View source for Tax haven

{{Short description|Place which charges very low taxes on profits}}
{{Taxation}}

A '''tax haven''' is a term, often used pejoratively, to describe a place with very low tax rates for [[Domicile (law)|non-domiciled investors]], even if the official rates may be higher.{{Efn|Many corporate–focused tax havens have high nominal rates of taxation (e.g. Netherlands at 25%, United Kingdom at 19%, Singapore at 17%, and Ireland at 12.5%), but maintain a tax ''regime'' that excludes sufficient items from taxable income to bring the ''effective'' rates of taxation closer to zero.}}<ref name="ftlex">{{cite news |url=http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=tax-haven |title=Financial Times Lexicon: Definition of tax haven|quote=A country with little or no taxation that offers foreign individuals or corporations residency so that they can avoid tax at home. |newspaper=[[Financial Times]]|date=June 2018|access-date=17 June 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180617115721/http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=tax-haven|archive-date=17 June 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref name="Collins">{{cite web|title=Tax haven definition and meaning |quote=A tax haven is a country or place which has a low rate of tax so that people choose to live there or register companies there in order to avoid paying higher tax in their own countries.|url=https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/tax-haven |work=Collins English Dictionary |access-date=27 December 2017|language=en|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171228000523/https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/tax-haven|archive-date=28 December 2017|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref name="Cambridge">{{cite web|title=Tax haven definition and meaning |quote=a place where people pay less tax than they would pay if they lived in their own country|url=https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/tax-haven|work=Cambridge English Dictionary|date=2018|language=en|access-date=17 June 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180617193146/https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/tax-haven|archive-date=17 June 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref name="dhar">{{cite journal|author1=Dhammika Dharmapala|author2-link=James R. Hines Jr|author2=James R. Hines Jr.|pages=1058–1068|quote=The 'tax havens' are locations with very low tax rates and other tax attributes designed to appeal to foreign investors.|url=http://faculty.smu.edu/millimet/classes/eco6375/papers/dharmapala%20hines.pdf|title=Which countries become tax havens?|journal=[[Journal of Public Economics]]|date=2009|volume=93|issue=9–10|doi=10.1016/j.jpubeco.2009.07.005|s2cid=16653726|author1-link=Dhammika Dharmapala|access-date=16 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170808070113/http://faculty.smu.edu/millimet/classes/eco6375/papers/dharmapala%20hines.pdf|archive-date=8 August 2017|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref name="hines2016">{{cite journal|url=https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2831&context=articles|title=Multinational Firms and Tax Havens|author1=James R. Hines Jr.|author2=Anna Gumpert|author3=Monika Schnitzer|date=2016|journal=[[The Review of Economics and Statistics]]|pages=713–727|quote=Tax havens are typically small, well-governed states that impose low or zero tax rates on foreign investors.|volume=98|issue=4|author1-link=James R. Hines Jr|access-date=16 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190417133943/https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2831&context=articles|archive-date=17 April 2019|url-status=live|df=dmy-all|doi=10.1162/REST_a_00591|s2cid=54649623|url-access=subscription}}</ref>

In some older definitions, a tax haven also offers [[Bank secrecy|financial secrecy]].{{efn|Since the post–2000 OECD–IMF–FATF initiatives on reducing banking secrecy and increasing transparency, modern academics consider the ''secrecy'' component to be redundant. See {{slink||Definitions}}.}}<ref name="Explainer">{{cite news|last1=Shaxson|first1=Nicholas|title=Explainer: what is a tax haven?|url=https://www.theguardian.com/business/2011/jan/09/explainer-what-is-tax-haven|access-date=27 December 2017|work=The Guardian|date=9 January 2011}}</ref> However, while countries with high levels of secrecy but also high rates of taxation, most notably the United States and Germany in the [[Financial Secrecy Index]] (FSI) rankings,{{efn|name=FSI|The FSI is often misquoted as a ranking of "tax havens", however the FSI does not quantify tax avoidance or BEPS flows like modern quantitative tax haven lists; the FSI it is a qualitative scoring of ''secrecy indicators'', and does not score some of the most common secrecy tools—the [[unlimited liability company]], the trust, and various special purpose vehicles (e.g. Irish QIAIFs and L–QIAIFs)—few of which are required to file public accounts in major tax havens, such as Ireland and the United Kingdom.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.taxjustice.net/2018/06/25/new-report-is-apple-paying-less-than-1-tax-in-the-eu/|title=New report: is Apple paying less than 1% tax in the EU?|publisher=[[Tax Justice Network]]|date=28 June 2018|quote=The use of private 'unlimited liability company' (ULC) status, which exempts companies from filing financial reports publicly. The fact that Apple, Google and many others continue to keep their Irish financial information secret is due to a failure by the Irish government to implement the 2013 EU Accounting Directive, which would require full public financial statements, until 2017, and even then retaining an exemption from financial reporting for certain holding companies until 2022|access-date=1 September 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180702064405/https://www.taxjustice.net/2018/06/25/new-report-is-apple-paying-less-than-1-tax-in-the-eu/|archive-date=2 July 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.taxresearch.org.uk/Blog/2018/07/04/irelands-playing-games-in-the-last-chance-saloon-of-tax-justice/|title=Ireland's playing games in the last chance saloon of tax justice|publisher=[[Richard Murphy (tax campaigner)|Richard Murphy]]|date=4 July 2018|quote=Local subsidiaries of multinationals must always be required to file their accounts on public record, which is not the case at present. Ireland is not just a tax haven at present, it is also a corporate secrecy jurisdiction.|access-date=1 September 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180708221837/http://www.taxresearch.org.uk/Blog/2018/07/04/irelands-playing-games-in-the-last-chance-saloon-of-tax-justice/|archive-date=8 July 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>}} can be featured in some tax haven lists, they are often omitted from lists for political reasons or through lack of subject matter knowledge. In contrast, countries with lower levels of secrecy but also low "effective" rates of taxation, most notably Ireland in the FSI rankings, appear in most {{slink||Tax haven lists}}.<ref name="TJN1">{{cite web|url=https://www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/Identifying_Tax_Havens_Jul_07.pdf|title=Identifying Tax Havens and Offshore Finance Centres|quote=Various attempts have been made to identify and list tax havens and offshore finance centres (OFCs). This Briefing Paper aims to compare these lists and clarify the criteria used in preparing them.|publisher=[[Tax Justice Network]] and [[Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations]]|date=July 2007|author1=Laurens Booijink|author2=Francis Weyzig|access-date=17 June 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171207183024/https://www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/Identifying_Tax_Havens_Jul_07.pdf|archive-date=7 December 2017|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> The consensus on ''effective tax rates'' has led academics to note that the term "tax haven" and "[[offshore financial centre]]" are almost synonymous.<ref name="missing profits">{{cite journal|url=https://eml.berkeley.edu/~saez/course/zucman11.pdf|title=The Missing Wealth of Nations: Are Europe and The U.S. Net Debtors or Net Creditors?|author=Gabriel Zucman|journal=[[The Quarterly Journal of Economics]]|volume=128|issue=3|pages=1321–1364|date=August 2013|quote=Tax havens are low-tax jurisdictions that offer businesses and individuals opportunities for tax avoidance' (Hines, 2008). In this paper, I will use the expression 'tax haven' and 'offshore financial center' interchangeably (the list of tax havens considered by Dharmapala and Hines (2009) is identical to the list of offshore financial centers considered by the Financial Stability Forum (IMF, 2000), barring minor exceptions) |doi=10.1093/qje/qjt012 |citeseerx=10.1.1.371.3828 |author-link=Gabriel Zucman|access-date=28 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170809133829/http://eml.berkeley.edu/~saez/course/zucman11.pdf|archive-date=9 August 2017|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> In reality, many offshore financial centers do not have harmful tax practices and are at the forefront among financial centers regarding AML practices and international tax reporting.

Developments since the early 21st century have substantially reduced the ability of individuals or corporations to use tax havens for [[tax evasion]] (illegal non-payment of taxes owed). These include the end of banking secrecy in many jurisdictions including [[Switzerland]] following the passing of the US [[Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act]] and the adoption by most countries, including typical tax havens, of the [[Common Reporting Standard]] (CRS) – a multilateral automatic taxpayer data exchange agreement initiated by the [[OECD]].<ref>{{Cite web |title=Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information in Tax Matters {{!}} READ online |url=https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/standard-for-automatic-exchange-of-financial-account-information-for-tax-matters_9789264216525-en#page13 |access-date=2023-10-27 |website=oecd-ilibrary.org}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=CRS by jurisdiction |url=https://www.oecd.org/tax/automatic-exchange/crs-implementation-and-assistance/crs-by-jurisdiction/ |website=www.oecd.org}}</ref> CRS countries require banks and other entities to identify the residence of account holders, beneficial owners of corporate entities<ref>{{Cite web |title=Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information in Tax Matters {{!}} READ online |url=https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/standard-for-automatic-exchange-of-financial-account-information-for-tax-matters_9789264216525-en#page14 |access-date=2023-10-27 |website=oecd-ilibrary.org}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information in Tax Matters {{!}} READ online |url=https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/standard-for-automatic-exchange-of-financial-account-information-for-tax-matters_9789264216525-en#page194 |access-date=2023-10-27 |website=oecd-ilibrary.org}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information in Tax Matters {{!}} READ online |url=https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/standard-for-automatic-exchange-of-financial-account-information-for-tax-matters_9789264216525-en#page197 |access-date=2023-10-27 |website=oecd-ilibrary.org}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information in Tax Matters {{!}} READ online |url=https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/standard-for-automatic-exchange-of-financial-account-information-for-tax-matters_9789264216525-en#page200 |access-date=2023-10-27 |website=oecd-ilibrary.org}}</ref> and record yearly account balances and communicate such information to local tax agencies, which will report back to tax agencies where account holders or beneficial owners of corporations reside.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information in Tax Matters {{!}} READ online |url=https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/standard-for-automatic-exchange-of-financial-account-information-for-tax-matters_9789264216525-en#page26 |access-date=2023-10-27 |website=oecd-ilibrary.org}}</ref> CRS intends to end offshore financial secrecy and [[tax evasion]] giving tax agencies knowledge to tax offshore income and assets. However, huge and complex corporations, like [[Multinational corporation|multinationals]], can still shift profits to [[Corporate haven|corporate tax havens]] using intricate schemes.

Traditional tax havens, like [[Jersey]], are open to zero rates of taxation, and as a consequence, they have few bilateral [[tax treaty|tax treaties]]. Modern [[corporate tax haven]]s have non-zero official (or "headline") rates of taxation and high levels of [[OECD]] compliance, and thus have large networks of bilateral tax treaties. However, their [[base erosion and profit shifting]] (BEPS) tools—such as ample opportunities to render income exempt from tax, for instance—enable corporations and non-domiciled investors to achieve ''de facto'' tax rates closer to zero, not just in the haven but in all countries with which the haven has tax treaties; thereby putting them on tax haven lists. According to modern studies, the {{slink||Top 10 tax havens}} include corporate-focused havens like the [[Netherlands]], [[Singapore]], the [[Republic of Ireland]], and the [[United Kingdom]]; while [[Luxembourg]], [[Hong Kong]], the [[Cayman Islands]], [[Bermuda]], the [[British Virgin Islands]], and Switzerland feature as both major traditional tax havens and major corporate tax havens. Corporate tax havens often serve as [[Conduit and Sink OFCs|"conduits"]] to traditional tax havens.<ref name="guar">{{cite news |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/25/netherlands-and-uk-are-biggest-channels-for-corporate-tax-avoidance |title=Netherlands and UK are biggest channels for corporate tax avoidance |newspaper=The Guardian |date=25 July 2017|access-date=23 May 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180524223447/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/25/netherlands-and-uk-are-biggest-channels-for-corporate-tax-avoidance|archive-date=24 May 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref name="bloom">{{cite web|url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-07-31/is-the-u-k-already-the-kind-of-tax-haven-it-claims-it-won-t-be|title=Is the U.K. Already the Kind of Tax Haven It Claims It Won't Be?|publisher=Bloomberg News|date=31 July 2017|access-date=23 May 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180613185644/https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-07-31/is-the-u-k-already-the-kind-of-tax-haven-it-claims-it-won-t-be|archive-date=13 June 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref name="bloom2">{{cite web|url=https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-04-11/tax-havens-can-be-surprisingly-close-to-home|title=Tax Havens Can Be Surprisingly Close to Home|publisher=Bloomberg View|date=11 April 2017|access-date=23 May 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180617093018/https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-04-11/tax-havens-can-be-surprisingly-close-to-home|archive-date=17 June 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>

The use of tax havens results in a loss of tax revenues to countries that are not tax havens. Estimates of the {{slink||Financial scale}} of taxes avoided vary, but the most credible have a range of US$100-250 billion per annum.<ref name="zucwsj">{{cite news|url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/corporations-push-profits-into-tax-havens-as-countries-struggle-in-pursuit-study-says-1528634659|title=Zucman:Corporations Push Profits Into Corporate Tax Havens as Countries Struggle in Pursuit, Gabrial Zucman Study Says|quote=Such profit shifting leads to a total annual revenue loss of $250 billion globally|newspaper=Wall Street Journal|date=10 June 2018|access-date=13 June 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190404203053/https://www.wsj.com/articles/corporations-push-profits-into-tax-havens-as-countries-struggle-in-pursuit-study-says-1528634659|archive-date=4 April 2019|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref name="gzuc"/><ref name="BEPS Background"/><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/02/how-do-corporate-tax-havens-work/|title=Tax havens cost governments $200 billion a year. It's time to change the way global tax works|website=World Economic Forum|date=27 February 2020 |language=en|access-date=2020-03-26}}</ref> In addition, capital held in tax havens can permanently leave the tax base (base erosion). Estimates of capital held in tax havens also vary: the most credible estimates are between US$7-10 trillion (up to 10% of global assets).<ref name=Zucman/> The harm of traditional and corporate tax havens has been particularly noted in developing nations, where tax revenues are needed to build infrastructure.<ref name=IMF5/><ref name="zucc"/><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/oureconomy/every-cent-lost-tax-havens-could-be-used-strengthen-our-health-and-social-systems/|title=Every cent lost to tax havens could be used to strengthen our health and social systems|website=openDemocracy|language=en|access-date=2020-03-26}}</ref>

Over 15%{{efn|name=number|The [[list of sovereign states]] numbered 206 as at September 2018, so 15% equates to just over 30 tax havens; the OECD's 2000 list had 35 tax havens,<ref name="OECDh"/> the [[James R. Hines Jr.#Hines 2010 list|James Hines 2010 list]] had 52 tax havens,<ref name="h1"/> the 2017 [[Conduit and Sink OFCs]] study lists 29 states.}} of countries are sometimes labelled tax havens.<ref name="dhar"/><ref name="TJN1"/> Tax havens are mostly successful and well-governed economies, and being a haven has brought prosperity.<ref name="h2">{{cite web|url=http://www.bus.umich.edu/otpr/WP2007-3.pdf|title=Tax Havens|quote=Tax havens are low-tax jurisdictions that offer businesses and individuals opportunities for tax avoidance. They attract disproportionate shares of world foreign direct investment, and, largely as a consequence, their economies have grown much more rapidly than the world as a whole over the past 25 years.|author=James R. Hines Jr.|publisher=[[The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics]]|date=2007|author-link=James R. Hines Jr|access-date=16 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160924214243/http://www.bus.umich.edu/otpr/WP2007-3.pdf|archive-date=24 September 2016|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref name="mich"/> The top 10-15 [[List of countries by GDP (PPP) per capita|GDP-per-capita]] countries, excluding oil and gas exporters, are tax havens. Because of {{slink||Inflated GDP-per-capita}} (due to accounting BEPS flows), havens are prone to over-leverage (international capital misprice the artificial debt-to-GDP). This can lead to severe credit cycles and/or property/banking crises when international capital flows are repriced. Ireland's [[Celtic Tiger]], and the subsequent financial crisis in 2009-13, is an example.<ref name="ber"/> Jersey is another.<ref name="jersey">{{cite news|url=https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/dec/08/fall-of-jersey-how-tax-haven-goes-bust|title=The fall of Jersey: how a tax haven goes bust|newspaper=The Guardian|author=Oliver Bullough|quote=Jersey bet its future on finance but since 2007 it has fallen on hard times and is heading for bankruptcy. Is the island's perilous present Britain's bleak future?|date=8 December 2015}}</ref> Research shows {{slink||U.S. as the largest beneficiary}}, and the use of tax havens by U.S corporates maximised U.S. exchequer receipts.<ref name="dryng"/>

The historical focus on combating tax havens (e.g. OECD-[[IMF]] projects) had been on common standards, transparency and data sharing.<ref name="crs2"/> The rise of OECD-compliant corporate tax havens, whose BEPS tools were responsible for most of the lost taxes,<ref name="imfx"/><ref name=IMF5/><ref name="BEPS Background">{{cite web|title=BEPS Project Background Brief|url=http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/background-brief-inclusive-framework-for-beps-implementation.pdf|publisher=[[OECD]]|quote=With a conservatively estimated annual revenue loss of USD 100 to 240 billion, the stakes are high for governments around the world. The impact of BEPS on developing countries, as a percentage of tax revenues, is estimated to be even higher than in developed countries.|date=January 2017|page=9|access-date=1 June 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170722073652/http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/background-brief-inclusive-framework-for-beps-implementation.pdf|archive-date=22 July 2017|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> led to criticism of this approach, versus actual taxes paid.<ref name=FDNS>{{cite journal | url=https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2019/09/tackling-global-tax-havens-shaxon.htm | title=Tackling Tax Havens | author=Nicholas Shaxson | journal=Finance & Development IMF Quarterly | date=September 2019 | volume=56 | issue=3| author-link=Nicholas Shaxson }}</ref><ref name="un1">{{cite web|url=https://www.taxjustice.net/2017/09/11/new-un-tax-handbook-sets-lower-income-countries-oecd-beps/|title=New UN tax handbook: Lower-income countries vs OECD BEPS failure|publisher=[[Tax Justice Network]]|author=Alex Cobham|date=11 September 2017|access-date=1 June 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180529020446/https://www.taxjustice.net/2017/09/11/new-un-tax-handbook-sets-lower-income-countries-oecd-beps/|archive-date=29 May 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> Higher-tax jurisdictions, such as the United States and many member states of the European Union, departed from the [[Base erosion and profit shifting (OECD project)|OECD BEPS Project]] in 2017-18 to introduce anti-BEPS tax regimes, targeted raising net taxes paid by corporations in corporate tax havens (e.g. the U.S. [[Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017]] ("TCJA") GILTI-BEAT-FDII tax regimes and move to a hybrid "territorial" tax system, and proposed EU [[Taxation of digital goods|Digital Services Tax]] regime, and EU [[Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base]]).<ref name=FDNS/>

==History==
===Overview===
While areas of low taxation are recorded in Ancient Greece, tax academics identify what we know as tax havens as being a modern phenomenon,<ref name="ronen.palan2"/><ref name="sol.piccolo">{{cite book | author=Sol Piccolo | year=1992 | title=International Business Taxation | url=https://www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/Picciotto%201992%20International%20Business%20Taxation.pdf | publisher=[[Cambridge University Press]] | isbn=978-0899307770 | author-link=Sol Piccolo | access-date=23 April 2019 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190103035111/http://www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/Picciotto%201992%20International%20Business%20Taxation.pdf | archive-date=3 January 2019 | url-status=live | df=dmy-all }}</ref> and note the following phases in their development:

