}}
* {{cite journal|doi=10.1080/01402391003603623|title=Small Wars in the Age of Clausewitz: The Watershed Between Partisan War and People's War|year=2010|last1=Heuser|first1=Beatrice|journal=Journal of Strategic Studies|volume=33|pages=139–162|s2cid=154880399}}
* {{cite journal|doi=10.1080/01402390701210855|title=Planning versus Chaos in Clausewitz's ''On'' War|year=2007|last1=Holmes|first1=Terence M.|journal=Journal of Strategic Studies|volume=30|pages=129–151|s2cid=44042550|citeseerx=10.1.1.472.9658}}
* [[Sir Michael Howard]], ''Clausewitz'', 1983 [originally a volume in the Oxford University Press "Past Masters" series, reissued in 2000 as ''Clausewitz: A Very Short Introduction'']. {{ISBN|0-192-87608-2}} {{OCLC|8709266}}
* {{cite journal|doi=10.1177/096834459400100305|title=John Keegan and the Grand Tradition of Trashing Clausewitz: A Polemic|year=1994|last1=Bassford|first1=Christopher|journal=War in History|volume=1|issue=3|pages=319–336|s2cid=162660742}}
** See critique of Keegan's arguments by Christopher Bassford, "[http://www.clausewitz.com/mobile/keegandelenda.htm John Keegan and the Grand Tradition of Trashing Clausewitz: A Polemic]," ''War in History'', November 1994, pp.&nbsp;319–336.
* {{cite book|doi=10.4324/9780203089125|title=Clausewitz and America|year=2009|last1=Kinross|first1=Stuart|isbn=978-0203089125}}
* {{cite journal|doi=10.2979/GSO.2009.3.1.18|title=How to do Things with Clausewitz|year=2009|last1=Mieszkowski|first1=Jan|journal=The Global South|volume=3|pages=18–29|s2cid=143627760}}
* Mertsalov, A.N. "Jomini versus Clausewitz" pp.&nbsp;11–19 from ''Russia War, Peace and Diplomacy'' edited by Mark and Ljubica Erickson, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2004, {{ISBN|0-297-84913-1}}.
* Paret, Peter. [http://www.berghahnbooks.com/title.php?rowtag=ParetClausewitz''Clausewitz in His Time: Essays in the Cultural and Intellectual History of Thinking about War'']. New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2015.
* {{cite journal|doi=10.1353/hsp.0.0118|title=Two Historians on Defeat in War and Its Causes|year=2010|last1=Peter Paret|journal=Historically Speaking|volume=11|issue=3|pages=2–8|s2cid=162357305}}
* Paret, Peter. ''Clausewitz and the State: The Man, His Theories, and His Times''. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976.
* {{cite journal|doi=10.1353/jhi.2004.0021|title=From Ideal to Ambiguity: Johannes von Muller, Clausewitz, and the People in Arms|year=2004|last1=Paret|first1=Peter|journal=Journal of the History of Ideas|volume=65|pages=101–111|s2cid=143173095}}
* {{cite journal|doi=10.2307/3093268|jstor=3093268|title=Clausewitz, Genius, and the Rules|year=2002|last1=Rogers|first1=Clifford J.|journal=The Journal of Military History|volume=66|issue=4|pages=1167–1176}}
* Paul Roques, Le général de Clausewitz. Sa vie et sa théorie de la guerre, Paris, Editions Astrée, 2013. {{ISBN|979-10-91815-01-7}} http://www.editions-astree.fr/BC/Bon_de_commande_Roques.pdf
* [[Hans Rothfels|Rothfels, Hans]] "Clausewitz" pp.&nbsp;93–113 from ''The Makers of Modern Strategy'' edited by Edward Mead Earle, [[Gordon A. Craig]] & [[Felix Gilbert]], Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1943.
* {{cite journal|doi=10.1080/09557571.2013.872600|title=A social theory of war: Clausewitz and war reconsidered|year=2015|last1=Sharma|first1=Vivek Swaroop|journal=Cambridge Review of International Affairs|volume=28|issue=3|pages=327–347|s2cid=144039698|url=https://www.researchgate.net/publication/271941186}}
* Smith, Hugh.  ''On Clausewitz: A Study of Military and Political Ideas.'' (2005). 303 pp.