* ''19th century New Jersey and Delaware Corporations''. In the 1880s, New Jersey was in financial difficulty and the governor, [[Leon Abbett]], backed a plan by a New York lawyer, Mr. Dill, to create a more liberal regime for establishing corporate structures, including the availability of "off-the-shelf companies" (but not non-resident companies). Delaware followed with the General Incorporation Act in 1898, on the basis of lobbying from other New York lawyers. Because of the restrictive incorporation regime in the Anglo-Saxon world as a result of the [[South Sea Bubble]], New Jersey and Delaware were successful, and though not explicitly tax havens (e.g. US federal and state taxes applied), many future tax havens would copy their "liberal" incorporation regimes.<ref name="ronen.palan2">{{cite web|url=http://www.historyandpolicy.org/policy-papers/papers/history-of-tax-havens|title=History of Tax Havens|author=Ronen Palan|publisher=History & Policy|date=1 October 2009|access-date=23 April 2019|author-link=Ronen Palan|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181007200857/http://www.historyandpolicy.org/policy-papers/papers/history-of-tax-havens|archive-date=7 October 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>
* ''Post World War I''. The modern concept of a tax haven is generally accepted to have emerged at an uncertain point in the immediate aftermath of [[World War I]].<ref name="ronen.palan2"/><ref>"[T]he tax haven is a creature of the twentieth century, and began to be used extensively because of the high levels of tax which prevailed after the First World War" at ¶26.1, ''Tolley's International Tax Planning'' (2002), {{ISBN|0-7545-1339-4}}</ref> [[Bermuda]] sometimes claims to have been the first tax haven based upon the creation of the first [[offshore company|offshore companies]] legislation in 1935 by the newly created law firm of [[Conyers Dill & Pearman]].<ref>See generally, Introduction to ''Tolley's International Initiatives Affecting Financial Havens'' (2001), {{ISBN|0-406-94264-1}}</ref> However, most tax academics identify the Zurich-Zug-Liechtenstein triangle as the first "tax haven hub" created during the mid-1920s.<ref name="ronen.palan2"/><ref>The ''Personen- und Gesellschaftsrecht'' of 20 January 1926</ref> Liechtenstein's 1924 Civil Code created the infamous ''Anstalt'' corporate vehicle, while Zurich and Zug developed the ''[[Aktiengesellschaft]]''/''[[S.A. (corporation)|Societé Anonyme]]'' and other [[Brass plate company|brass plate companies]].<ref name="ronen.palan2"/>  Tax academic [[Ronen Palan]] identifies two of the three major groups of tax havens, as emerging during this period:
** ''British Empire–based tax havens''. The 1929 court case of ''Egyptian Delta Land and Investment Co. Ltd. V. Todd'' in Britain created the "non-resident corporation" and recognised a British-registered company with no business activities in Britain as not liable to British taxation. Tax academic [[Sol Picciotto]] noted the creation of such "non-resident" companies was "a loophole which, in a sense, made Britain a tax haven". The ruling applied to the British Empire, including Bermuda, Barbados, and the Cayman Islands.<ref name="ronen.palan"/><ref name="sol.piccolo"/>
** ''European-based tax havens''. The Zurich-Zug-Liechtenstein triangle expanded and was joined by Luxembourg in 1929 when they created tax-free ''holding companies''.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Calabrese |first1=Matteo |last2=Majerus |first2=Benoît |date=2023 |title=Archaeology of a Treasure Island: Actors and Practices of Holding Companies in Luxembourg (1929–1940) |journal=Contemporary European History |volume=33 |issue=4 |pages=1398–1415 |language=en |doi=10.1017/S0960777323000437 |issn=0960-7773|doi-access=free }}</ref><ref name="ronen.palan2"/> However, in 1934, as a reaction to the global depression, the Swiss Banking Act of 1934 put bank secrecy under Swiss criminal law.<ref name="ronen.palan"/> Secrecy and privacy would become an important and distinctive part of the European-based tax havens, in comparison with other tax havens.<ref name="sol.piccolo"/>

* ''Post–World War II offshore financial centres''. Currency controls enacted post–World War II led to the creation of the Eurodollar market and the rise in [[offshore financial centre]]s (OFCs).<ref name="imf"/>  Many of these OFCs were traditional tax havens from the post-World War I phase, including the Cayman Islands and Bermuda, however new centres such as Hong Kong and Singapore began to emerge.<ref name="imf"/> The [[Tangier International Zone]] was an extreme case of tax leniency and banking secrecy in the period following its wartime suspension, but that was brought to an end in 1960 as a consequence of [[Moroccan independence]].<ref>{{cite book |title=Tangier/Gibraltar – A Tale of One City: An Ethnography |author=Dieter Haller |publisher=Transcript Verlag |year=2021 }}</ref>{{rp|113}} London's position as a global [[financial centre]] for these OFCs was secured when the [[Bank of England]] ruled in 1957 that transactions executed by British banks on behalf of a lender and borrower who were not located in the UK, were not to be officially viewed as having taken place in the UK for regulatory or tax purposes, even though the transaction was only ever recorded as taking place in London.<ref name="ronen.palan"/><ref name="sol.piccolo"/><ref name="eurodollar">{{cite news|url=https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/sep/07/the-real-goldfinger-the-london-banker-who-broke-the-world|title=The real Goldfinger: the London banker who broke the world|newspaper=The Guardian|date=7 September 2017|access-date=23 April 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190331045225/https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/sep/07/the-real-goldfinger-the-london-banker-who-broke-the-world|archive-date=31 March 2019|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> The rise of OFCs would continue so that by 2008, the Cayman Islands would be the 4th largest financial centre in the world, while Singapore and Hong Kong had become major [[Financial centre|Regional Financial Centre]]s (RFCs).<ref name="ronen.palan"/>  By 2010, tax activists would promote the notion that OFCs are synonymous with tax havens, and that most of their services involved taxation.<ref name="missing profits"/><ref name="nicholas.shaxson"/>
* ''Emerging economy–based tax havens''. As well as the dramatic rise in OFCs, from the late 1960s onwards, new tax havens began to emerge to service developing and emerging markets, which became Palan's third group. The first Pacific tax haven was [[Norfolk Island]] (1966), a self-governing external territory of Australia. It was followed by Vanuatu (1970–71), Nauru (1972), the Cook Islands (1981), Tonga (1984), Samoa (1988), the Marshall Islands (1990), and Nauru (1994).<ref name="ronen.palan2"/> All these havens introduced familiar legislation modeled on the successful British Empire and European tax havens, including near-zero taxation for exempt companies, and non-residential companies, Swiss-style bank secrecy laws, trust companies laws, offshore insurance laws, flags of convenience for shipping fleets and aircraft leasing, and beneficial regulations for new online services (e.g. gambling, pornography, etc.).<ref name="ronen.palan"/><ref name="jason">{{cite book|title=Havens in a Storm: The Struggle for Global Tax Regulation|author=Jason Sharman|year=2006|publisher=[[Cornell University Press]]|pages=224|jstor=10.7591/j.ctt7z6jm |chapter=The Struggle for Global Tax Regulation|isbn=9780801445040}}</ref>
* ''Corporate-focused tax havens''. In 1981, the US IRS published the ''Gordon Report'' on the use of tax havens by US taxpayers, which highlighted the use of tax havens by US corporations.<ref name="gordon2"/>  In 1983, US corporation McDermott International executed the first [[tax inversion]] to Panama.<ref name="hallCBO"/> The EU Commission showed that Apple Inc. had begun to use the infamous [[Double Irish]] BEPS tool as early as 1991. US tax academic [[James R. Hines Jr.]] showed in 1994 that US corporations were achieving effective rates of taxation of circa 4% in corporate-focused OECD tax havens like Ireland.<ref name="h3">{{cite journal |author1=James R. Hines Jr. |author2=Eric Rice |date=February 1994 |title=Fiscal Paradise: Foreign Tax Havens and American Business |url=http://taxdoctoralseminar.web.unc.edu/files/2016/02/Hines-Rice.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170825172644/http://taxdoctoralseminar.web.unc.edu/files/2016/02/Hines-Rice.pdf |archive-date=25 August 2017 |url-status=live |journal=Quarterly Journal of Economics (Harvard/MIT) |volume=9 |issue=1|access-date=17 August 2018 |quote=We identify 41 countries and regions as tax havens for the purposes of U. S. businesses. Together the seven tax havens with populations greater than one million (Hong Kong, Ireland, Liberia, Lebanon, Panama, Singapore, and Switzerland) account for 80 percent of total tax haven population and 89 percent of tax haven GDP. |df=dmy-all}}</ref> When in 2004, the US Congress stopped "naked tax inversions" by US corporations to Caribbean tax havens with the introduction of IRS Regulation 7874, a much larger wave of US corporate "merger inversions" started that involved moving to OECD tax havens.<ref name="hallCBO"/> A new class of corporate tax haven had emerged that was OECD-compliant, and transparent, but offered complex base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) tools that could achieve net tax rates similar to traditional tax havens.<ref name="jason"/><ref name="nicholas.shaxson"/> Initiatives by the OECD to curb tax havens would mainly impact Palan's third group of ''Emerging economy–based tax havens'', however, the corporate-focused tax havens were drawn from the largest OFCs that had emerged from the ''British Empire–based tax havens'' and ''European-based tax havens'', and included the Netherlands, Singapore, Ireland, USA and the U.K., and even reformed traditional tax havens such as Luxembourg, Hong Kong, the Caribbean (the Cayman, Bermuda, and the British Virgin Islands), and Switzerland.<ref name="nicholas.shaxson"/> The scale of their BEPS activities meant that this group of 10 jurisdictions would dominate academic tax haven lists from 2010, including [[James R. Hines Jr.#Hines 2010 list|Hines' 2010 list]], the [[Conduit and Sink OFCs|Conduit and Sink OFC 2017 list]], and [[Gabriel Zucman#Tørsløv-Wier-Zucman 2018 list|Zucman's 2018 list]].

===Notable events===
* 1929: British courts rule in ''Egyptian Delta Land and Investment Co. Ltd. V. Todd.'' that a British-registered company with no business activities in Britain is not liable to British taxation. [[Sol Picciotto]] noted the creation of such "non-resident" companies was "a loophole which, in a sense, made Britain a tax haven". The ruling applied to the British Empire, including Bermuda, Barbados, and the Cayman Islands.<ref name="ronen.palan"/>
* 1934: As a reaction to the global depression, the Swiss Banking Act of 1934 put bank secrecy under Swiss criminal law. The law required "absolute silence with respect to a professional secret" (i.e. accounts in Swiss banks). "Absolute" means protection from any government, including the Swiss. The law even made inquiry or research into the "trade secrets" of Swiss banks, a criminal offense.<ref name="ronen.palan"/>
* 1981: The US Treasury and the US Attorney General are given: ''Tax havens and their use by United States taxpayers: An Overview'' by Richard A. Gordon Special Counsel for International Taxation at the IRS.  The Gordon Report identifies new types of ''corporate'' tax havens such as Ireland (described as a ''manufacturing tax haven'').<ref name="gordon2">{{cite book|url=https://archive.org/details/taxhavenstheirus01gord|title=Tax Havens and their use by United States Taxpayers, An Overview|publisher=U.S. Internal Revenue Service|date=12 January 1981|access-date=28 April 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170527103008/https://archive.org/details/taxhavenstheirus01gord|archive-date=27 May 2017|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>
* 1983: The first officially recognized US corporate [[tax inversion]] as [[McDermott International]] moves from [[Texas]] to a tax haven, Panama.<ref name="bloomberg1"/><ref name="hallCBO"/>
* 1994: [[James R. Hines Jr.]] publishes the important [[James R. Hines Jr.#Tax haven research|Hines–Rice paper]], producing the first academic list of 41 tax havens, including 7 ''major tax havens''.  The Hines-Rice paper used the term ''profit shifting'', and showed that while many tax havens had higher ''headline'' tax rates, their ''effective'' tax rates were much lower. Hines shows that the US is a major user of tax havens.<ref name="h3"/>
* 2000:  The OECD produces its first formal list of 35 tax havens that have met two of three OECD ''[[#OECD–IMF (1998–2018)|Criteria]]''; none of the existing 35 OECD members, or EU–28 members, were listed as tax havens.<ref name="OECDh"/> By 2008, only Trinidad & Tobago had met the OECD's criteria for being a tax haven.<ref name="fttt"/> Academics have started using the terms "OECD tax havens" and "EU tax havens".
* 2000: The [[Financial Stability Forum|FSF]]–[[IMF]] define an [[offshore financial centre]] (OFC) with a list of [[Offshore financial centre#FSF–IMF 2000 list|42–46 OFCs]] using a qualitative list of criteria;<ref name="IMF2000Paper"/> in 2007, the IMF produced a revised quantitative-based list of [[Offshore financial centre#IMF 2007 list|22 OFCs]],<ref name="imf"/> and in 2018, another revised quantitative-based list of [[Offshore financial centre#IMF 2018 list|8 major OFCs]], who are responsible for 85% of OFC financial flows.<ref name="imfx"/> By 2010, tax academics consider [[Offshore financial centre#Link to Tax Havens|OFCs and tax havens as synonymous]].<ref name="missing profits"/> 
* 2004: US Congress pas the [[American Jobs Creation Act of 2004]] (AJCA) with IRS Section 7874 that effectively end [[naked inversion]]s by US corporations to Caribbean tax havens.<ref name="hallCBO"/>
* 2009: The [[Tax Justice Network]] introduced the [[Financial Secrecy Index]] ("FSI") and the term "secrecy jurisdiction",<ref name="tjn10"/> to highlight issues in regard to OECD-compliant countries that have high tax rates and do not appear on academic lists of tax havens, but have transparency issues.
* 2010: [[James R. Hines Jr.]] publishes a list of [[James R. Hines Jr.#Hines 2010 list|52 tax havens]], and unlike all past tax haven lists, were scaled quantitatively by analysing corporate investment flows.<ref name="h1"/> The Hines 2010 list was the first to estimate the ten largest global tax havens, only two of which, Jersey and the British Virgin Islands, were on the OECD's 2000 list.<ref name="h1"/>
* 2015: [[Medtronic]] completes the largest tax inversion in history in a US$48 billion merger with [[Covidien plc]] in Ireland, while [[Apple Inc.]] complete the largest hybrid-tax inversion in history moving US$300 billion of [[intellectual property]] to Ireland (called leprechaun economics); by 2016, the US Treasury tighten the inversion rules, causing Pfizer to abort their US$160 billion merger with [[Allergan plc]].<ref name="hallCBO"/> 
* 2017: The [[University of Amsterdam]]'s CORPNET group using a purely quantitive approach, splits the understanding of OFCs into [[Conduit and Sink OFCs#Conduit OFC|Conduit OFCs]] and [[Conduit and Sink OFCs#Sink OFC|Sink OFCs]]. CORPNET's lists of the top five Conduit OFCs and top five Sink OFCs, matched 9 of the top 10 havens in Hines' 2010 list, only differing in the United Kingdom, which only [[Corporate haven#U.K. transformation|transformed their tax code in 2009–12]].<ref name="uk1"/><ref name="xx"/>
* 2017: The [[EU Commission]] produces its first formal list of tax havens with 17 countries on its 2017 blacklist and 47 on its 2017 greylist;<ref name="eu havens">{{cite news|url=https://www.ft.com/content/c4d721dc-d9cf-11e7-a039-c64b1c09b482|title=EU puts 17 countries on blacklist|newspaper=[[Financial Times]]|date=5 December 2017|quote=The 17 countries on the European list are American Samoa, Bahrain, Barbados, Grenada, Guam, South Korea, Macau, the Marshall Islands, Mongolia, Namibia, Palau, Panama, St Lucia, Samoa, Trinidad & Tobago, Tunisia and the UAE|author=Rochelle Toplensky|access-date=1 May 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190330160534/https://www.ft.com/content/c4d721dc-d9cf-11e7-a039-c64b1c09b482|archive-date=30 March 2019|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> however, as with the previous 2010 OECD list, none of the jurisdictions are OECD or EU–28 countries, nor are they in the list of {{slink||Top 10 tax havens}}.<ref name="ced"/><ref name="ft.com"/>
* 2018: Tax academic [[Gabriel Zucman]] (''et alia'') estimates ''aggregate'' corporate "profit shifting" (i.e. BEPS) is shielding over US$250 billion per year from taxes.<ref name="zucwsj"/><ref name="gbz"/> Zucman's 2018 list of top 10 havens matched 9 of the top 10 havens in Hines' 2010 list, but with Ireland as the largest global haven.<ref name="zux"/> Zucman shows that US corporations are almost half of all profits shifted.<ref name="zucwright">{{Cite web |author1=Gabriel Zucman |author1-link=Gabriel Zucman |author2=Thomas Wright |date=September 2018 |title=The Exorbitant Tax Privilege |url=http://gabriel-zucman.eu/files/WrightZucman2018.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180911152016/http://gabriel-zucman.eu/files/WrightZucman2018.pdf |archive-date=11 September 2018 |url-status=live |series=Working Paper 24983 |publisher=[[National Bureau of Economic Research]] |page=11 |access-date=11 September 2018 |df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref name="japantimes"/><ref name="zucwsj2"/><ref name="zucbi"/>
* 2019: [[European Parliament]] votes to accept a report by 505 votes in favour to 63 against, identifying five "EU tax havens" that should be included on the [[EU Commission]] list of tax havens.{{efn | The [[European Parliament]] vote is not binding on the [[EU Commission]] to formally include these "EU tax havens" in the official EU list of tax havens (blacklist or greylist); to be binding, it must be a unanimous vote by all member states.<ref name="dutchnl"/>}}<ref name="Simon Bowers"/><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/is-ireland-a-tax-haven-european-parliament-says-yes-1.3841668?mode=sample&auth-failed=1&pw-origin=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.irishtimes.com%2Fbusiness%2Feconomy%2Fis-ireland-a-tax-haven-european-parliament-says-yes-1.3841668|title=Is Ireland a tax haven? European Parliament says yes|author=Cliff Taylor|newspaper=[[Irish Times]]|date=28 March 2019|access-date=20 April 2019|quote=The Republic helps big multinationals to engage in aggressive tax planning and the European Commission should regard it as one of five “EU tax havens” until substantial tax reforms are implemented.|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190403063638/https://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/is-ireland-a-tax-haven-european-parliament-says-yes-1.3841668?mode=sample&auth-failed=1&pw-origin=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.irishtimes.com%2Fbusiness%2Feconomy%2Fis-ireland-a-tax-haven-european-parliament-says-yes-1.3841668|archive-date=3 April 2019|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.rte.ie/news/business/2019/0326/1038812-ireland-european-report/|title=Ireland likened to tax haven in report accepted in European Parliament|publisher=[[RTE News]]|author=Colm Ó Mongáin|date=26 March 2019|access-date=20 April 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190330073756/https://www.rte.ie/news/business/2019/0326/1038812-ireland-european-report/|archive-date=30 March 2019|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>

==Definitions==
===Context===
There is no established consensus regarding a specific definition of what constitutes a tax haven. This is the conclusion from [[non-governmental organisations]], such as the [[Tax Justice Network]] in 2018,<ref name="tjn10">{{cite web | url=https://www.taxjustice.net/faq/tax-havens/|title=Tax Havens|publisher=[[Tax Justice Network]]|quote=There is no generally agreed definition of what a tax haven is. |date=2018}}</ref> from the 2008 investigation by the U.S. [[Government Accountability Office]],<ref name="congress1">{{cite web|url=https://www.gao.gov/assets/290/284522.pdf|title=INTERNATIONAL TAXATION: Large U.S. Corporations and Federal Contractors with Subsidiaries in Jurisdictions Listed as Tax Havens or Financial Privacy Jurisdictions|publisher=[[Government Accountability Office]]|quote=Table 1: Jurisdictions Listed as Tax Havens or Financial Privacy Jurisdictions and the Sources of Those Jurisdictions|page=12|date=18 December 2008|access-date=17 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180820194211/https://www.gao.gov/assets/290/284522.pdf|archive-date=20 August 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> from the 2015 investigation by the [[U.S. Congressional Research Service]],<ref name="CRS">{{cite web|url=https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2387&context=key_workplace|title=Tax Havens: International Tax Avoidance and Evasion |author=Jane Gravelle|publisher=[[Congressional Research Service]], [[Cornell University]] | page=4 |quote=Table 1. Countries Listed on Various Tax Haven Lists | date=15 January 2015}}</ref> from the 2017 investigation by the European Parliament,<ref name="EUP">{{cite web|url=http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/614633/EPRS_BRI(2017)614633_EN.pdf|title=Understanding the rationale for compiling 'tax haven' lists|publisher=[[European Parliamentary Research Service]]|page=3|quote=There is no single definition of a tax haven, although there are a number of commonalities in the various concepts used|date=December 2017|access-date=17 June 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180617193151/http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/614633/EPRS_BRI(2017)614633_EN.pdf|archive-date=17 June 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> and from leading academic researchers of tax havens.<ref name="dhh">{{cite journal|url=https://academic.oup.com/oxrep/article/24/4/661/547359#|title=What Problems and Opportunities are Created by Tax Havens?|author=Dhammika Dharmapala|journal=[[Oxford Review of Economic Policy]]|page=3|quote=Although tax havens have attracted widespread interest (and a considerable amount of opprobrium) in recent years, there is no standard definition of what this term means. Typically, the term is applied to countries and territories that offer favorable tax regimes for foreign investors.|date=December 2008|volume=24|issue=4|author-link=Dhammika Dharmapala|access-date=18 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180818160719/https://academic.oup.com/oxrep/article/24/4/661/547359|archive-date=18 August 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>