* Stoker, Donald J. ''Clausewitz: His Life and Work'' (Oxford UP, 2014) 376 pp.  [https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=42780 online review]; also [https://www.amazon.com/Clausewitz-Life-Work-Donald-Stoker/dp/0199357943/  excerpt]
* {{cite book|doi=10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199232024.001.0001|title=Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century|year=2007|isbn=978-0199232024|editor1-last=Strachan|editor1-first=Hew|editor2-last=Herberg-Rothe|editor2-first=Andreas}}
* Strachan, Hew, and Andreas Herberg-Rothe, eds. ''Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century'' (2007) [https://www.amazon.com/dp/0199232024/ excerpt and text search]
* {{cite journal|doi=10.2307/2677163|jstor=2677163|title=The Relationship of History and Theory in on War: The Clausewitzian Ideal and Its Implications|year=2001|last1=Sumida|first1=Jon Tetsuro|journal=The Journal of Military History|volume=65|issue=2|pages=333–354}}
* Sumida, Jon Tetsuro. ''Decoding Clausewitz: A New Approach to On War'' Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2008. {{ISBN|978-0700616169}} {{OCLC| 213765799}}
* Villacres, Edward J. and Bassford, Christopher. [http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Bassford/Trinity/TRININTR.htm "Reclaiming the Clausewitzian Trinity"]. Parameters, Autumn 95,  pp.&nbsp;9–19,
* [[Jehuda L. Wallach|Wallach, Jehuda L.]] ''The Dogma of the Battle of Annihilation: The Theories of Clausewitz and Schlieffen and Their Impact on the German Conduct of Two World Wars.'' (1986).
* {{cite journal |last=Waldman |first=Thomas |year=2012 |title=Clausewitz and the Study of War |journal=Defence Studies |volume=13 |issue=3 |pages=345–374 |issn=1470-2436|doi=10.1080/14702436.2012.703843 |s2cid=153486360 }}
*{{cite journal|url=https://www.militarystrategymagazine.com/article/clausewitz-theory-and-ending-the-ukraine-war/|title=Clausewitz, Theory, and Ending the Ukraine War|first1=Donald|last1=Stoker|first2=Michael|last2=Campbell|journal=Military Strategy Magazine|volume=9|issue=3}}
{{Refend}}

===Primary sources (including translations)===
{{Refbegin|40em}}
* Clausewitz, Carl von. ''Historical and Political Writings,'' ed. Peter Paret and Daniel Moran (1992).
* Clausewitz, Carl von. ''[http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/VomKriege1832/TOC.htm Vom Kriege]''. Berlin: Dümmlers Verlag, 1832.
* {{cite book |last=Clausewitz |first=Carl von |editor1-last=Howard |editor1-first=Michael |editor1-link=Michael Howard (historian)|editor2-last=Paret |editor2-first=Peter |editor2-link=Peter Paret|title=On War |location=Princeton |publisher=Princeton University Press |edition=trans. |orig-year=1976 |year=1984 |isbn=978-0-691-05657-9}}
* Clausewitz, Carl von. ''On War'', abridged version translated by [[Michael Howard (historian)|Michael Howard]] and [[Peter Paret]], edited with an introduction by Beatrice Heuser Oxford World's Classics (Oxford University Press, 2007) {{ISBN|978-0-19-954002-0}}
* Clausewitz, Carl von. ''[http://www.clausewitz.com/mobile/principlesofwar.htm Principles of War]''. Translated by Hans Gatske. The Military Service Publishing Company, 1942. Originally "Die wichtigsten Grundsätze des Kriegführens zur Ergänzung meines Unterrichts bei Sr. Königlichen Hoheit dem Kronprinzen" (written 1812).
* Clausewitz, Carl von. Col. J. J. Graham, translator. ''Vom Kriege''. ''[https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/1946 On War – Volume 1]'', [[Project Gutenberg]] eBook. The ''full'' text of the 1873 English translation can be seen in parallel with the original German text at [http://www.clausewitz.com/CompareFrameSource1.htm Compare VOM KRIEGE (1832) and ON WAR (1873 translation)] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181111002001/http://clausewitz.com/CompareFrameSource1.htm |date=2018-11-11 }}. [http://www.clausewitz.com/CompareFrameSource1.htm Compare VOM KRIEGE (1832) and ON WAR (1873 translation)] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181111002001/http://clausewitz.com/CompareFrameSource1.htm |date=2018-11-11 }}
* Clausewitz, Karl von. ''On War.'' Trans. O.J. Matthijs Jolles. New York: Random House, 1943. Though not currently the standard translation, this is increasingly viewed by many Clausewitz scholars as the most precise and accurate English translation.
* Clausewitz, Carl von (2018). ''Napoleon's 1796 Italian Campaign.'' Trans and ed. Nicholas Murray and Christopher Pringle. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas. {{ISBN|978-0-7006-2676-2}}
* Clausewitz, Carl von (2020). ''Napoleon Absent, Coalition Ascendant: The 1799 Campaign in Italy and Switzerland, Volume 1.'' Trans and ed. Nicholas Murray and Christopher Pringle. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas. {{ISBN|978-0-7006-3025-7}} [http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=57772 online review]
* Clausewitz, Carl von (2021). ''The Coalition Crumbles, Napoleon Returns: The 1799 Campaign in Italy and Switzerland, Volume 2.'' Trans and ed. Nicholas Murray and Christopher Pringle. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas. {{ISBN|978-0-7006-3034-9}}
* Clausewitz, Carl von. ''[http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/1812/Clausewitz-CampaignOf1812inRussia-EllesmereTranslation.pdf ''The Campaign of 1812 in Russia''] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200113114054/http://clausewitz.com/readings/1812/Clausewitz-CampaignOf1812inRussia-EllesmereTranslation.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110608020736/http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/1812/Clausewitz-CampaignOf1812inRussia-EllesmereTranslation.pdf |archive-date=2011-06-08 |url-status=live |date=2020-01-13 }}''. Trans. anonymous [Wellington's friend Francis Egerton, later Lord Ellesmere], London: John Murray Publishers, 1843. Originally Carl von Clausewitz, ''Hinterlassene Werke des Generals Carl von Clausewitz über Krieg und Krieg führung'', 10 vols., Berlin, 1832–37, "''Der Feldzug von 1812 in Russland''" in Vol. 7, Berlin, 1835.
* Clausewitz, Carl von, and Wellesley, Arthur (First Duke of Wellington), ed./trans. Christopher Bassford, Gregory W. Pedlow, and Daniel Moran, [http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/1815/ ''On Waterloo: Clausewitz, Wellington, and the Campaign of 1815'']. (Clausewitz.com, 2010). This collection of documents includes, in a modern English translation, the whole of Clausewitz's study, ''[http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/1815/five1-9.htm The Campaign of 1815: Strategic Overview]'' (Berlin: 1835). {{ISBN|1-4537-0150-8}}. It also includes [http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/1815/six.htm Wellington's reply] to Clausewitz's discussion of the campaign, as well as [http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/1815/three.htm two letters by Clausewitz] to his wife after the major battles of 1815 and other supporting documents and essays.
* Clausewitz, Carl von. ''[http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/TwoLetters/TwoLetters.htm Two Letters on Strategy]''. Ed./trans. Peter Paret and Daniel Moran. Carlisle: Army War College Foundation, 1984.
{{Refend}}

==External links==
{{Sister project links |wikt=no |commons=Category:Carl von Clausewitz |b=no |n=no |q=Carl von Clausewitz |s=Author:Carl von Clausewitz |v=no |species=no }}
* [https://www.mindmeister.com/609061126/on-war Mind Map of ''On War'']
* [http://www.clausewitz.com/index.htm Clausewitz homepage], large amounts of information.
* Corn, Tony. [http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6795 "Clausewitz in Wonderland"], ''Policy Review'', September 2006. This is an article hostile to "Clausewitz and the Clausewitzians." See also [http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Bassford/OnCornyIdeas.htm reply by Clausewitz Homepage], "Clausewitz's self-appointed PR Flack."
* {{Gutenberg author |id=757| name=Carl von Clausewitz}}
* {{Internet Archive author |sname=Carl von Clausewitz}}
* {{Librivox author |id=5423}}
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20070926204024/http://www.homepage.bluewin.ch/abegglen/papers/clausewitz_influence_on_jomini.pdf The Influence of Clausewitz on Jomini's Le Précis de l'Art de la Guerre]
* [http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/TwoLetters/TwoLetters.htm ''Two Letters On Strategy''], addressed to the Prussian general-staff officer, Major von Roeder, respectively of 22 and 24 December 1827.
* [https://www.academia.edu/attachments/35927726/download_file?st=MTQxODQ3NjcxNCwxMDguMjYuMTIzLjE2MSwxMzMzMjk5MA%3D%3D Erfourth M. & Bazin, A. (2014). Clausewitz's Military Genius and the #Human Dimension. The Bridge.]

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