The issue, however, is material, as being labelled a "tax haven" has consequences for a country seeking to develop and trade under bilateral tax treaties. When Ireland was "blacklisted" by G20 member Brazil in 2016, bilateral trade declined.<ref name="reuters1">{{cite news|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/ireland-brazil-funds/blacklisted-by-brazil-dublin-funds-find-new-ways-to-invest-idUSL8N1MK2NX|title=Blacklisted by Brazil, Dublin funds find new ways to invest|work=Reuters|date=20 March 2017|access-date=17 June 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180614121655/https://www.reuters.com/article/ireland-brazil-funds/blacklisted-by-brazil-dublin-funds-find-new-ways-to-invest-idUSL8N1MK2NX|archive-date=14 June 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.taxjustice.net/2017/04/10/tax-haven-blacklisting-13-latin-american-countries/|title=Tax haven blacklisting in Latin America|publisher=Tax Justice Network|date=6 April 2017|access-date=17 June 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180522043636/https://www.taxjustice.net/2017/04/10/tax-haven-blacklisting-13-latin-american-countries/|archive-date=22 May 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>

===Academic non-quantitative (1994–2016)===
One of the first {{slink||Important papers on tax havens}},<ref name="eup">{{cite web|url=https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/dp_055_en.pdf|title=Banks in Tax Havens: First Evidence based on Country-by-Country Reporting|page=50|author1=Vincent Bouvatier|author2=Gunther Capelle-Blancard|author3=Anne-Laure Delatte|quote=Figure D: Tax Haven Literature Review: A Typology|publisher=[[EU Commission]]|date=July 2017|access-date=20 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180623170004/https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/dp_055_en.pdf|archive-date=23 June 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> was the 1994 [[James R. Hines Jr.#Tax haven research|Hines–Rice paper]] by [[James R. Hines Jr.]]<ref name="h3"/> It is the most cited paper on tax haven research,<ref name="respec"/> even in late 2017,<ref name="CRS2">{{cite web|url=https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/documents/Tax%20Reform%20and%20Wages.pdf|title=TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT OF 2017 Corporate Tax Reform and Wages: Theory and Evidence|quote=[In the Whitehouse advocating for the TCJA] Applying Hines and Rice’s (1994) findings to a statutory corporate rate reduction of 15 percentage points (from 35 to 20 percent) suggests that reduced profit shifting would result in more than $140 billion of repatriated profit based on 2016 numbers.|date=17 October 2017|access-date=19 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210120204709/https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/documents/Tax%20Reform%20and%20Wages.pdf|archive-date=20 January 2021|url-status=live|via=[[NARA|National Archives]]|work=[[whitehouse.gov]]|df=dmy-all}}</ref> and Hines is the most cited author on tax haven research.<ref name="respec">{{cite web|url=https://ideas.repec.org/cgi-bin/htsearch?form=extended&wm=wrd&dt=range&ul=&q=tax+haven&cmd=Search%21&wf=4BFF&s=C&db=&de=|title=IDEAS/RePEc Database|quote=Tax Havens by Most Cited|access-date=23 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181204123511/https://ideas.repec.org/cgi-bin/htsearch?form=extended&wm=wrd&dt=range&ul=&q=tax+haven&cmd=Search%21&wf=4BFF&s=C&db=&de=|archive-date=4 December 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> As well as offering insights into tax havens, it took the view that the diversity of countries that become tax havens was so great that detailed definitions were inappropriate. Hines merely noted that tax havens were: "a group of countries with unusually low tax rates". Hines reaffirmed this approach in a 2009 paper with [[Dhammika Dharmapala]].<ref name="dhar"/>

In December 2008, Dharmapala wrote that the OECD process had removed much of the need to include "bank secrecy" in any definition of a tax haven and that it was now "first and foremost, low or zero corporate tax rates",<ref name="dhh"/> and this has become the general "financial dictionary" definition of a tax haven.<ref name="ftlex"/><ref name="Collins"/><ref name="Cambridge"/>

Hines refined his definition in 2016 to incorporate research on {{slink||Incentives for tax havens}} on governance, which is broadly accepted in the academic lexicon.<ref name="missing profits"/><ref name="eup"/><ref name="cesifo">{{cite journal|url=http://www.cesifo-group.de/DocDL/cesifo1_wp7171.pdf|title=Firms, Trade and Profit Shifting: Evidence from Aggregate Data|author1=Sébastien Laffitte|author2=Farid Toubal|journal=[[CESifo Economic Studies]]|date=July 2018|quote=Concerning the characterization of tax havens, we follow the definition proposed by Hines and Rice (1994) which has been recently used by Dharmapala and Hines (2009).|page=8|access-date=17 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180817055804/http://www.cesifo-group.de/DocDL/cesifo1_wp7171.pdf|archive-date=17 August 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>

{{blockquote|Tax havens are typically small, well-governed states that impose low or zero tax rates on foreign investors.|title=[[James R. Hines Jr.]] "Multinational Firms and Tax Havens"|source=''[[The Review of Economics and Statistics]]'' (2016)<ref name="hines2016"/>}}

===OECD–IMF (1998–2018)===
In April 1998, the OECD produced a definition of a tax haven, as meeting "three of four" criteria.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.oecd.org/ctp/harmful/42469606.pdf|title=COUNTERING OFFSHORE TAX EVASION|publisher=OECD|page=3|date=September 2009|access-date=17 June 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180211034926/https://www.oecd.org/ctp/harmful/42469606.pdf|archive-date=11 February 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.oecd.org/document/63/0,3343,en_2649_37427_30575447_1_1_1_37427,00.html |title=Tax Haven Criteria |publisher=Oecd.org |date= 26 February 2008 |access-date=2011-03-22 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120512074208/http://www.oecd.org/document/63/0,3343,en_2649_37427_30575447_1_1_1_37427,00.html |archive-date=12 May 2012 }}</ref> It was produced as part of their "Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue" initiative.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/about-the-global-forum/publications/harmful-tax-competition-emerging-global-issue.pdf|title=Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue|publisher=OECD|date=9 April 1998|access-date=17 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180624150446/http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/about-the-global-forum/publications/harmful-tax-competition-emerging-global-issue.pdf|archive-date=24 June 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> By 2000, when the OECD published their first list of tax havens,<ref name="OECDh">{{cite web|url=http://www.oecd.org/ctp/harmful/2090192.pdf|title=Towards Global Tax Co-operation|date=April 2000|page=17|publisher=[[OECD]]|quote=TAX HAVENS: 1.Andorra 2.Anguilla 3.Antigua and Barbuda 4.Aruba 5.Bahamas 6.Bahrain 7.Barbados 8.Belize 9.British Virgin Islands 10.Cook Islands 11.Dominica 12.Gibraltar 13.Grenada 14.Guernsey 15.Isle of Man 16.Jersey 17.Liberia 18.Liechtenstein 19.Maldives 20.Marshall Islands 21.Monaco 22.Montserrat 23.Nauru 24.Net Antilles 25.Niue 26.Panama 27.Samoa 28.Seychelles 29.St. Lucia 30.St. Kitts & Nevis 31.St. Vincent and the Grenadines 32.Tonga 33.Turks & Caicos 34.U.S. Virgin Islands 35.Vanuatu|access-date=1 June 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180331040150/http://www.oecd.org/ctp/harmful/2090192.pdf|archive-date=31 March 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> it included no OECD member countries as they were now all considered to have engaged in the OECD's new [[Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes]], and therefore would not meet ''Criteria ii'' and ''Criteria iii''. As the [[OECD]] has never listed any of its 35 members as tax havens, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Switzerland are sometimes defined as "OECD tax havens".<ref>{{cite journal|url=https://francisweyzig.files.wordpress.com/2013/05/weyzig-tax-treaty-shopping-20120810.pdf|title=Tax treaty shopping: structural determinants of FDI routed through the Netherlands|quote=The four OECD member countries Luxembourg, Ireland, Belgium, and Switzerland, which can also be regarded as tax havens for multinationals because of their special tax regimes.|journal=International Tax and Public Finance|author=Francis Weyzig|date=2013|volume=20|issue=6|pages=910–937|doi=10.1007/s10797-012-9250-z|s2cid=45082557|access-date=17 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180629183105/https://francisweyzig.files.wordpress.com/2013/05/weyzig-tax-treaty-shopping-20120810.pdf|archive-date=29 June 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>

In 2017, only Trinidad & Tobago met the 1998 OECD definition; that definition thus fell into disrepute.<ref name="fttt">{{cite news| url=https://www.ft.com/content/94d84054-5bf0-11e7-b553-e2df1b0c3220| title=Trinidad & Tobago left as the last blacklisted tax haven| newspaper=[[Financial Times]]| author=Vanessa Houlder| quote=Alex Cobham of the [[Tax Justice Network]] said: It's disheartening to see the OECD fall back into the old pattern of creating 'tax haven' blacklists on the basis of criteria that are so weak as to be near enough meaningless, and then declaring success when the list is empty.”| date=September 2017| access-date=27 April 2019| archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181215124710/https://www.ft.com/content/94d84054-5bf0-11e7-b553-e2df1b0c3220| archive-date=15 December 2018| url-status=live| df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.humanosphere.org/world-politics/2017/06/activists-and-experts-ridicule-oecds-tax-havens-blacklist-as-a-farce/|title=Activists and experts ridicule OECD's tax havens 'blacklist' as a farce|work=Humanosphere |quote=One of the criteria, for example, is that a country must be at least “largely compliant” with the Exchange Of Information on Request standard, a bilateral country-to-country information exchange. According to Turner, this standard is outdated and has been proven to not really work.|date=30 June 2017|access-date=20 June 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180620124912/http://www.humanosphere.org/world-politics/2017/06/activists-and-experts-ridicule-oecds-tax-havens-blacklist-as-a-farce/|archive-date=20 June 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all |last1=Lu |first1=Joanne }}</ref>

{{ordered list|type=lower-roman
|No or nominal tax on the relevant income; 
|Lack of effective exchange of information; 
|Lack of transparency; 
|''No substantial activities (e.g. tolerance of [[brass plate company|brass plate companies]])''.†
}}

(†) The 4th criterion was withdrawn after objections from the new U.S. Bush Administration in 2001,<ref name="crs2">{{cite web|url=https://info.publicintelligence.net/R40114.pdf|title=The OECD Initiative on Tax Havens|date=11 March 2010|publisher=[[Congressional Research Service]]|author=James K. Jackson|page=7|quote=As a result of the Bush Administration’s efforts, the OECD backed away from its efforts to target “harmful tax practices” and shifted the scope of its efforts to improving exchanges of tax information between member countries.|access-date=21 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130630094806/https://info.publicintelligence.net/R40114.pdf|archive-date=30 June 2013|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> and in the OECD's 2002 report the definition became "two of three criteria".<ref name="TJN1"/>

The 1998 OECD definition is most frequently invoked by the "OECD tax havens".<ref name="esri">{{cite web|url=https://igees.gov.ie/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/What-makes-a-country-a-tax-haven.pdf|title=What Makes a Country a Tax Haven? An Assessment of International Standards Shows Why Ireland Is Not a Tax Haven|publisher=[[Department of Finance (Ireland)]]/[[Economic and Social Research Institute]] Review|page=403|date=September 2013|quote=Ireland does not meet any of the OECD criteria for being a tax haven but because of its 12.5 per cent corporation tax rate and the open nature of the Irish economy, Ireland has on a few occasions been labeled a tax haven.|access-date=17 June 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180425130055/http://igees.gov.ie/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/What-makes-a-country-a-tax-haven.pdf|archive-date=25 April 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> However, that definition (as noted above) lost credibility when, in 2017, under its parameters, only Trinidad & Tobago qualified as a tax haven and has since been largely discounted by tax haven academics,<ref name="dhh"/><ref name="cesifo"/><ref name="ronen.palan">{{cite web|url=http://www.historyandpolicy.org/policy-papers/papers/history-of-tax-havens|title=History of Tax Havens|author=Ronen Palan|quote=The OECD is clearly ill-equipped to deal with tax havens, not least as many of its members, including the UK, Switzerland, Ireland and the Benelux countries are themselves considered tax havens|publisher=History and Policy|date=1 October 2009|author-link=Ronen Palan|access-date=22 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180822181338/http://www.historyandpolicy.org/policy-papers/papers/history-of-tax-havens|archive-date=22 August 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> including the 2015 [[U.S. Congressional Research Service]] investigation into tax havens, as being restrictive, and enabling Hines' low-tax havens (i.e. to which the first criterion applies), to avoid the OECD definition by improving OECD cooperation (so the second and third criteria do not apply).<ref name="CRS"/>

{{blockquote|Thus, the evidence (limited though it undoubtedly is) does not suggest any impact of the OECD initiative on tax-haven activity. [...] Thus, the OECD initiative cannot be expected to have much impact on corporate uses of tax havens, even if (or when) the initiative is fully implemented|author=[[Dhammika Dharmapala]]|source="What Problems and Opportunities are created by Tax Havens?" (December 2008)<ref name="dhh"/>}}

In April 2000, the [[Financial Stability Forum]] (or FSF) defined the related concept of an offshore financial centre (or OFC),<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r_0004b.pdf?page_moved=1|title=Report from the Working Group on Offshore Centres|publisher=[[Financial Stability Forum]]|date=5 April 2000|access-date=18 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180818214756/http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r_0004b.pdf?page_moved=1|archive-date=18 August 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> which the IMF adopted in June 2000, producing a [[Offshore financial centre#FSF–IMF 2000 List|list of 46 OFCs]].<ref name="IMF2000Paper">{{cite web|url=https://www.imf.org/external/np/mae/oshore/2000/eng/back.htm|title=Offshore Financial Centers: IMF Background Paper|publisher=[[International Monetary Fund]]|date=23 June 2000|access-date=4 September 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180823044230/http://www.imf.org/external/np/mae/oshore/2000/eng/back.htm|archive-date=23 August 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> The FSF–IMF definition focused on the [[BEPS]] tools havens offer, and on [[James R. Hines Jr.|Hines]]' observation that the accounting flows from BEPS tools are "out-of-proportion" and thus distort the economic statistics of the haven. The FSF–IMF list captured new corporate tax havens, such as the Netherlands, which Hines considered too small in 1994.<ref name="TJN1"/> In April 2007, the IMF used a more quantitative approach to generate a [[Offshore financial centre#IMF 2007 list|list of 22 major OFCs]],<ref name="imf">{{Cite web |author=Ahmed Zoromé |date=1 April 2007 |title=Concept of Offshore Financial Centers: In Search of an Operational Definition |url=http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/wp0787.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160407224029/http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/wp0787.pdf |archive-date=7 April 2016 |url-status=live |series=IMF Working Paper 07/87 |publisher=[[International Monetary Fund]] |access-date=31 May 2018 |df=dmy-all}}</ref> and in 2018 [[Offshore financial centre#IMF 2018 list|listed the eight major OFCs]] that handle 85% of all flows.<ref name="imfx"/> From about 2010, tax academics considered [[Offshore financial centre#Link to Tax Havens|OFCs and tax havens to be synonymous terms]].<ref name="missing profits"/><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.academic-foresights.com/Tax_Havens.pdf|quote=Some experts see no difference between tax havens and OFCs and employ the terms interchangeably.|title=Tax Havens and Offshore Financial Centres|publisher=University of Birmingham|author=Ronen Palan|date=4 April 2012|author-link=Ronen Palan|access-date=6 July 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180412230116/http://www.academic-foresights.com/Tax_Havens.pdf|archive-date=12 April 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref name="ronen">{{cite book|url=http://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/?GCOI=80140100541250|page=24|quote=Yet today it is difficult to distinguish between the activities of tax havens and OFCs.|title=Tax Havens and Offshore Financial Centres|publisher=Cornell University Press|author=Ronen Palan|author2=Richard Murphy|date=2010|isbn=9780801476129|series=Cornell Studies in Money|author2-link=Richard Murphy (tax campaigner)|author-link=Ronen Palan|access-date=6 July 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180628181406/http://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/?GCOI=80140100541250|archive-date=28 June 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>

===Academic quantitative (2010–2018)===
In October 2010, Hines published a list of [[James R. Hines Jr.#Hines 2010 list|52 tax havens]], which he had scaled quantitatively by analysing corporate investment flows.<ref name="h1">{{cite journal|url=https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.ie/&httpsredir=1&article=1716&context=articles|title=Treasure Islands|pages=103–125|author=James R. Hines Jr.|quote=Table 1: 52 Tax Havens|journal=[[Journal of Economic Perspectives]]|volume=4|issue=24|date=2010|author-link=James R. Hines Jr}}</ref> Hines' largest havens were dominated by corporate tax havens, which Dharmapala noted in 2014 accounted for the bulk of global tax haven activity from BEPS tools.<ref name="be">{{cite web|url=https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2385&context=law_and_economics|title=What Do We Know About Base Erosion and Profit Shifting? A Review of the Empirical Literature|publisher=[[University of Chicago]]|author=Dhammika Dharmapala|date=2014|quote=It focuses particularly on the dominant approach within the economics literature on income shifting, which dates back to Hines and Rice (1994) and which we refer to as the “Hines-Rice” approach.|page=1|author-link=Dhammika Dharmapala|access-date=17 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180720094150/https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2385&context=law_and_economics|archive-date=20 July 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> The Hines 2010 list was the first to estimate the ten largest global tax havens, only two of which, Jersey and the British Virgin Islands, were on the OECD's 2000 list.

In July 2017, the [[University of Amsterdam]]'s CORPNET group ignored any definition of a tax haven and focused on a purely quantitive approach, analysing 98 million global corporate connections on the [[Bureau van Dijk|Orbis database]]. CORPNET's lists of top five [[Conduit and Sink OFCs#Conduit OFC|Conduit OFCs]], and top five [[Conduit and Sink OFCs#Sink OFC|Sink OFCs]], matched 9 of the top 10 havens in Hines' 2010 list, only differing in the United Kingdom, which only [[Corporate haven#U.K. transformation|transformed their tax code in 2009–12]].<ref name="uk1"/> CORPNET's [[Conduit and Sink OFCs]] study split the understanding of a tax haven into two classifications:<ref name="xx">{{cite journal | author1=Javier Garcia-Bernardo | author2=Jan Fichtner | author3=Frank W. Takes | author4=Eelke M. Heemskerk | volume=7 | issue=6246 | title=Uncovering Offshore Financial Centers: Conduits and Sinks in the Global Corporate Ownership Network | journal=[[Nature (journal)|Nature]] | date=24 July 2017 | page=6246 | df=dmy-all | doi=10.1038/s41598-017-06322-9 | pmid=28740120 | pmc=5524793 | arxiv=1703.03016 | bibcode=2017NatSR...7.6246G | doi-access=free }}</ref><ref name="RTEconduit">{{cite web | url=https://www.rte.ie/brainstorm/2017/0725/892887-these-countries-are-conduits-for-the-worlds-biggest-tax-havens/ | publisher=[[RTE News]] | date=25 September 2017 | title=The countries which are conduits for the biggest tax havens | access-date=25 April 2019 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190426120033/https://www.rte.ie/brainstorm/2017/0725/892887-these-countries-are-conduits-for-the-worlds-biggest-tax-havens/ | archive-date=26 April 2019 | url-status=live | df=dmy-all }}</ref>

*  24 Sink OFCs: jurisdictions in which a disproportionate amount of value disappears from the economic system (i.e. the traditional tax havens).
*  5 Conduit OFCs: jurisdictions through which a disproportionate amount of value moves toward sink OFCs (i.e. the modern corporate tax havens).

In June 2018, tax academic [[Gabriel Zucman]] (''et alia'') published research that also ignored any definition of a tax haven, but estimated the corporate "profit shifting" (i.e. [[BEPS]]), and "enhanced corporate profitability" that Hines and Dharmapala had noted.<ref name="gbz">{{cite web|url=http://gabriel-zucman.eu/missingprofits/|title=The Missing Profits of Nations|quote=Appendix Table 2: Tax Havens|page=31|author1=Gabriel Zucman|author2=Thomas Torslov|author3=Ludvig Wier|publisher=[[National Bureau of Economic Research]], Working Papers|date=June 2018|author1-link=Gabriel Zucman|access-date=17 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190402221958/http://gabriel-zucman.eu/missingprofits/|archive-date=2 April 2019|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> Zucman pointed out that the CORPNET research under-represented havens associated with US technology firms, like Ireland and the [[Cayman Islands]], as Google, Facebook and Apple do not appear on Orbis.<ref name="zucz">{{cite web|url=http://gabriel-zucman.eu/files/TWZ2018Slides.pdf|page=35|title=The Missing Profits of Nations|author=Gabriel Zucman|publisher=[[National Bureau of Economic Research]], Working Papers|date=April 2018|author-link=Gabriel Zucman|access-date=15 May 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180612141342/http://gabriel-zucman.eu/files/TWZ2018Slides.pdf|archive-date=12 June 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> Even so, Zucman's 2018 list of top 10 havens also matched 9 of the top 10 havens in Hines' 2010 list, but with Ireland as the largest global haven.<ref name="zux">{{cite news|url=https://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/ireland-is-the-world-s-biggest-corporate-tax-haven-say-academics-1.3528401?mode=sample&auth-failed=1&pw-origin=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.irishtimes.com%2Fbusiness%2Feconomy%2Fireland-is-the-world-s-biggest-corporate-tax-haven-say-academics-1.3528401|title=Ireland is the world's biggest corporate 'tax haven', say academics|quote=New Gabriel Zucman study claims State shelters more multinational profits than the entire Caribbean|newspaper=Irish Times|date=13 June 2018|access-date=13 June 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180824044322/https://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/ireland-is-the-world-s-biggest-corporate-tax-haven-say-academics-1.3528401?mode=sample&auth-failed=1&pw-origin=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.irishtimes.com%2Fbusiness%2Feconomy%2Fireland-is-the-world-s-biggest-corporate-tax-haven-say-academics-1.3528401|archive-date=24 August 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> These lists (Hines 2010, CORPNET 2017 and Zucman 2018), and others, which followed a purely quantitive approach, showed a firm consensus around the largest corporate tax havens.

===Related definitions===
In October 2009, the [[Tax Justice Network]] introduced the [[Financial Secrecy Index]] ("FSI") and the term "secrecy jurisdiction",<ref name="tjn10"/> to highlight issues in regard to OECD-compliant countries that have high tax rates and do not appear on academic lists of tax havens, but have transparency issues. The FSI does not assess tax rates or BEPS flows in its calculation; but it is often misinterpreted as a tax haven definition in the financial media,{{efn|name=FSI}} particularly when it lists the US and Germany as major "secrecy jurisdictions".<ref name="Drucker2016"/><ref>{{cite news|last=Wood|first=Robert W.|title=The World's Next Top Tax Haven Is...America|url=https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2016/01/27/the-worlds-next-top-tax-haven-is-america|access-date=7 June 2016|work=Forbes|date=27 January 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160810004528/http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2016/01/27/the-worlds-next-top-tax-haven-is-america/|archive-date=10 August 2016|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|last=Swanson|first=Ana|title=How the U.S. became one of the world's biggest tax havens|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/04/05/how-the-u-s-became-one-of-the-worlds-biggest-tax-havens/|access-date=23 April 2016|newspaper=Washington Post|date=5 April 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160421005012/https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/04/05/how-the-u-s-became-one-of-the-worlds-biggest-tax-havens/|archive-date=21 April 2016|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>  However, many types of tax havens also rank as secrecy jurisdictions.

==Groupings==
{{See also|Tax haven#History}}

While tax havens are diverse and varied, tax academics sometimes recognise three major "groupings" of tax havens when discussing the history of their development:<ref name="ronen.palan2"/><ref name="sol.piccolo"/><ref name="jason"/><ref name="nicholas.shaxson"/>

===European-related tax havens===
As discussed in {{slink||History}}, the first recognized tax haven hub was the Zurich-Zug-Liechtenstein triangle created in the mid-1920s, later joined by Luxembourg in 1929.<ref name="ronen.palan2"/>  Privacy and secrecy were established as an important aspect of European tax havens.  However, modern European tax havens also include corporate-focussed tax havens, which maintain higher levels of OECD transparency, such as the Netherlands and Ireland.{{efn|Ireland is also connected to the British Empire–related tax havens as Ireland's common law legal system, and company tax system, are more derived from the UK, then from Continental Europe.}} European tax havens act as an important part of the global flows to tax havens, with three of the five major global Conduit OFCs being European (i.e. the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Ireland).<ref name="xx"/> Four European-related tax havens appear in the various notable {{slink||Top 10 tax havens}} lists, namely: the Netherlands, Ireland, Switzerland, and Luxembourg.

===British Empire–related tax havens===
[[File:British Overseas Territories (at the same geographic scale).svg|thumb|British Overseas Territories (same geographic scale) includes leading traditional and corporate tax global tax havens, including the U.K. itself.]]

Many tax havens are former or current dependencies of the United Kingdom and still use the same core legal structures.<ref name="sol.piccolo"/> Six British Empire–related tax havens appear in the {{slink||Top 10 tax havens}} lists, namely: Caribbean tax havens (e.g., Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, and the Cayman Islands), Channel Islands tax havens (e.g. Jersey) and Asian tax havens (e.g., Singapore and Hong Kong). As discussed in {{slink||History}}, the United Kingdom created its first "non-resident company" in 1929, and led the [[Offshore financial centre#Shadow banking and securitisation|Eurodollar offshore financial centre market]] post–World War II.<ref name="ronen.palan2"/><ref name="sol.piccolo"/>  Since the reform of its corporate tax code in 2009–2012, the UK has re-emerged as a major corporate-focused tax haven.<ref name="uk1">{{cite web|url=https://taxfoundation.org/tax-reform-uk-reversed-tide-corporate-tax-inversions/#_ftn4|title=Tax Reform in the UK Reversed the Tide of Corporate Tax Inversions|publisher=[[Tax Foundation]]|author=William McBride|date=14 October 2014|access-date=28 April 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190417155717/https://taxfoundation.org/tax-reform-uk-reversed-tide-corporate-tax-inversions/#_ftn4|archive-date=17 April 2019|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>  Two of the five major global Conduit OFCs are from this grouping (i.e. the U.K. and Singapore).<ref name="xx"/>

In November 2009, Michael Foot, a former Bank of England official and Bahamas bank inspector, delivered an integrated report on the three British [[Crown dependencies|Crown Dependencies]] (Guernsey, Isle of Man and Jersey), and the six [[British Overseas Territories|Overseas Territories]] (Anguilla, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Gibraltar, Turks and Caicos Islands), "to identify the opportunities and challenges as offshore financial centres", for the [[HM Treasury]].<ref>{{cite report|url=https://www.financialtransparency.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/foot_review_main.pdf|title=Final report of the independent Review of British offshore financial centres|date=October 2009|access-date=24 April 2019|publisher=[[HM Treasury]]|author=Sir Michael Foot|isbn=9781845325923|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190424221034/https://www.financialtransparency.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/foot_review_main.pdf|archive-date=24 April 2019|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.theguardian.com/business/2009/sep/13/british-tax-havens-need-bailouts|title=Britain 'may be forced to bail out tax havens'|date=13 September 2009|access-date=24 April 2019|newspaper=[[The Guardian]]|author=Nick Mathiason}}</ref>

===Emerging market-related tax havens===
As discussed in {{slink||History}}, most of these tax havens date from the late 1960s and effectively copied the structures and services of the above groups.<ref name="ronen.palan2"/>  Most of these tax havens are not OECD members, or in the case of British Empire–related tax havens, do not have a senior OECD member at their core.<ref name="ronen.palan2"/><ref name="jason"/>  Some have suffered setbacks during various OECD initiatives to curb tax havens (e.g. Vanuatu and Samoa).<ref name="ronen.palan2"/> However, others such as Taiwan (for AsiaPAC), and Mauritius (for Africa), have grown materially in the past decades.<ref name="jason"/> Taiwan has been described as the "Switzerland of Asia", with a focus on secrecy.<ref name="TaiwanTJN"/> Although no Emerging market-related tax haven ranks in the five major global Conduit OFCs or any {{slink||Top 10 tax havens}} lists, both Taiwan and Mauritius rank in the top ten global Sink OFCs.<ref name="xx"/>

== <span class="anchor" id="Tax haven lists"></span> Lists ==
{{See also|Offshore financial centre#Offshore Financial Centre lists}}

===Types of lists===
Three main types of tax haven lists have been produced to date:<ref name="CRS"/>

{{ordered list|type=lower-roman
| Governmental, Qualitative: these lists are qualitative and political;<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.taxjustice.net/2018/07/27/blacklist-whitewashed-how-the-oecd-bent-its-rules-to-help-tax-haven-usa/|title=Blacklist, whitewashed: How the OECD bent its rules to help tax haven USA|publisher=[[Tax Justice Network]]|author=Andres Knobel|quote=We’ve criticised for years the farcical nature of ‘tax haven’ blacklists, whether EU or OECD ones. They all turn out to be politicised, misleading and ineffective|date=27 July 2018|access-date=22 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180822113409/https://www.taxjustice.net/2018/07/27/blacklist-whitewashed-how-the-oecd-bent-its-rules-to-help-tax-haven-usa/|archive-date=22 August 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> they never list members (or each other), and are largely disregarded by academic research;<ref name="dhh"/><ref name="ronen.palan"/> the EU had 16 countries on [[European Union tax haven blacklist|its 2023 list]], Russia is the only OECD or EU country, or {{slink||Top 10 tax havens}}.<ref name="ced">{{cite news|url=https://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/outbreak-of-so-whatery-over-eu-tax-haven-blacklist-1.3318149|title=Outbreak of 'so whatery' over EU tax haven blacklist|newspaper=Irish Times|quote=It was certainly an improvement on the list recently published by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, which featured only one name – Trinidad & Tobago – but campaigners believe the European Union has much more to do if it is to prove it is serious about addressing tax havens.|date=7 December 2017|access-date=19 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171207132025/https://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/outbreak-of-so-whatery-over-eu-tax-haven-blacklist-1.3318149|archive-date=7 December 2017|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref name="ft.com">{{cite news|url=https://www.ft.com/content/c4d721dc-d9cf-11e7-a039-c64b1c09b482|title=EU puts 17 countries on tax haven blacklist|quote=EU members were not screened but Oxfam said that if the criteria were applied to publicly available information the list should feature 35 countries including EU members Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Malta|newspaper=Financial Times|date=8 December 2017|access-date=19 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180623222112/https://www.ft.com/content/c4d721dc-d9cf-11e7-a039-c64b1c09b482|archive-date=23 June 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>
| [[Financial Secrecy Index]] (although the FSI is a list of "financial secrecy jurisdictions", and not specifically tax havens).{{efn|name=FSI}}
| Non-governmental, Quantitative:  by following an objective quantitative approach, they can rank the relative scale of individual havens; the best known are:
* Tax rate – focus on ''effective tax rates'', like the [[James R. Hines Jr.#Hines-Rice 1994 list|Hines–Rice 1994 list]],<ref name="h3"/> and the [[Dhammika Dharmapala#Dharmapala-Hines 2009 list|Dharmapala–Hines 2009 list]].<ref name="dhar"/> (Hines and Dharmapala avoided ''rankings'' in these lists).
* Connections – focus on ''legal connections'', either [[Bureau van Dijk|Orbis connections]] like CORPNET's 2017 [[Conduit and Sink OFCs]], or subsidiary connections like the [[Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy#ITEP 2017 tax haven list (by quantum of connections)|ITEP Connections 2017 list]].<ref name="ITEP"/>
* Quantum – focus on ''profits shifted'', either BEPS flows like the [[Gabriel Zucman#Zucman-Tørsløv-Wier 2018 list|Zucman–Tørsløv–Wier 2018 list]],<ref name="gbz"/><ref name="zuc10">{{cite news|url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/corporations-push-profits-into-tax-havens-as-countries-struggle-in-pursuit-study-says-1528634659|title=Zucman:Corporations Push Profits Into Corporate Tax Havens as Countries Struggle in Pursuit, Gabrial Zucman Study Says|quote=The new research draws on data from countries such as Ireland, Luxembourg and the Netherlands that hadn’t previously been collected.|newspaper=Wall Street Journal|date=10 June 2018|access-date=13 June 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190404203053/https://www.wsj.com/articles/corporations-push-profits-into-tax-havens-as-countries-struggle-in-pursuit-study-says-1528634659|archive-date=4 April 2019|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> [[Foreign direct investment|FDI]] flows like the [[James R. Hines Jr.#Hines 2010 list|James Hines 2010 list]],<ref name="h1"/> or Profits like the [[Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy#ITEP 2017 tax haven list (by quantum of profits)|ITEP Profits 2017 list]].{{efn|name=ITEP|The ITEP list only focuses on Fortune 500 Companies; its strong correlation with tax haven lists derived from global studies highlights that U.S multinationals are the most dominant source of global tax avoidance, and users of tax havens.}}<ref name="ITEP">{{cite web|url=https://itep.org/wp-content/uploads/offshoreshellgames2017.pdf|title=Offshore Shell Games 2017|quote=Amount of Tax Haven Connections (Figure 1, Page 11), Amount of Tax Haven Profits (Figure 4, Page 16)|author1=Richard Phillips|author2=Matt Gardner|author3=Alexandria Robins|author4=Michelle Surka|publisher=[[Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy]]|date=2017}}</ref>
}}

Research also highlights [[Corporate haven#Proxy tests|proxy indicators]], of which the two most prominent are:
{{ordered list|type=lower-roman
| U.S. [[tax inversion]]s – A "sense-check" of a tax haven is whether individuals or entities redomicile themselves into a lower tax jurisdiction to legally avoid high US corporate tax rates, and additionally because of the advantage for a multinational company to be based in a territorial tax regime such as Ireland. The top 3 destinations for all U.S. corporate [[tax inversion]]s since 1983 are: Ireland (#1), Bermuda (#2) and the U.K. (#3);<ref name="bbb">{{cite web|url=https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/tax-inversion-tracker/|title=Tracking the tax runaways|publisher=[[Bloomberg News]]|author=Zachary Mider|date=1 March 2017|access-date=24 April 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181031060724/https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/tax-inversion-tracker/|archive-date=31 October 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>
| [[List of countries by GDP (PPP) per capita|GDP-per-capita]] tables – Another "sense–check" of a tax haven is distortion in its GDP data from the IP–based BEPS tools and  Debt–based BEPS tools.  Excluding the non-oil & gas nations (e.g. Qatar, Norway), and micro jurisdictions, the resulting highest [[List of countries by GDP (PPP) per capita#Distorted GDP-per-capita for tax havens|GDP-per-capita]] countries are tax havens, led by: Luxembourg (#1), Singapore (#2), and Ireland (#3).
}}

=== <span class="anchor" id="Top 10 tax havens"></span> Top 10 tax havens===
The post-2010 rise in quantitative techniques of identifying tax havens has resulted in a more stable list of the largest tax havens.  [[Dhammika Dharmapala|Dharmapala]] notes that as corporate BEPS flows dominate tax haven activity, these are mostly corporate tax havens.<ref name="be"/>  Nine of the top ten tax havens in [[Gabriel Zucman]]'s June 2018 study also appear in the top ten lists of the two other quantitative studies since 2010. Four of the top five Conduit OFCs are represented; however, the UK only [[Corporate haven#U.K. transformation|transformed its tax code]] in 2009–2012.<ref name="uk1"/>  All five of the top 5 Sink OFCs are represented, although Jersey only appears in the Hines 2010 list.

The studies capture the rise of Ireland and Singapore, both major regional headquarters for some of the largest BEPS tool users, [[Apple Inc.|Apple]], [[Google]] and [[Facebook]].<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.irishtimes.com/business/commercial-property/tech-giants-eating-up-dublin-s-office-market-1.3455742|title=Tech giants eating up Dublin's office market|newspaper=Irish Times|date=18 April 2018|access-date=19 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180513224039/https://www.irishtimes.com/business/commercial-property/tech-giants-eating-up-dublin-s-office-market-1.3455742|archive-date=13 May 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.cnbc.com/2016/11/10/googles-new-apac-headquarters-in-singapore-is-a-blend-of-office-building-and-tech-campus.html|title=Google's new APAC headquarters in Singapore is a blend of office building and tech campus|publisher=CNBC|date=November 2016|access-date=19 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180710003456/https://www.cnbc.com/2016/11/10/googles-new-apac-headquarters-in-singapore-is-a-blend-of-office-building-and-tech-campus.html|archive-date=10 July 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/facebook-s-singapore-office-will-make-you-want-to-quit-your-job-a6675511.html|title=Facebook's Singapore APAC Headquarters|newspaper=The Independent|date=October 2015|access-date=19 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180629160620/https://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/facebook-s-singapore-office-will-make-you-want-to-quit-your-job-a6675511.html|archive-date=29 June 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>  In Q1 2015, Apple completed the largest BEPS action in history, when it shifted US$300 billion of IP to Ireland, which Nobel-prize economist [[Paul Krugman]] called "[[leprechaun economics]]".  In September 2018, using TCJA repatriation tax data, the [[National Bureau of Economic Research|NBER]] listed the ''key tax havens'' as: "Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Switzerland, Singapore, Bermuda and [the] Caribbean havens".<ref name="zucwright"/><ref name="japantimes"/>

{| class="wikitable"
|+ style="text-align: left;" | Comparison of top ten tax havens from the major quantitative studies since 2010:
|-
! style="text-align:left" | List
! style="text-align:left" | [[James R. Hines Jr.#Hines 2010 list|Hines 2010]]<ref name="h1"/>
! style=";text-align:left" | [[Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy#ITEP 2017 tax haven list (by quantum of profits)|ITEP 2017]]{{efn|name=ITEP}}<ref name="ITEP"/>
! style=";text-align:left" | [[Gabriel Zucman#Zucman-Tørsløv-Wier 2018 list|Zucman 2018]]<ref name="gbz"/>
|-
! style="text-align:left" | Quantum
! style="text-align:left" | [[Foreign direct investment|FDI]]
! style=";text-align:left" |Profits
! style=";text-align:left" |[[BEPS]]
|-
! style="text-align:left" | Rank
|-
| 1 || align="left" | Luxembourg*‡ || Netherlands*† || Ireland*†
|-
| 2 || align="left" | Cayman Islands* || Ireland*† || Caribbean: Cayman Islands*<br/>& British Virgin Islands*‡Δ
|-
| 3 || align="left" | Ireland*† || Bermuda*‡ || Singapore*†
|-
| 4 || align="left" | Switzerland*† || Luxembourg*‡ || Switzerland*†
|-
| 5 || align="left" | Bermuda*‡ || Cayman Islands* || Netherlands*†
|-
| 6 || align="left" | Hong Kong*‡ || Switzerland*† || Luxembourg*‡
|-
| 7 || align="left" | Jersey‡Δ || Singapore*† || Puerto Rico
|-
| 8 || align="left" | Netherlands*† || BahamasΔ || Hong Kong*‡
|-
| 9 || align="left" | Singapore*† || Hong Kong*‡ || Bermuda*‡
|-
| 10 || align="left" | British Virgin Islands*‡Δ || British Virgin Islands*‡Δ || (n.a. as "Caribbean"<br/>contains 2 havens)
|}

(*) Appears as a top ten tax haven in all three lists; 9 major tax havens meet this criterion, ''Ireland, Singapore, Switzerland and the Netherlands (the Conduit OFCs), and the Cayman Islands, British Virgin Islands, Luxembourg, Hong Kong and Bermuda (the Sink OFCs)''.<br/>
(†) Also appears as one of 5 [[Conduit and Sink OFCs#Conduit OFC|Conduit OFCs]] (Ireland, Singapore, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom), in CORPNET's 2017 research; or<br/>
(‡) Also appears as a Top 5 [[Conduit and Sink OFCs#Sink OFC|Sink OFC]] (British Virgin Islands, Luxembourg, Hong Kong, Jersey, Bermuda), in CORPNET's 2017 research.<br/>
(Δ) Identified on the first, and largest, OECD 2000 list of 35 tax havens (the OECD list only contained Trinidad & Tobago by 2017).<ref name="OECDh"/><ref name="fttt"/>

The strongest consensus amongst academics regarding the world's largest tax havens is therefore: Ireland, Singapore, Switzerland and the Netherlands (the major Conduit OFCs), and the Cayman Islands, British Virgin Islands, Luxembourg, Hong Kong and Bermuda (the major Sink OFCs), with the United Kingdom (a major Conduit OFC) still in transformation.

Of these ten major havens, all except the United Kingdom and the Netherlands featured on the original [[James R. Hines Jr.#Hines-Rice 1994 list|Hines–Rice 1994 list]]. The United Kingdom was not a tax haven in 1994, and Hines estimated the Netherlands's effective tax rate in 1994 at over 20%. (Hines identified Ireland as having the lowest effective tax rate at 4%.) Four of these: Ireland, Singapore, Switzerland (3 of the 5 top Conduit OFCs), and Hong Kong (a top 5 Sink OFC), featured in the Hines–Rice 1994 list's ''7 major tax havens'' subcategory; highlighting a lack of progress in curtailing tax havens.<ref name="h3"/>

In terms of [[Corporate haven#Proxy tests|proxy indicators]], this list, excluding Canada, contains all seven of the countries that received more than one US [[tax inversion]] since 1982 (see [[Tax inversion#US inversions|here]]).<ref name="bbb"/> In addition, six of these major tax havens are in the top 15 [[List of countries by GDP (PPP) per capita#Distorted GDP-per-capita for tax havens|GDP-per-capita]], and of the four others, three of them, the Caribbean locations, are not included in IMF-World Bank GDP-per-capita tables.

In a June 2018 joint IMF report into the effect of BEPS flows on global economic data, eight of the above (excluding Switzerland and the United Kingdom) were cited as the world's leading tax havens.<ref name="imfx"/>

=== <span class="anchor" id="Top 20 tax havens"></span> Top 20 tax havens===
The longest list from ''Non-governmental, Quantitative'' research on tax havens is the University of Amsterdam CORPNET July 2017 [[Conduit and Sink OFCs]] study, at 29 (5 Conduit OFCs and 25 Sink OFCs).  The following are the 20 largest (5 Conduit OFCs and 15 Sink OFCs), which reconcile with other main lists as follows:

(*) Appears in as a {{slink||Top 10 tax havens}} in all three quantitative lists, Hines 2010, ITEP 2017 and Zucman 2018 (above); all nine such {{slink||Top 10 tax haven}}s are listed below.<br/>
(♣) Appears on the [[James R. Hines Jr.#Hines 2010 list|James Hines 2010 list]] of 52 tax havens; 17 of the 20 locations below, are on the James Hines 2010 list.<br/>
(Δ) Identified on the largest OECD 2000 list of 35 tax havens (the OECD list only contained Trinidad & Tobago by 2017); only four locations below were ever on an OECD list.<ref name="OECDh"/><br/> 
(↕) Identified on the European Union's first 2017 list of 17 tax havens;<ref name="eu havens"/> only one location below is on the EU 2017 list.

Sovereign states that feature mainly as major corporate tax havens are:

* *♣[[Republic of Ireland|Ireland]] – a major corporate tax haven, and ranked by some tax academics as the largest;<ref name="gzuc">{{cite web|url=http://gabriel-zucman.eu/files/TWZ2018Slides.pdf|page=68|title=The Missing Profits of Nations|author=Gabriel Zucman|date=April 2018|access-date=15 May 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180612141342/http://gabriel-zucman.eu/files/TWZ2018Slides.pdf|archive-date=12 June 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref name="zuc10"/><ref name="japantimes"/><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/ireland-is-the-world-s-biggest-corporate-tax-haven-say-academics-1.3528401?mode=sample&auth-failed=1&pw-origin=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.irishtimes.com%2Fbusiness%2Feconomy%2Fireland-is-the-world-s-biggest-corporate-tax-haven-say-academics-1.3528401|title=Ireland is the world's biggest corporate 'tax haven', say academics|quote=Study claims State shelters more multinational profits than the entire Caribbean|newspaper=Irish Times|date=13 June 2018|access-date=13 June 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180824044322/https://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/ireland-is-the-world-s-biggest-corporate-tax-haven-say-academics-1.3528401?mode=sample&auth-failed=1&pw-origin=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.irishtimes.com%2Fbusiness%2Feconomy%2Fireland-is-the-world-s-biggest-corporate-tax-haven-say-academics-1.3528401|archive-date=24 August 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>  leader in IP–based BEPS tools (e.g. double Irish), but also Debt-based BEPS tools.<ref name="bbb"/><ref name="bbbg">{{Cite web|url=https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/infographics/u-s-profits-in-ireland-pile-up.html|title=Ireland: Where Profits Pile Up, Helping Multinationals Keep Taxes Low|publisher=Bloomberg News|date=October 2013|access-date=23 May 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180516033549/https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/infographics/u-s-profits-in-ireland-pile-up.html|archive-date=16 May 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>
* *♣[[Singapore]] – the major corporate tax haven for Asia (APAC headquarters for most US technology firms), and key conduit to core Asian [[Conduit and Sink OFCs|Sink OFCs]], Hong Kong and Taiwan.<ref name="singapore">{{cite news|url=https://www.smh.com.au/business/multinationals-channel-more-money-through-hubs-in-singapore-switzerland-than-ever-before-tax-office-says-20150204-1363u5.html|title=Multinationals channel more money through "hubs" in Singapore, Switzerland than ever before, Tax Office says|newspaper=Sydney Morning Herald|date=5 February 2015|access-date=23 May 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180522042115/https://www.smh.com.au/business/multinationals-channel-more-money-through-hubs-in-singapore-switzerland-than-ever-before-tax-office-says-20150204-1363u5.html|archive-date=22 May 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>
* *♣[[Netherlands]] – a major corporate tax haven,<ref name="guar"/> and the largest [[Conduit and Sink OFCs|Conduit OFC]] via its IP-based BEPS tools (e.g. [[Dutch Sandwich (tax avoidance)|Dutch Sandwich]]); traditional leader in Debt-based BEPS tools.<ref>{{cite web| url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-02/google-s-dutch-sandwich-shielded-16-billion-euros-from-tax| title=Google's 'Dutch Sandwich' Shielded 16 Billion Euros From Tax| publisher=Bloomberg| date=2 January 2018| access-date=23 May 2018| archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180605192813/https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-02/google-s-dutch-sandwich-shielded-16-billion-euros-from-tax| archive-date=5 June 2018| url-status=live| df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref name="dut">{{cite web|url=https://thecorrespondent.com/6942/bermuda-guess-again-turns-out-holland-is-the-tax-haven-of-choice-for-us-companies/417639737658-b85252de|title=Bermuda? Guess again. Turns out Holland is the tax haven of choice for US companies|publisher=The Correspondent|date=30 June 2017|access-date=23 May 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170813222811/https://thecorrespondent.com/6942/bermuda-guess-again-turns-out-holland-is-the-tax-haven-of-choice-for-us-companies/417639737658-b85252de|archive-date=13 August 2017|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> 
* [[United Kingdom]] – rising corporate tax haven after [[Corporate haven#U.K. transformation|restructuring tax code in 2009–12]]; 17 of the 24 Sink OFCs are current or former dependencies of the UK (see Sink OFC table).<ref name="bloom"/><ref name="bbb"/>

Sovereign states or autonomous regions that feature as both major corporate tax havens and major traditional tax havens:

* *♣[[Switzerland]] – both a major traditional tax haven (or [[Conduit and Sink OFCs#Sink OFC|Sink OFC]]), and a major corporate tax haven (or [[Conduit and Sink OFCs#Conduit OFC|Conduit OFC]]), and strongly linked{{citation needed|date=August 2018}} to major [[Conduit and Sink OFCs#Sink OFC|Sink OFC]], Jersey.
* *♣[[Luxembourg]] – one of the largest [[Conduit and Sink OFCs#Sink OFC|Sink OFCs]] in the world (a terminus for many corporate tax havens, especially Ireland and the Netherlands).<ref>{{Cite web |last1=Markle |first1=Kevin S. |last2=Shackelford |first2=Douglas A. |date=June 2009 |title=Do Multinationals or Domestic Firms Face higher Effective Tax Rates? |url=https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w15091/w15091.pdf |publisher=[[National Bureau of Economic Research]] |doi=10.3386/w15091 |doi-access=free}}</ref>
* *♣[[Hong Kong]] – the "Luxembourg of Asia", and almost as large a [[Conduit and Sink OFCs#Sink OFC|Sink OFC]] as Luxembourg; tied to APAC's largest corporate tax haven, Singapore.

[[File:List of sink-OFCs, ordered by sink centrality value.png|thumb|"Uncovering Offshore Financial Centers": List of [[Conduit and Sink OFCs|Sink OFCs]] ordered by value]]

Sovereign (including de facto) states that feature mainly as traditional tax havens (but have non-zero tax rates):
* [[Taiwan]] – major traditional tax haven for APAC, and described by the [[Tax Justice Network]] as the "Switzerland of Asia".<ref name="TaiwanTJN">{{cite web|url=https://www.taxjustice.net/2016/02/10/taiwan-the-un-noticed-asian-tax-haven/|title=Taiwan, the un-noticed Asian tax haven?|publisher=[[Tax Justice Network]]|date=10 February 2016|access-date=24 April 2019|author=Nicholas Shaxson|author-link=Nicholas Shaxson}}</ref>
* ♣[[Malta]] – an emerging tax haven inside the EU,<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/national/79320/scientists_find_name_for_maltas_tax_haven_rep_#.WsIY14jwZPY|title=Scientists have found a way of showing how Malta is a global top ten tax haven|newspaper=Malta Today|date=31 July 2017|access-date=31 May 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180403051427/https://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/national/79320/scientists_find_name_for_maltas_tax_haven_rep_#.WsIY14jwZPY|archive-date=3 April 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20170729/local/malta-is-main-eu-tax-haven-study.654369|title='Malta is main EU tax haven' - study|publisher=Times Malta|date=29 July 2017|last=Borg|first=Jacob|access-date=31 May 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180716224154/https://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20170729/local/malta-is-main-eu-tax-haven-study.654369|archive-date=16 July 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> which has been a target of wider media scrutiny.<ref>{{cite news |url= https://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20170520/local/malta-is-a-target-for-italian-mafia-russia-loan-sharks-damning-report.648474 |title= Malta is a target for Italian mafia, Russia loan sharks, damning probe says |newspaper= Times of Malta |date= 20 May 2017 |access-date= 31 May 2018 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20180708191923/https://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20170520/local/malta-is-a-target-for-italian-mafia-russia-loan-sharks-damning-report.648474 |archive-date= 8 July 2018 |url-status= live |df= dmy-all }}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-40026826|title=Is Malta really Europe's 'pirate base' for tax?|last=Grech|first=Herman|work=[[BBC News]]|date=2017-05-25|access-date=2019-04-07|language=en-GB|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190407092234/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-40026826|archive-date=7 April 2019|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>

Sovereign or sub-national states that are very traditional tax havens (i.e. explicit 0% rate of tax) include (fuller list in table opposite):
*♣Δ[[Jersey]] (United Kingdom dependency),<ref name="nicholas.shaxson">{{cite book | author=Nicholas Shaxson | title = Treasure Islands: Uncovering the Damage of Offshore Banking and Tax Havens | publisher = Palgrave Macmillan | year=2011 | isbn = 978-0-230-10501-0 | title-link = Treasure Islands: Tax Havens and the Men Who Stole the World | author-link = Nicholas Shaxson }}</ref> still a major traditional tax haven; the CORPNET research identifies a very strong connection with Conduit OFC Switzerland (i.e. Switzerland is increasingly relying on Jersey as a traditional tax haven); issues of financial stability.<ref name="jersey"/>
*(♣Δ''[[Isle of Man]]'' (United Kingdom dependency), the "failing tax haven",<ref>{{cite web| url=http://www.taxresearch.org.uk/Blog/2017/08/02/the-isle-of-man-is-failing-at-being-a-tax-haven/| title=The Isle of Man is failing at being a tax haven| publisher=Tax Research UK| date=2 August 2017| access-date=23 May 2018| archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180617165221/http://www.taxresearch.org.uk/Blog/2017/08/02/the-isle-of-man-is-failing-at-being-a-tax-haven/| archive-date=17 June 2018| url-status=live| df=dmy-all}}</ref> not in the CORPNET study (discussed [[Conduit and Sink OFCs#Isle of Man omitted|here]]), but included for completeness.)
*''Current [[British Overseas Territories]]'', see table opposite, where 17 of the 24 Sink OFCs are current, or past, U.K. dependencies:
** *♣Δ[[British Virgin Islands]], the largest Sink OFC in the world and regularly appears alongside the Caymans and Bermuda (the Caribbean "triad") as a group.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tax-havens-idUSBREA0R1KF20140128|title=Top tax haven got more investment in 2013 than India and Brazil: U.N|newspaper=Reuters|access-date=29 July 2015|date=2014-01-28|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150908204520/http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/28/us-tax-havens-idUSBREA0R1KF20140128|archive-date=8 September 2015|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2014/jan/21/china-british-virgin-islands-wealth-offshore-havens|title=China's princelings storing riches in Caribbean offshore haven|author=Guardian US interactive team|work=The Guardian|access-date=29 July 2015|date=2014-01-21}}</ref>
** *♣[[Bermuda]],<ref>Dan Nakaso: U.S. tax shelter appears secure; ''San Jose Mercury News'', 25 Dec. 2012, pp. 1, 5</ref> does feature as a U.S. corporate tax haven; only 2nd to Ireland as a destination for U.S. tax inversions.<ref name="bbb"/>
** *♣[[Cayman Islands]],<ref>William Brittain-Catlin (2005): ''Offshore – The Dark Side of the Global Economy''; Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005.</ref> also features as a major U.S. corporate tax haven; 6th most popular destination for U.S. corporate tax inversions.<ref name="bbb"/>
** ♣Δ[[Gibraltar]] – like the Isle of Man, has declined due to concerns, even by the U.K., over its practices.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/apr/08/defend-gibraltar-condemn-it-as-dodgy-tax-haven|title=Defend Gibraltar? Better condemn it as a dodgy tax haven|newspaper=The Guardian|date=9 April 2017|access-date=1 June 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180622140136/https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/apr/08/defend-gibraltar-condemn-it-as-dodgy-tax-haven|archive-date=22 June 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>
* ♣[[Mauritius]] – has become a major tax haven for both Asian (especially India) and African economies, and now ranking 8th overall.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.theguardian.com/business/2013/nov/03/deloittes-tax-savings-investments-in-poor-countries|title=Deloitte promotes Mauritius as tax haven to avoid big payouts to poor African nations|newspaper=The Guardian|date=3 November 2013}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.irishtimes.com/business/rise-of-tax-haven-mauritius-comes-at-the-expense-of-rest-of-africa-1.3282982|title=Rise of tax haven Mauritius comes at the expense of rest of Africa|newspaper=Irish Times|date=7 November 2017|access-date=2 June 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180622140142/https://www.irishtimes.com/business/rise-of-tax-haven-mauritius-comes-at-the-expense-of-rest-of-africa-1.3282982|archive-date=22 June 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>
* [[Curaçao]] – the Dutch dependency ranked 8th on Oxfam's tax haven list, and the 12th largest Sink OFC, and recently made the EU's greylist.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://nltimes.nl/2017/12/06/eu-releases-tax-haven-blacklist-netherlands|title=EU RELEASES TAX HAVEN BLACKLIST; NETHERLANDS NOT ON IT|publisher=NL.com|date=6 December 2017}}</ref>
* ♣Δ[[Liechtenstein]] – long-established very traditional European tax haven and just outside of the top 10 global Sink OFCs.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.independent.co.uk/news/long_reads/liechtenstein-tax-haven-super-rich-trust-lost-beneficiaries-trustees-legal-laws-a8239956.html|title=Liechtenstein: The mysterious tax heaven that's losing the trust of the super-rich|publisher=The Independent U.K.|date=8 March 2018|access-date=2 June 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180622114547/https://www.independent.co.uk/news/long_reads/liechtenstein-tax-haven-super-rich-trust-lost-beneficiaries-trustees-legal-laws-a8239956.html|archive-date=22 June 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>
* ♣Δ[[Bahamas]] – acts as both a traditional tax haven (ranked 12th Sink OFC), and ranks 8th on the [[Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy|ITEP]] profits list (figure 4, page 16)<ref name="ITEP"/> of corporate havens; 3rd highest ''secrecy score'' on the [[Financial Secrecy Index|FSI]].
* ♣Δ↕[[Samoa]] – a traditional tax haven (ranked 14th Sink OFC), used to have one of the highest ''secrecy scores'' on the [[Financial Secrecy Index|FSI]], since reduced moderately.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://pacificguardians.org/blog/2015/02/15/samoa-ranked-no-1-as-worlds-most-secretive-tax-haven-potential-for-more-investors/|title=SAMOA: Ranked No.1 as world's most secretive tax haven, potential for more investors|date=15 February 2015|publisher=Pacific Guardians|access-date=22 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180105143403/http://pacificguardians.org/blog/2015/02/15/samoa-ranked-no-1-as-worlds-most-secretive-tax-haven-potential-for-more-investors/|archive-date=5 January 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>

===Historic broad lists of tax havens===
Post–2010 research on tax havens is focused on quantitative analysis (which can be ranked), and tends to ignore very small tax havens where data is limited as the haven is used for individual tax avoidance rather than corporate tax avoidance. The last credible broad unranked list of global tax havens is the [[James R. Hines Jr.#Hines 2010 list|James Hines 2010 list]] of 52 tax havens. It is shown below but expanded to 55 to include havens identified in the July 2017 [[Conduit and Sink OFCs]] study that were not considered havens in 2010, namely the United Kingdom, Taiwan, and Curaçao. The James Hines 2010 list contains 34 of the original 35 OECD tax havens;<ref name="OECDh"/> and compared with the {{slink||Top 10 tax havens}} and {{slink||Top 20 tax havens}} above, show OECD processes focus on the compliance of tiny havens.

{{columns-list|colwidth=15em|

{{ordered list
|AndorraΔ
|Anguilla‡Δ
|Antigua and BarbudaΔ
|ArubaΔ
|Bahamas‡Δ
|Bahrain↕Δ
|Barbados↕Δ
|Belize‡Δ
|Bermuda‡
|British Virgin Islands‡Δ
|Cayman Islands‡
|Cook IslandsΔ
|Costa Rica
|[Curaçao‡] not on Hines list
|Cyprus‡
|Djibouti
|DominicaΔ
|Gibraltar‡Δ
|Grenada↕Δ
|GuernseyΔ
|Hong Kong‡
|Ireland†
|Isle of ManΔ
|Jersey‡Δ
|Jordan
|Lebanon
|Liberia‡Δ
|Liechtenstein‡Δ
|Luxembourg‡
|Macao↕
|MaldivesΔ
|Malta‡
|Marshall Islands‡↕Δ
|Mauritius‡
|Micronesia
|Monaco‡Δ
|MontserratΔ
|Nauru‡Δ
|Netherlands† & AntillesΔ
|NiueΔ
|Panama↕Δ
|Samoa‡↕Δ
|San Marino
|Seychelles‡Δ
|Singapore†
|St. Kitts and NevisΔ
|St. Lucia↕Δ
|St. Martin
|St. Vincent and the Grenadines‡Δ
|Switzerland†
|[Taiwan‡] not on Hines list
|TongaΔ
|Turks and CaicosΔ
|[United Kingdom†] not on Hines list
|VanuatuΔ
}}
}}

(†) Identified as one of the 5 [[Conduit and Sink OFCs#Conduit OFC|Conduits]] by CORPNET in 2017; the above list has 5 of the 5.<br/>
(‡) Identified as one of the largest 24 [[Conduit and Sink OFCs#Sink OFC|Sinks]] by CORPNET in 2017; the above list has 23 of the 24 (Guyana missing).<br/>
(↕) Identified on the European Union's first 2017 list of 17 tax havens; the above list contains 8 of the 17.<ref name="eu havens"/><br/>
(Δ) Identified on the first, and the largest, OECD 2000 list of 35 tax havens (the OECD list only contained Trinidad & Tobago by 2017); the above list contains 34 of the 35 (U.S. Virgin Islands missing).<ref name="OECDh"/>

===Unusual cases===
U.S. dedicated entities:

* [[Delaware]] ([[United States]]), a unique "onshore" specialised haven with strong secrecy laws and a liberal incorporation regime; however Federal and State tax apply (see {{slink||History}}).<ref>Leslie Wayne (2012): [https://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/01/business/how-delaware-thrives-as-a-corporate-tax-haven.html How Delaware Thrives as a Corporate Tax Haven] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180612212511/https://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/01/business/how-delaware-thrives-as-a-corporate-tax-haven.html |date=12 June 2018 }}; ''The New York Times'', 30 Jun. 2012.</ref>
* [[Puerto Rico]] (United States), almost a corporate tax haven "concession" by the U.S.,<ref>Reuven S. Avi-Yonah (2012): Statement to Congress; University of Michigan School of Law, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, U.S. Congress, 20 Sep. 2012.</ref> but which the [[Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017]] mostly removed.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://money.cnn.com/2017/12/20/news/economy/puerto-rico-tax-bill/index.html|title=Puerto Rico Governor: GOP tax bill is 'serious setback' for the island|publisher=CNN|date=20 September 2017|access-date=1 June 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180527105742/http://money.cnn.com/2017/12/20/news/economy/puerto-rico-tax-bill/index.html|archive-date=27 May 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>

Major sovereign States that feature on financial secrecy lists (e.g. the [[Financial Secrecy Index]]), but not on corporate tax haven or traditional tax haven lists, are:

* United States – noted for secrecy, per the Financial Secrecy Index (see [[United States as a tax haven]]); makes a "controversial" appearance on some lists.<ref name="Drucker2016">{{cite web|url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-27/the-world-s-favorite-new-tax-haven-is-the-united-states|title=The World's Favorite New Tax Haven Is the United States|author=Jesse Drucker|date=27 January 2016|work=Bloomberg.com|access-date=11 March 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170311164127/https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-27/the-world-s-favorite-new-tax-haven-is-the-united-states|archive-date=11 March 2017|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>
* [[Germany]] – similar to the U.S., Germany can be included on lists for its tax secrecy, per the Financial Secrecy Index.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://global.handelsblatt.com/finance/a-german-tax-haven-626845|title=A German Tax Haven|website=Handelsblatt Global|date=25 October 2016|first=Konrad|last=Fischer|access-date=23 May 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180524004334/https://global.handelsblatt.com/finance/a-german-tax-haven-626845|archive-date=24 May 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>

Neither the U.S. nor Germany have appeared on any tax haven lists by the main academic leaders in tax haven research, namely [[James R. Hines Jr.]], [[Dhammika Dharmapala]], or [[Gabriel Zucman]]. There are no known cases of foreign firms executing [[tax inversion]]s to the U.S. or Germany for tax purposes, a basic characteristic of a corporate tax haven.<ref name="bbb"/>

===Former tax havens===
* [[Beirut]], [[Lebanon]] formerly had a reputation as the only tax haven in the [[Middle East]]. However, this changed after the [[Intra Bank]] crash of 1966,<ref>{{cite news|url =http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,945606-1,00.html|title =Lebanon: Election Under Fire|work =Time Magazine|date =17 May 1976|url-access =subscription|archive-url =https://web.archive.org/web/20070930191003/http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,945606-1,00.html|archive-date =30 September 2007|url-status =dead|df =dmy-all}}</ref> and the subsequent political and military deterioration of Lebanon dissuaded foreign use of the country as a tax haven.
* [[Liberia]] had a prosperous [[flag of convenience|ship registration industry]]. The series of bloody [[First Liberian Civil War|civil wars]] in the 1990s and early 2000s severely damaged confidence in the country. The fact that the ship registration business still continues is partly a testament to its early success, and partly a testament to moving the national shipping registry to New York, United States.
* The [[Tangier International Zone]] had a short existence as a tax haven in the period between the end of effective control by the Spanish in 1945 until it was formally reunited with [[Morocco]] in 1956.
* Some Pacific islands were tax havens but were curtailed by OECD demands for regulation and transparency in the late 1990s, on the threat of blacklisting. [[Vanuatu]]'s Financial Services commissioner said in May 2008 that his country would reform laws and cease being a tax haven. "We've been associated with this stigma for a long time and we now aim to get away from being a tax haven."<ref>{{cite web|url = http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,23652068-2702,00.html|title = Vanuatu to ditch tax haven|first = Anthony|last = Klan|work = The Australian|date = 6 May 2008|url-status = dead|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20080507013228/http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,23652068-2702,00.html|archive-date = 7 May 2008|access-date = 6 May 2008|df = dmy-all}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2017-11-15/the-final-days-of-a-tax-haven|title=The Final Days of a Tax Haven|publisher=Bloomberg|date=15 November 2017|last=Bremner|first=Brian|access-date=23 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180824002254/https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2017-11-15/the-final-days-of-a-tax-haven|archive-date=24 August 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>

== <span class="anchor" id="Financial scale"></span><span class="anchor" id="Financla effect"></span> Scale ==
=== Overview ===
[[File:HMRC offshore evasion poster February 2014.jpg|thumbnail|Poster issued by British HMRC to counter offshore [[tax evasion]]]]

Estimating the financial scale of tax havens is complicated by their inherent lack of transparency.<ref name=FDNS/>  Even jurisdictions that comply with OECD transparency requirements such as Ireland, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, provide alternate secrecy tools (e.g. Trusts, [[QIAIF]]s and [[Unlimited company|ULL]]s) that may be used for the secrecy of UBOs.<ref name="james2"/>  For example, when the EU Commission discovered [[EU illegal State aid case against Apple in Ireland|Apple's tax rate in Ireland was 0.005%]], they found Apple had used Irish ULLs to avoid filing Irish public accounts since the early 1990s.<ref name="eu1">{{Cite web|url=http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/253200/253200_1851004_674_2.pdf|title=COMMISSION DECISION of 30.8.2016 on STATE AID SA. 38373 (2014/C) (ex 2014/NN) (ex 2014/CP) implemented by Ireland to Apple|date=30 August 2016|publisher=[[EU Commission]]|quote=Brussels. 30.8.2016 C(2016) 5605 final. Total Pages (130)|access-date=4 March 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180417143234/http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/253200/253200_1851004_674_2.pdf|archive-date=17 April 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>

Additionally, there is sometimes confusion between figures that focus on the ''amount of annual taxes'' lost due to tax havens (estimated to be in the hundreds of billions of USD), and figures that focus on the ''amount of capital'' residing in tax havens (estimated to be many trillions of USD).<ref name="james2"/>

{{As of |March 2019}}, the most credible methods used for estimating the financial scale have been:<ref name="james2"/>
{{ordered list|type=lower-roman
| Banking data.  Estimating the amount of capital in the private and/or offshore banking system through [[IMF]]–[[Bank for International Settlements|BIS]] bank filings; associated with several NGOs.
| National accounts data. Estimating the amount of capital that is unreconciled in global [[national accounts]] data; associated with tax academic [[Gabriel Zucman]].
| Corporate data. Estimating [[BEPS]] flows of multinationals that are untaxed; associated with tax academics (Hines, Zucman), NGOs, and OECD–IMF studies.
}}

There have been many other "guesstimates" produced by NGOs that are either crude derivatives of the first method ("Banking data"), and are often criticised for taking mistaken interpretations and conclusions from aggregate global banking and financial data, to produce unsound estimates.<ref name="james2"/><ref name="Gordon & Morriss" />

=== <span class="anchor" id="Price of Offshore"></span> ''Price of Offshore: Revisited'' (2012–2014) ===
A notable study on the financial effect was ''Price of Offshore: Revisited'' in 2012–2014, by former [[McKinsey & Company]] chief economist [[James S. Henry]].<ref name="guardianhenry">{{cite news|url=https://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/jul/21/global-elite-tax-offshore-economy|title=£13tn hoard hidden from taxman by global elite|newspaper=[[The Guardian]]|date=21 July 2010|author=Heather Stewart|quote=James Henry, former chief economist at consultancy McKinsey and an expert on tax havens, has compiled the most detailed estimates yet of the size of the offshore economy in a new report, The Price of Offshore Revisited, released exclusively to the Observer.|access-date=5 March 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190306044505/https://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/jul/21/global-elite-tax-offshore-economy|archive-date=6 March 2019|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref name="henry">{{cite web|url=https://www.taxjustice.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Price_of_Offshore_Revisited_120722.pdf|title=The Price of Offshore Revisited|date=July 2014|access-date=4 March 2019|author=James S. Henry|publisher=[[Tax Justice Network]]|author-link=James S. Henry|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190127165740/http://www.taxjustice.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Price_of_Offshore_Revisited_120722.pdf|archive-date=27 January 2019|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref name=tjn12>{{cite web|publisher=[[Tax Justice Network]]|date=22 July 2012|access-date=4 March 2019|url=http://www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/The_Price_of_Offshore_Revisited_Presser_120722.pdf|title=Revealed: Global super-rich has at least $21 trillion hidden in secret tax havens|author=Nicholas Shaxson|author-link=Nicholas Shaxson|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181230194959/http://www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/The_Price_of_Offshore_Revisited_Presser_120722.pdf|archive-date=30 December 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>  Henry did the study for the [[Tax Justice Network]] (TJN), and as part of his analysis, chronicled the history of past financial estimates by various organisations.<ref name="james2">{{cite web|url=https://www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/Appendix_1_-_The_Pre_History_of_estimates.pdf|title=The Pre-History of Offshore Estimates|author=James S. Henry|publisher=[[Tax Justice Network]]|date=1 July 2012|access-date=4 March 2019|author-link=James S. Henry|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160402222104/http://www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/Appendix_1_-_The_Pre_History_of_estimates.pdf|archive-date=2 April 2016|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref name=FDNS/>

Henry used mainly global banking data from various regulatory sources to estimate that:<ref name="henry"/><ref name=tjn12 />
{{ordered list
| type = lower-roman|USD 21 to 32 trillion of global assets (over 20% of global wealth) "has been invested virtually tax-free [...] in more than 80 offshore secrecy jurisdictions";<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/business-18944097|title=Tax havens: Super-rich 'hiding' at least $21tn|date=22 July 2012|access-date=24 April 2019|work=[[BBC News]]|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190503170904/https://www.bbc.com/news/business-18944097|archive-date=3 May 2019|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>|USD 190 to 255 billion in annual tax revenues are lost due to i. above;|USD 7.3 to 9.3 trillion is represented by individuals from a subset of 139 "low to middle income" countries for which data is available;|These figures only include "financial assets" and do not include assets such as Real Estate, precious metals, etc.
}}
Henry's credibility and the depth of this analysis meant that the report attracted international attention.<ref name="guardianhenry"/><ref name="Reuters">{{cite news | url=http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-offshore-wealth-idUKBRE86L03W20120722?feedType=RSS&feedname=topNews | title=Super rich hold $32 trillion in offshore havens | work=[[Reuters]] | date=22 July 2012 | access-date=22 July 2012 | author=Chris Vellacott | quote=The study estimating the extent of global private financial wealth held in offshore accounts - excluding non-financial assets such as real estate, gold, yachts and racehorses - puts the sum at between $21 and $32 trillion. | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121022175535/http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/07/22/uk-offshore-wealth-idUKBRE86L03W20120722?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews | archive-date=22 October 2012 | url-status=dead | df=dmy-all }}</ref><ref name="BBC">{{cite news | url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-18944097 | title=Tax havens: Super-rich 'hiding' at least $21tn | work=[[BBC News]] | date=22 July 2012 | access-date=5 March 2019 | quote=Mr Henry said his $21tn is actually a conservative figure and the true scale could be $32tn. A trillion is 1,000 billion. Mr Henry used data from the Bank of International Settlements, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and national governments. | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190217235634/https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-18944097 | archive-date=17 February 2019 | url-status=live | df=dmy-all }}</ref>  The TJN supplemented his report with another report on the consequences of the analysis in terms of global inequality and lost revenues to developing economies.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.taxjustice.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Inequality-1207-you-dont-know-the-half-of-it.pdf|title=Inequality: You don't know the half of it|date=22 July 2012|access-date=4 March 2019|publisher=[[Tax Justice Network]]|author1=Nicholas Shaxson|author2=John Christensen|author3=Nick Mathiason|author1-link=Nicholas Shaxson|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180808144624/http://www.taxjustice.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Inequality-1207-you-dont-know-the-half-of-it.pdf|archive-date=8 August 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>  The report was criticised by a 2013 report funded by ''Jersey Finance'' (a lobby group for the financial services sector in Jersey), and written by two U.S. academics, Richard Morriss and Andrew Gordon.<ref name="Gordon & Morriss">{{cite journal |last1=Gordon |first1=Richard |last2=Morriss |first2=Andrew |date=20 October 2013 |title=Moving Money: International Financial Flows, Taxes & Money Laundering |ssrn=2348144 |journal=Hastings International and Comparative Law Review |volume=31 |issue=1 |pages=123 |quote=(From abstract) In this paper we argue that such claims rest on poor data and analysis, and on mistakes about how financial transactions, international taxation, and anti-money laundering rules actually work.}}</ref> In 2014, the TJN issued a report responding to these criticisms.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.taxjustice.net/2014/06/04/tax-haven-jersey-attack-tjn-funded-study-respond/|title=Tax haven of Jersey to attack TJN with funded study. We respond.|date=4 June 2014|access-date=4 March 2019|author=Nicholas Shaxson|publisher=[[Tax Justice Network]]|author-link=Nicholas Shaxson|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190306042929/https://www.taxjustice.net/2014/06/04/tax-haven-jersey-attack-tjn-funded-study-respond/|archive-date=6 March 2019|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.taxjustice.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Price-of-Offshore-Revisited-Jersey-Finance-Study-2014.pdf|title=Jersey Finance attacks TJN 2014 - TJN response|date=4 June 2014|access-date=4 March 2019|author=Nicholas Shaxson|publisher=[[Tax Justice Network]]|author-link=Nicholas Shaxson|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160313121853/http://www.taxjustice.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Price-of-Offshore-Revisited-Jersey-Finance-Study-2014.pdf|archive-date=13 March 2016|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>

===''The Hidden Wealth of Nations'' (2015)===
In 2015, French tax economist Gabriel Zucman published ''[[The Hidden Wealth of Nations]]'' which used global national accounts data to calculate the quantum of net foreign asset positions of rich countries which are unreported because they are located in tax havens. Zucman estimated that circa 8–10% of the global financial wealth of households, or over US$7.6 trillion, was held in tax havens.<ref name=Zucman>{{cite journal |author=Gabriel Zucman |title=Taxing across Borders: Tracking Personal Wealth and Corporate Profits |journal=[[Journal of Economic Perspectives]]|volume=28 |issue=4 |pages=121–48 |doi= 10.1257/jep.28.4.121|date=August 2014|author-link=Gabriel Zucman |doi-access=free }}</ref><ref name="zucc">{{cite news | url=https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/nov/08/tax-havens-dodging-theft-multinationals-avoiding-tax | title=The desperate inequality behind global tax dodging | newspaper=[[The Guardian]] | author=Gabriel Zucman | date=8 November 2017 | access-date=6 March 2019 | quote=The equivalent of 10% of global GDP is held offshore by rich individuals in the form of bank deposits, equities, bonds and mutual fund shares, most of the time in the name of faceless shell corporations, foundations and trusts. | author-link=Gabriel Zucman | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190308142032/https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/nov/08/tax-havens-dodging-theft-multinationals-avoiding-tax | archive-date=8 March 2019 | url-status=live | df=dmy-all }}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/16/opinion/a-piketty-proteges-theory-on-tax-havens.html|title=The True Cost of Hidden Money|newspaper=[[The New York Times]]|date=15 June 2014|author=Jacques Leslie|access-date=27 April 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190416121413/https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/16/opinion/a-piketty-proteges-theory-on-tax-havens.html|archive-date=16 April 2019|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref name=FDNS/>

Zucman followed up his 2015 book with several co-authored papers that focused on corporate use of tax havens, titled "The Missing Profits of Nations" (2016–2018),<ref name="zucwsj"/><ref name="gzuc"/> and "The Exorbitant Tax Privilege" (2018),<ref name="zucwright"/><ref name="japantimes"/> which showed that corporations, shield over US$250 billion per annum from taxes. Zucman showed that almost half of these are U.S. corporations,<ref name="zucwsj2"/> and that it was the driver of how U.S. corporations built up offshore cash deposits of US$1 to 2 trillion since 2004.<ref name="zucbi"/> Zucman's (et alia) analysis showed that global GDP figures were materially distorted by multinational BEPS flows.<ref name="zucphys"/><ref name=FDNS/>

A 2022 study by Zucman and co-authors estimated that 36% of the profits of multinational firms are shifted to tax havens.<ref name=":1">{{Cite journal |last1=Tèrslèv |first1=Thomas |last2=Wier |first2=Ludvig |last3=Zucman |first3=Gabriel |date=2022 |title=The Missing Profits of Nations |url=https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdac049 |journal=The Review of Economic Studies |volume=90 |issue=3 |pages=1499–1534 |doi=10.1093/restud/rdac049 |issn=0034-6527|url-access=subscription }}</ref> If the profits had been reallocated to their domestic source, "domestic profits would increase by about 20% in high-tax European Union countries, 10% in the United States, and 5% in developing countries, while they would fall by 55% in tax havens."<ref name=":1" />

===OECD/IMF reports (since 2007)===
In 2007, the OECD estimated that capital held offshore amounted to between US$5 to 7 trillion, making up approximately 6–8% of total global investments under management.<ref name="Places in the sun">{{cite news|url=http://www.economist.com/surveys/displaystory.cfm?story_id=8695139|title=Places in the sun|newspaper=[[The Economist]]|date=22 February 2007|access-date=4 March 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100401212107/http://www.economist.com/surveys/displaystory.cfm?story_id=8695139|archive-date=1 April 2010|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> In 2017, as part of the OECD BEPS Project, it estimated that between US$100 to 240 billion in corporate profits were being shielded from taxation via BEPS activities carried out through tax haven-type jurisdictions.<ref name="BEPS Background"/><ref name=FDNS/>

In 2018, the IMF's quarterly journal ''[[Finance & Development]]'' published joint research between the IMF and tax academics titled, "Piercing the Veil", that estimated circa US$12 trillion in global corporate investment worldwide was "just phantom corporate investment" structured to avoid corporate taxation, and was concentrated in eight major locations.<ref name="imfx"/> In 2019, the same team published further research titled, "The Rise of Phantom Investments", which estimated that a high percentage of global [[foreign direct investment]] (FDI) was "phantom", and that "Empty corporate shells in tax havens undermine tax collection in advanced, emerging market, and developing economies".<ref name=IMF5>{{cite journal | url=https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2019/09/the-rise-of-phantom-FDI-in-tax-havens-damgaard.htm | title=The Rise of Phantom Investments | volume=56 | issue=3 | date= September 2019 | journal=Finance & Development IMF Quarterly | author1=Jannick Damgaard | author2=Thomas Elkjaer | author3=Niels Johannesen }}</ref> The research singled out Ireland, and estimated that over two-thirds of Ireland's FDI was "phantom".<ref name=IMF4>{{cite news | url=https://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/almost-two-thirds-of-irish-fdi-is-phantom-imf-study-1.4012191 | title=Almost two-thirds of Irish FDI is 'phantom' – IMF study | newspaper=[[Irish Times]] | date=9 September 2020 | access-date=30 January 2020 | author=Martin Sandbu}}</ref><ref name=CLIFF4>{{cite news | url=https://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/is-it-true-to-say-ireland-is-one-of-the-world-s-biggest-tax-havens-1.4016024?mode=sample&auth-failed=1&pw-origin=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.irishtimes.com%2Fbusiness%2Feconomy%2Fis-it-true-to-say-ireland-is-one-of-the-world-s-biggest-tax-havens-1.4016024 | title=Is it true to say Ireland is one of the world's biggest tax havens? | author=Cliff Taylor | date=12 September 2020 | access-date=30 January 2020 | quote=One recent report said that the bulk of the foreign direct investment here was “phantom” and driven by tax avoidance. Another said that we are one of the world’s biggest tax havens. [..] More leprechaun economics at work? | newspaper=[[Irish Times]]}}</ref>

== <span class="anchor" id="Incentives for tax havens"></span> Incentives ==
===Prosperity===
In several research papers, [[James R. Hines Jr.]] showed that tax havens were typically small but well-governed nations and that being a tax haven had brought significant prosperity.<ref name="h2"/><ref name="mich"/> In 2009, Hines and Dharmapala suggested that roughly 15% of countries are tax havens, but they wondered why more countries had not become tax havens given the observable economic prosperity it could bring.<ref name="dhar"/>

{{blockquote|There are roughly 40 major tax havens in the world today, but the sizable apparent economic returns to becoming a tax haven raise the question of why there are not more.|source=Which Countries Become Tax Havens? (2009)<ref name="dhar"/>|author=[[Dhammika Dharmapala]], [[James R. Hines Jr.]]}}

Hines and Dharmapala concluded that governance was a major issue for smaller countries in trying to become tax havens.  Only countries with strong governance and legislation which was trusted by foreign corporates and investors, would become tax havens.<ref name="dhar"/> Hines and Dharmapala's positive view on the financial benefits of becoming a tax haven, as well as being two of the major academic leaders in tax haven research, put them in sharp conflict with non-governmental organisations advocating ''tax justice'', such as the Tax Justice Network, who accused them as promoting tax avoidance.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://taxjustice.blogspot.com/2010/03/jim-hines-fails-to-defend-secrecy.html|title=Jim Hines fails to defend secrecy jurisdictions|publisher=[[Tax Justice Network]]|date=3 March 2010|access-date=17 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180812150805/https://taxjustice.blogspot.com/2010/03/jim-hines-fails-to-defend-secrecy.html|archive-date=12 August 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref name="ns1">{{cite web|url=http://treasureislands.org/the-arguments/|title=Tax havens' arguments in their defence – and why they are wrong|quote=First, many these claims rest heavily on work done by James Hines of the University of Michigan and a few others – research that is fatally flawed.|author=Nicholas Shaxson|date=19 November 2010|author-link=Nicholas Shaxson|access-date=17 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180817155640/http://treasureislands.org/the-arguments/|archive-date=17 August 2018|url-status=usurped|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref name="ns2">{{cite news|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/five-myths-about-tax-havens/2016/04/15/76d001d2-0255-11e6-b823-707c79ce3504_story.html?noredirect=on|title=Five myths about tax havens|quote=According to economics professor James Hines, tax havens serve as healthy competition for high-tax countries, nudging them toward less-restrictive financial policy. By providing alternatives to tightly controlled financial sectors, Hines wrote in a 2010 paper, tax havens discourage regulations that act as “a drag on local economies.”|newspaper=The Washington Post|author=Nicholas Shaxson|date=15 April 2016|author-link=Nicholas Shaxson|access-date=17 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190202095145/https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/five-myths-about-tax-havens/2016/04/15/76d001d2-0255-11e6-b823-707c79ce3504_story.html?noredirect=on|archive-date=2 February 2019|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>

=== <span class="anchor" id="Inflated GDP-per-capita"></span> GDP-per-capita ===
{{see also|List of countries by GDP (PPP) per capita#Distorted GDP-per-capita for tax havens}}

Tax havens have high [[List of countries by GDP (PPP) per capita|GDP-per-capita]] rankings, as their "headline" economic statistics are artificially inflated by the BEPS flows that add to the haven's GDP, but are not taxable in the haven.<ref name="imfx">{{cite journal|url=http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2018/06/inside-the-world-of-global-tax-havens-and-offshore-banking/damgaard.htm|title=Piercing the Veil of Tax Havens | first1=Jannick|last1=Damgaard|first2=Thomas|last2=Elkjaer|first3=Niels|last3=Johannesen|journal=Finance & Development, IMF Quarterly|quote=The eight major pass-through economies—the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Hong Kong SAR, the British Virgin Islands, Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, Ireland, and Singapore—host more than 85 percent of the world’s investment in special purpose entities, which are often set up for tax reasons.|volume=55|issue=2|date=June 2018|access-date=13 June 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180612142524/http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2018/06/inside-the-world-of-global-tax-havens-and-offshore-banking/damgaard.htm|archive-date=12 June 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref name="qqtz">{{cite news|url=https://qz.com/1300880/tax-havens-mean-40-of-foreign-direct-investments-are-artificial/|title=How tax havens turn economic statistics into nonsense|work=Quartz|date=11 June 2018|access-date=13 June 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180612143908/https://qz.com/1300880/tax-havens-mean-40-of-foreign-direct-investments-are-artificial/|archive-date=12 June 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> As the largest facilitators of BEPS flows, corporate-focused tax havens, in particular, make up most of the top 10-15 GDP-per-capita tables, excluding oil and gas nations (see table below).  Research into tax havens suggests a high GDP-per-capita score, in the absence of material natural resources, as an important [[Corporate haven#Proxy tests|proxy indicator]] of a tax haven.<ref name="imf"/> At the core of the FSF-IMF definition of an [[offshore financial centre]] is a country where the financial BEPS flows are out of proportion to the size of the indigenous economy.<ref name="imf"/> Apple's Q1 2015 "leprechaun economics" BEPS transaction in Ireland was a dramatic example, which caused Ireland to abandon its GDP and GNP metrics in February 2017, in favour of a new metric, [[modified gross national income]], or GNI*.

The artificial inflation of GDP can attract underpriced foreign capital (who use the "headline" Debt-to-GDP metric of the haven), thus producing phases of stronger economic growth.<ref name="mich">{{cite journal|url=https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/39181/921.pdf?sequence=1|title=Do Tax Havens Flourish|author=James R. Hines Jr.|journal=Tax Policy and the Economy|quote=ABSTRACT: Per capita real GDP in tax haven countries grew at an average annual rate of 3.3 percent between 1982 and 1999, which compares favorably to the world average of 1.4 percent.|volume=19|pages=65–99|date=2005|author-link=James R. Hines Jr|access-date=31 May 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170818061404/https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/39181/921.pdf?sequence=1|archive-date=18 August 2017|url-status=live|df=dmy-all|doi=10.1086/tpe.19.20061896|doi-access=free}}</ref> However, the increased leverage leads to more severe credit cycles, particularly where the artificial nature of the GDP is exposed to foreign investors.<ref name="ber">{{cite web|url=https://www.socialeurope.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/p_imk_wp_175_2017.pdf|author=Heike Joebges|title=CRISIS RECOVERY IN A COUNTRY WITH A HIGH PRESENCE OF FOREIGN-OWNED COMPANIES: The Case of Ireland|publisher=IMK Macroeconomic Policy Institute, [[Hans-Böckler-Stiftung]]|date=January 2017|access-date=1 June 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190412082814/https://www.socialeurope.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/p_imk_wp_175_2017.pdf|archive-date=12 April 2019|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref name="atlantic">{{cite magazine|url=https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/07/tax-haven-curse/491411/|title=Why Tax Havens are Political and Economic disasters|magazine=The Atlantic|date=28 July 2016|access-date=31 May 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180526041555/https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/07/tax-haven-curse/491411/|archive-date=26 May 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>

[[File:Paul Krugman at the German National Library in Frankfurt.jpg|thumb|Nobel Prize–winning economist [[Paul Krugman]] called the 2015 restatement of Ireland's national accounts, as a result of the Q1 2015 restructuring of Apple's BEPS tools, "leprechaun economics".]]

{| style="font-size:100%;"
|-
| width="50%" align="center" |'''[[International Monetary Fund]] (2017) [[List of countries by GDP (PPP) per capita|GDP-per-capita]]'''<ref name="worldbank_2017-07-01">[http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD?view=chart, PPP (current international $)", World Development Indicators database] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180505220646/https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD?view=chart, |date=5 May 2018 }}, World Bank. Database updated on 1 July 2017. Accessed on 2 July 2017.</ref>
| width="50%" align="center" |'''[[World Bank]] (2016) [[List of countries by GDP (PPP) per capita|GDP-per-capita]]'''<ref name="worldbank_2017-07-01"/><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD?year_high_desc=true|title=World Bank, International Comparison Program database.|access-date=10 April 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180411025852/https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD?year_high_desc=true|archive-date=11 April 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>
|- valign="top"
|
{| class="wikitable sortable" style="margin-left:auto;margin-right:auto;text-align:left"
! data-sort-type="number" | Rank
! Country/Territory
! Type
|-
| 1 || align="left" | {{flag|Qatar}} || Oil & Gas
|-
|—|| align="left" | ''{{flag|Macau}}'' || Tax haven (Sink OFC)
|-
| 2 || align="left" | {{flag|Luxembourg}} || Top 10 Tax haven (Sink OFC)
|-
| 3 || align="left" | {{flag|Singapore}} || Top 10 Tax haven (Conduit OFC)
|-
| 4 || align="left" | {{flag|Brunei}} || Oil & Gas
|-
| 5 || align="left" | {{flag|Ireland}} || Top 10 Tax haven (Conduit OFC)
|-
| 6 || align="left" | {{flag|Norway}} || Oil & Gas
|-
| 7 || align="left" | {{flag|Kuwait}} || Oil & Gas
|-
| 8 || align="left" | {{flag|United Arab Emirates}} || Oil & Gas
|-
| 9 || align="left" | {{flag|Switzerland}} || Top 10 Tax Haven (Conduit OFC)
|-
| — || align="left" | ''{{flag|Hong Kong}}'' || Top 10 Tax Haven (Sink OFC)
|-
| 10 || align="left" | {{flag|San Marino}} || Tax haven (Sink OFC)
|-
| 11 || align="left" | {{flag|United States}} || 59,495‡
|-
| 12 || align="left" | {{flag|Saudi Arabia}} || Oil & Gas
|-
| 13 || align="left" | {{flag|Netherlands}} || Top 10 Tax Haven (Conduit OFC)
|-
| 14 || align="left" | {{flag|Iceland}} || 52,150‡
|-
| 15 || align="left" | {{flag|Bahrain}} || Oil & Gas
|}
|
{| class="wikitable sortable" style="margin-left:auto;margin-right:auto;text-align: left"
! data-sort-type="number" | Rank
! Country/Territory
! Type
|-
| 1 || align="left" | {{flag|Qatar}} || Oil & Gas
|-
| 2 || align="left" | {{flag|Luxembourg}} || Top 10 Tax haven (Sink OFC)
|-
| — || align="left" | ''{{flag|Macau}}'' || Tax haven (Sink OFC)
|-
| 3 || align="left" | {{flag|Singapore}} ||  Top 10 Tax haven (Conduit OFC)
|-
| 4 || align="left" | {{flag|Brunei}} || Oil & Gas
|-
| 5 || align="left" | {{flag|United Arab Emirates}} || Oil & Gas
|-
| 6 || align="left" | {{flag|Ireland}} || Top 10 Tax haven (Conduit OFC)
|-
| 7 || align="left" | {{flag|Switzerland}} || Top 10 Tax haven (Conduit OFC)
|-
| 8 || align="left" | {{flag|Norway}} || Oil & Gas
|-
| — || align="left" | ''{{flag|Hong Kong}}'' || Top 10 Tax haven (Sink OFC)
|-
| 9 || align="left" | {{flag|United States}} || 57,467‡
|-
| 10 || align="left" | {{flag|Saudi Arabia}} || Oil & Gas
|-
| 11 || align="left" | {{flag|Iceland}} || 51,399‡
|-
| 12 || align="left" | {{flag|Netherlands}} || Top 10 Tax haven (Conduit OFC)
|-
| 13 || align="left" | {{flag|Austria}} || 50,078‡
|-
| 14 || align="left" | {{flag|Denmark}} || 49,496‡
|-
| 15 || align="left" | {{flag|Sweden}} || 49,175‡
|}
|
|- valign="top"
|}

''Notes:''
{{ordered list
| type = lower-roman|Data is sourced from [[List of countries by GDP (PPP) per capita]] and the figures, where shown (marked by, ‡), are USD per capita for places that are not tax havens.|"Top 10 Tax Haven" in the table refers to the {{slink||Top 10 tax havens}} above; 6 of the 9 tax havens that appear in all {{slink||Top 10 tax havens}} are represented above (Ireland, Singapore, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Hong Kong), and the remaining 3 havens (Cayman Islands, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands), do not appear in World Bank-IMF GDP-per-capita tables.|"Conduit OFC" and "Sink OFC" refers to the University of Amsterdam's CORPNET's 2017 [[Conduit and Sink OFCs]] study
}}

===Acceptance===
In 2018, noted tax haven economist, [[Gabriel Zucman]], showed that most corporate tax disputes are between high-tax jurisdictions, and not between high-tax and low-tax jurisdictions.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.finfacts-blog.com/2018/06/profits-of-us-firms-in-ireland-at-800.html|title=Profits of US firms in Ireland at 800% of payroll costs|date=11 June 2018|publisher=Finfacts|author=Michael Hennigan|quote=Based on an analysis of data on tax disputes between tax authorities, the economists say that tax authorities in high-income countries tend to focus on transactions with other high-income countries rather than work on profit shifting trails that end in such island havens as Bermuda.|access-date=30 May 2019}}</ref>  Zucman (et alia) research showed that disputes with major havens such as Ireland, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, are actually quite rare.<ref name="gbz"/><ref>{{cite web|title=The Policy Failure of High-Tax Countries|pages=44–49|url=http://gabriel-zucman.eu/files/TWZ2018Slides.pdf|publisher=[[National Bureau of Economic Research]], Working Papers|author1=Gabriel Zucman|author2=Thomas Torslov|author3=Ludvig Wier |date=June 2018|author1-link=Gabriel Zucman}}</ref>

{{blockquote|We show theoretically and empirically that in the current international tax system, tax authorities of high-tax countries do not have incentives to combat profit shifting to tax havens. They instead focus their enforcement effort on relocating profits booked in other high-tax countries, in effect stealing revenue from each other. This policy failure can explain the persistence of profit shifting to low-tax countries despite the high costs involved for high-tax countries.|source=[[Gabriel Zucman]], [[Harvard Kennedy School]] (May 2018)<ref>{{cite web|url=https://inequality.hks.harvard.edu/event/gabriel-zucman-tba|title=Gabriel Zucman: The Missing Profits of Nations|date=7 May 2018|access-date=30 May 2019|publisher=[[Harvard Kennedy School]]}}</ref>}}

== <span class="anchor" id="Benefits of tax havens"></span> Benefits ==
===Promoters of growth===
A controversial area of research into tax havens is the suggestion that tax havens actually promote global economic growth by solving perceived issues in the tax regimes of higher-taxed nations (e.g. the above discussion on the U.S. "worldwide" tax system). Important academic leaders in tax haven research, such as Hines,<ref>{{cite news|url=https://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/04/tax-havens-and-treasure-hunts/|title=Tax havens and treasure hunts|newspaper=[[New York Times]]|quote=Some economists champion tax havens. In an article in the Journal of Economic Perspectives published last fall (also titled “Treasure Islands”), James R. Hines Jr. of the University of Michigan argued that they contribute to financial market competition, encourage investment in high-tax countries and promote economic growth.  Like many economists, Professor Hines expresses far more confidence in the market than in the state. He worries more about possible overtaxation than about undertaxation of corporate income. He does not engage with such concepts as “tax justice.”|date=11 April 2011|access-date=23 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180812115602/https://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/04/tax-havens-and-treasure-hunts/|archive-date=12 August 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> Dharmapala,<ref name="dhh"/> and others,<ref name="praise"/> cite evidence that, in certain cases, tax havens appear to promote economic growth in higher-tax countries, and can support beneficial hybrid tax regimes of higher taxes on domestic activity, but lower taxes on international sourced capital or income:

{{blockquote| The effect of tax havens on economic welfare in high-tax countries is unclear, though the availability of tax havens appears to stimulate economic activity in nearby high-tax countries.|author=[[James R. Hines Jr.]] |source="Abstract: Tax Havens" (2007)<ref name="h2"/>}}

{{blockquote|Tax havens change the nature of tax competition among other countries, very possibly permitting them to sustain high domestic tax rates that are effectively mitigated for mobile international investors whose transactions are routed through tax havens. [..] In fact, countries that lie close to tax havens have exhibited more rapid real income growth than have those further away, possibly in part as a result of financial flows and their market effects.|author=[[James R. Hines Jr.]] |source="Treasure Islands" p. 107 (2010)<ref name="h1"/>}}

The most cited paper on research into [[offshore financial centres]] ("OFCs"),<ref name="respecOFC">{{cite web|url=https://ideas.repec.org/cgi-bin/htsearch?form=extended&wm=wrd&dt=range&ul=&q=tax+haven&cmd=Search%21&wf=4BFF&s=C&db=&de=|title=IDEAS/RePEc Database|quote=Offshore Financial Centres by Most Cited|access-date=23 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181204123511/https://ideas.repec.org/cgi-bin/htsearch?form=extended&wm=wrd&dt=range&ul=&q=tax+haven&cmd=Search%21&wf=4BFF&s=C&db=&de=|archive-date=4 December 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> a closely related term to tax havens, noted the positive and negative aspects of OFCs on neighbouring high-tax, or source, economies, and marginally came out in favour of OFCs.<ref name="RoseSpiegel">{{cite journal|url=http://www.nber.org/papers/w12044.pdf|title=Offshore Financial Centers: Parasites or Symbionts?|author1=Andrew K. Rose|author2=Mark M. Spiegel|date=21 September 2007|journal=[[The Economic Journal]]|volume=117|issue=523|pages=1310–1335|access-date=4 September 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180602140706/http://www.nber.org/papers/w12044.pdf|archive-date=2 June 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all|doi=10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02084.x|s2cid=153485002}}</ref>

{{blockquote|CONCLUSION: Using both bilateral and multilateral samples, we find empirically that successful offshore financial centers encourage bad behavior in source countries since they facilitate tax evasion and money laundering [...] Nevertheless, offshore financial centers created to facilitate undesirable activities can still have unintended positive consequences. [...] We tentatively conclude that OFCs are better characterized as "symbionts".|source=Andrew K. Rose, Mark M. Spiegel, "Offshore Financial Centers: Parasites or Symbionts?", ''[[The Economic Journal]]'', (September 2007)<ref name="RoseSpiegel"/>}}

However, other notable tax academics strongly dispute these views, such as work by [[Joel Slemrod|Slemrod]] and Wilson, who in their {{slink||Important papers on tax havens}}, label tax havens as ''parasitic'' to jurisdictions with normal tax regimes, which can damage their economies.<ref name="slemrod">{{cite journal|url=http://gabriel-zucman.eu/files/teaching/SlemrodWilson09.pdf|title=Tax competition with parasitic tax havens|date=6 September 2009|journal=[[Journal of Public Economics]]|author1=Joel Slemrod|author2=John D. Wilson|quote=Although a previous literature has modelled tax havens as a benign phenomenon that helps high-tax countries reduce the negative impact of their own suboptimal domestic tax policies, there is considerable concern that the havens are “parasitic” on the tax revenues of the non-haven countries|author1-link=Joel Slemrod|access-date=21 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180821223153/http://gabriel-zucman.eu/files/teaching/SlemrodWilson09.pdf|archive-date=21 August 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> In addition, ''tax justice'' campaign groups have been equally critical of Hines, and others, in these views.<ref name="ns1"/><ref name="ns2"/> Research in June 2018 by the IMF showed that much of the [[foreign direct investment]] ("FDI") that came from tax havens into higher-tax countries, had really originated from the higher-tax country,<ref name="imfx"/> and for example, that the largest source of FDI into the United Kingdom, was actually from the United Kingdom, but invested via tax havens.<ref name="quartz">{{cite news|url=https://qz.com/1300880/tax-havens-mean-40-of-foreign-direct-investments-are-artificial/|title=How tax havens turn economic statistics into nonsense|date=11 June 2018|author=Max de Haldevang|work=[[Quartz (publication)]]|quote=For example, according to the UK Treasury, on the surface it looks like Britain’s second-biggest investor is the Netherlands. But the UK Treasury has admitted most of those investments actually consist of British cash that has been sent to Holland for tax purposes and rerouted back home. So, Britain’s second biggest foreign investor is itself.|access-date=13 June 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180612143908/https://qz.com/1300880/tax-havens-mean-40-of-foreign-direct-investments-are-artificial/|archive-date=12 June 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>

The boundaries with wider contested economic theories on the effects of corporate taxation on economic growth, and whether there should be corporate taxes, are easy to blur. Other researchers that have examined tax havens, such as [[Gabriel Zucman|Zucman]], highlight the injustice of tax havens and see the effects as lost income for the development of society.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/nov/08/tax-havens-dodging-theft-multinationals-avoiding-tax|title=The desperate inequality behind global tax dodging|newspaper=The Guardian|author=Gabriel Zucman|date=8 November 2017|access-date=1 June 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180602012215/https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/nov/08/tax-havens-dodging-theft-multinationals-avoiding-tax|archive-date=2 June 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> It remains a controversial area with advocates on both sides.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2018-07-25/fighting-corporate-tax-avoidance-can-kill-economic-growth|title=Fighting tax dodgers can kill economic growth|publisher=Bloomberg|date=25 July 2018|access-date=19 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180819182205/https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2018-07-25/fighting-corporate-tax-avoidance-can-kill-economic-growth|archive-date=19 August 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>

=== <span class="anchor" id="U.S. as the largest user and beneficiary"></span><span class="anchor" id="U.S. as the largest beneficiary"></span> U.S. tax receipts ===
A finding of the 1994 [[James R. Hines Jr.#Tax haven research|Hines-Rice paper]], re-affirmed by others,<ref name="praise">{{cite journal|url=https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/9fa3/80280acbdf02a218407dc38cf909d0260b6e.pdf|title=In praise of tax havens: International tax planning and foreign direct investment|journal=[[European Economic Review]]|volume=54|issue=1|pages=82–95|date=January 2010|author1=Qing Hong|author2=Michael Smart|doi=10.1016/j.euroecorev.2009.06.006|s2cid=37028316|access-date=28 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180829034952/https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/9fa3/80280acbdf02a218407dc38cf909d0260b6e.pdf|archive-date=29 August 2018|url-status=dead|df=dmy-all}}</ref> was that: ''low foreign tax rates [from tax havens] ultimately enhance U.S. tax collections''.<ref name="h3"/> Hines showed that as a result of paying no foreign taxes by using tax havens, U.S. multinationals avoided building up foreign tax credits that would reduce their U.S. tax liability. Hines returned to this finding several times, and in his [[#Important papers on tax havens|2010 paper]], "Treasure Islands", where he showed how U.S. multinationals used tax havens and BEPS tools to avoid Japanese taxes on their Japanese investments, noted that this was being confirmed by other empirical research at a company-level.<ref name="dryng">{{cite journal|title=Using Financial Accounting Data to Examine the Effect of Foreign Operations Located in Tax Havens and Other Countries on US Multinational Firms' Tax Rates|author1=Scott Dyreng|author2=Bradley P. Lindsey|date=12 October 2009|quote=Finally, we find that US firms with operations in some tax haven countries have higher federal tax rates on foreign income than other firms. This result suggests that in some cases, tax haven operations may increase US tax collections at the expense of foreign country tax collections.|journal=[[Journal of Accounting Research]]|volume = 47|issue=5|pages=1283–1316|doi=10.1111/j.1475-679X.2009.00346.x|doi-access=free}}</ref> Hines's observations would influence U.S. policy towards tax havens, including the 1996 "[[Entity classification election|check-the-box]]"{{efn|name="check"|Before 1996, the United States, like other high-income countries, had anti-avoidance rules—known as "controlled foreign corporations" provisions—designed to immediately tax in the United States some foreign income (such as royalties and interest) conducive of profit shifting. In 1996, the IRS issued regulations that enabled U.S. multinationals to avoid some of these rules by electing to treat their foreign subsidiaries as if they were not corporations but disregarded entities for tax purposes. This move is called "checking the box" because that is all that needs to be done on IRS form 8832 to make it work and use Irish BEPS tools on non-U.S. revenues was a compromise to keep U.S. multinationals from leaving the U.S. (page 10.)<ref name="zucwright"/>}} rules, and U.S. hostility to OECD attempts in curbing Ireland's BEPS tools,{{efn|The U.S. refused to sign the OECD BEPS Multilateral Instrument ("MLI") on the 24 November 2016.}}<ref name="crs2"/> and why, in spite of public disclosure of tax avoidance by firms such as Google, Facebook, and Apple, with Irish BEPS tools, little has been done by the U.S. to stop them.<ref name="praise"/>

[[File:Where do U.S. multinationals book their profits (2016 BEA).png|thumb|upright=1.6|U.S. multinationals book over half of their non-U.S. profits in tax havens by using BEPS tools (2016 [[Bureau of Economic Analysis|BEA]]).<ref name="zucwright"/><ref name="japantimes"/>]]

{{blockquote|Lower foreign tax rates entail smaller credits for foreign taxes and greater ultimate U.S. tax collections (Hines and Rice, 1994).<ref name="h3"/> Dyreng and Lindsey (2009),<ref name="dryng"/> offer evidence that U.S. firms with foreign affiliates in certain tax havens pay lower foreign taxes and higher U.S. taxes than do otherwise-similar large U.S. companies.|author=[[James R. Hines Jr.]] |source="Treasure Islands" p. 107 (2010)<ref name="h1"/>}}

Research in June–September 2018, confirmed U.S. multinationals as the largest global users of tax havens and BEPS tools.<ref name="zucwsj2">{{cite news|url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/corporations-push-profits-into-tax-havens-as-countries-struggle-in-pursuit-study-says-1528634659|newspaper=[[The Wall Street Journal]]|author=Richard Rubin|quote=U.S. companies are the most aggressive users of profit-shifting techniques, which often relocate paper profits without bringing jobs and wages, according to the study by economists Thomas Torslov and Ludvig Wier of the University of Copenhagen and Gabriel Zucman of the University of California, Berkeley|date=10 June 2018|title=Corporations Push Profits Into Tax Havens as Countries Struggle in Pursuit, Study Says|access-date=13 June 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190404203053/https://www.wsj.com/articles/corporations-push-profits-into-tax-havens-as-countries-struggle-in-pursuit-study-says-1528634659|archive-date=4 April 2019|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref name="zucbi">{{cite web|url=https://nordic.businessinsider.com/new-research-finds-40-of-multinationals-profits-shifted-to-tax-havens--eu-biggest-loser-while-us-firms-most-shifty--/|website=[[Business Insider]]|title=New research finds 40% of multinationals' profits shifted to tax havens – EU biggest loser while US firms most shifty|date=20 July 2018|access-date=30 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180831002541/https://nordic.businessinsider.com/new-research-finds-40-of-multinationals-profits-shifted-to-tax-havens--eu-biggest-loser-while-us-firms-most-shifty--/|archive-date=31 August 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref name="zucphys">{{cite web | url=https://phys.org/news/2018-09-foreign-profits-tax-havens-paper.html | title=Half of US foreign profits booked in tax havens: paper | date=10 September 2019 | access-date=2 March 2019 | publisher=[[phys.org]] | quote=US companies are by far the biggest users of tax havens, where they face effective tax rates of just seven percent, according to the study by economists Thomas Wright and Gabriel Zucman. | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190306044430/https://phys.org/news/2018-09-foreign-profits-tax-havens-paper.html | archive-date=6 March 2019 | url-status=live | df=dmy-all }}</ref>

{{blockquote|U.S. multinationals use tax havens{{efn|The paper lists tax havens as: ''Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Switzerland, Singapore, Bermuda and Caribbean havens'' (page 6.)}} more than multinationals from other countries that have kept their controlled foreign corporations regulations. No other non-haven OECD country records as high a share of foreign profits booked in tax havens as the United States. [...] This suggests that half of all the global profits shifted to tax havens are shifted by U.S. multinationals. By contrast, about 25% accrues to E.U. countries, 10% to the rest of the OECD, and 15% to developing countries (Tørsløv et al., 2018).|source=[[Gabriel Zucman]], Thomas Wright, "The Exorbitant Tax Privilege", [[National Bureau of Economic Research|NBER]] Working Papers (September 2018).<ref name="zucwright"/><ref name="japantimes">{{cite news|url=https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/09/11/business/half-u-s-foreign-profits-booked-tax-havens-especially-ireland-paper/ |title=Half of U.S. foreign profits booked in tax havens, especially Ireland: NBER paper|newspaper=[[The Japan Times]]|quote='Ireland solidifies its position as the #1 tax haven,' Zucman said on Twitter. 'U.S. firms book more profits in Ireland than in China, Japan, Germany, France & Mexico combined. Irish tax rate: 5.7%.'|date=10 September 2018|access-date=11 September 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180911110309/https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/09/11/business/half-u-s-foreign-profits-booked-tax-havens-especially-ireland-paper/ |archive-date=11 September 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>}}

[[File:U.S. corporate profits booked in tax havens.png|thumb|upright=1.4|Distribution of U.S. corporate profits (as a % of U.S. GDP) booked in foreign locations (BEA Data)<ref name="brad1"/>]]

In 2019, non-academic groups, such as the [[Council on Foreign Relations]], realised the scale of U.S. corporate use of tax havens:

{{blockquote|Well over half the profits that American companies report earning abroad are still booked in only a few low-tax havens — places that, of course, are not actually home to the customers, workers, and taxpayers facilitating most of their business. A multinational corporation can route its global sales through Ireland, pay royalties to its Dutch subsidiary and then funnel income to its Bermudian subsidiary — taking advantage of Bermuda's corporate tax rate of zero.|source=[[Brad Setser]], "The Global Con Hidden in Trump's Tax Reform Law, Revealed", ''[[The New York Times]]'' (February 2019).<ref name="brad1">{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/06/opinion/business-economics/trump-tax-reform-state-of-the-union-2019.html|title=The Global Con Hidden in Trump's Tax Reform Law, Revealed|newspaper=[[The New York Times]]|author=[[Brad Setser]], [[Council on Foreign Relations]]|date=6 February 2019|access-date=24 February 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190224231631/https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/06/opinion/business-economics/trump-tax-reform-state-of-the-union-2019.html|archive-date=24 February 2019|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>}}

''Tax justice'' groups interpreted Hines' research as the U.S. engaging in tax competition with higher-tax nations (i.e. the U.S. exchequer earning excess taxes at the expense of others). The 2017 TCJA seems to support this view with the U.S. exchequer being able to levy a 15.5% repatriation tax on over $1 trillion of untaxed offshore profits built up by U.S. multinationals with BEPS tools from non-U.S. revenues. Had these U.S. multinationals paid taxes on these non-U.S. profits in the countries in which they were earned, there would have been little further liability to U.S. taxation. Research by Zucman and Wright (2018) estimated that most of the TCJA repatriation benefit went to the shareholders of U.S. multinationals, and not the U.S. exchequer.<ref name="zucwright"/>{{efn|Zucman and Wright's analysis assumed that U.S. multinationals were going to pay a U.S. 35% rate eventually (i.e. they would repatriate their untaxed offshore cash at some stage in the future); if the assumption is made that they were going to permanently leave their offshore cash outside of the U.S., then the U.S. exchequer was the main beneficiary}}

Academics who study tax havens, attribute Washington's support of U.S. corporate use of tax havens to a political compromise between Washington, and other higher-tax OECD nations, to compensate for shortcomings of the U.S. "worldwide" tax system.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34115.pdf|title=Reform of U.S. International Taxation: Alternatives|publisher=[[Congressional Research Service]]|author=Jane G. Gravelle|date=1 August 2017|access-date=22 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171205205323/https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34115.pdf|archive-date=5 December 2017|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|title=Tax havens: How Globalization Really Works|url=https://academic.oup.com/joeg/article-abstract/11/4/753/918739?redirectedFrom=fulltext#|publisher=[[Cornell University Press]]|author1=Ronen Palan|author2-link=Richard Murphy (tax campaigner)|author2=Richard Murphy|author3=Christian Chavagneux|date=1 July 2011|isbn=978-0801476129|author1-link=Ronen Palan|access-date=22 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180707200103/https://academic.oup.com/joeg/article-abstract/11/4/753/918739?redirectedFrom=fulltext|archive-date=7 July 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> Hines had advocated for a switch to a "territorial" tax system, as most other nations use, which would remove U.S. multinational need for tax havens. In 2016, Hines, with German tax academics, showed that German multinationals make little use of tax havens because their tax regime, a "territorial" system, removes any need for it.<ref>{{cite journal|url=https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2831&context=articles|title=Multinational Firms and Tax Havens|author1=James R. Hines Jr.|author2=Anna Gumpert|author3=Monika Schnitzer|date=2016|journal=[[The Review of Economics and Statistics]]|page=714|quote=Germany taxes only 5% of the active foreign business profits of its resident corporations. [..] Furthermore, German firms do not have incentives to structure their foreign operations in ways that avoid repatriating income. Therefore, the tax incentives for German firms to establish tax haven affiliates are likely to differ from those of U.S. firms and bear strong similarities to those of other G-7 and OECD firms.|volume=98|issue=4|author1-link=James R. Hines Jr|access-date=16 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190417133943/https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2831&context=articles|archive-date=17 April 2019|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>

Hines' research was cited by the [[Council of Economic Advisors]] ("CEA") in drafting the TCJA legislation in 2017, and advocating for moving to a hybrid "territorial" tax system framework.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/documents/Tax%20Reform%20and%20Wages.pdf|title=Corporate Tax Reform and Wages: Theory and Evidence|quote=Applying Hines and Rice's (1994) findings to a statutory corporate rate reduction of 15 percentage points (from 35 to 20 percent) suggests that reduced profit shifting would result in more than $140 billion of repatriated profit based on 2016 numbers.|date=17 October 2017|access-date=19 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210120204709/https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/documents/Tax%20Reform%20and%20Wages.pdf|archive-date=20 January 2021|url-status=live|via=[[NARA|National Archives]]|work=[[whitehouse.gov]]|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/17/us/politics/white-house-push-to-help-workers-through-corporate-tax-cut-draws-skepticism.html|title=White House Push to Help Workers Through Corporate Tax Cut Draws Skepticism|newspaper=New York Times|date=17 October 2017|quote=But the CEA did not misinterpret the Desai, Foley, and Hines paper.|access-date=19 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180813145000/https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/17/us/politics/white-house-push-to-help-workers-through-corporate-tax-cut-draws-skepticism.html|archive-date=13 August 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>

==Concepts==
There are a number of notable concepts in relation to how individuals and corporates engage with tax havens:<ref name="ronen.palan"/><ref name=Tolley>''Tolley's Offshore Service'' (2006), {{ISBN|1-4057-1568-5}}</ref>

===Captured state===

Some authors on tax havens describe them as "captured states" by their offshore finance industry, suggesting the legal, taxation and other requirements of the professional service firms operating from the tax haven are given higher priority to any conflicting State needs.<ref name="nicholas.shaxson"/><ref name="palan10">{{Cite book | publisher = [[Cornell University Press]] |isbn = 978-0-8014-7612-9 |author1=Ronen Palan |author2-link = Richard Murphy (tax campaigner) |author2=Richard Murphy |author3=Christian Chavagneux|title = Tax Havens: How Globalization Really Works |year = 2009 | page=102 | quote=John Christensen and Mark Hampton (1999) have shown [..] how several tax havens have in effect been "captured" by these private interests, which literally draft local laws to suit their interests.|author1-link = Ronen Palan }}</ref> The term has been particularly used for smaller tax havens,<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.irishtimes.com/business/financial-services/no-desks-no-staff-no-tax-ireland-s-shadow-banks-1.1388923|title=No desks. No staff. No tax. Ireland's shadow banks|author=Carl O'Brien|author2=Caelainn Barr|newspaper=[[Irish Times]]|quote=[..] “the captured state”: a world in which policymaking has been largely taken over by financial interests that can pick and choose between jurisdictions and in effect write the laws they need. “That happens in its purest form in the very small tax havens where there is just no local democracy to do anything.|date=11 March 2013|access-date=2 May 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161226014650/http://www.irishtimes.com/business/financial-services/no-desks-no-staff-no-tax-ireland-s-shadow-banks-1.1388923|archive-date=26 December 2016|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> with examples being Delaware, the Seychelles,<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.taxjustice.net/2015/10/12/seychelles-the-ex-billionaire-and-the-captured-state/|title=Seychelles: the ex-billionaire and the captured state|publisher=[[Tax Justice Network]]|author=Nicholas Shaxson|date=12 October 2015|access-date=30 April 2019|author-link=Nicholas Shaxson|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190427194531/https://www.taxjustice.net/2015/10/12/seychelles-the-ex-billionaire-and-the-captured-state/|archive-date=27 April 2019|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> and Jersey.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.theguardian.com/money/2008/mar/21/tax|newspaper=[[The Guardian]]|author=John Henley|title=Big trouble on treasure island|date=21 March 2008|access-date=2 May 2019|quote=Jersey is what we call a captured state|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190502074802/https://www.theguardian.com/money/2008/mar/21/tax|archive-date=2 May 2019|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> However, the term "captured state" has also been used for larger and more established OECD and EU offshore financial centres or tax havens.<ref>{{cite web|title=Malta is a captured state, say sons of Daphne Caruana Galizia|url=https://www.euronews.com/2018/05/29/malta-is-a-captured-state-say-sons-of-daphne-caruana-galizia|publisher=[[Euronews]]|date=31 May 2018|author1=Sophie Claudet|author2=Everton Gayle|access-date=2 May 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190502073729/https://www.euronews.com/2018/05/29/malta-is-a-captured-state-say-sons-of-daphne-caruana-galizia|archive-date=2 May 2019|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/oct/24/britain-cant-prosper-tax-haven-hollow-threats-brexiteers-offshore-eu|newspaper=[[The Guardian]]|author=Nicholas Shaxson|date=17 October 2017|access-date=30 April 2019|title=Britain can't prosper as a tax haven. It has to stop these hollow threats|quote=All havens are “captured” by offshore finance: local democracy mustn’t be allowed to get in the way of making money. [..] In 2014 the “big four” accountancy firms, key architects of the global offshore system, advertised in Hong Kong newspapers urging democracy demonstrators to pipe down, saying the protests would scare away their financial and multinational clients, with “a long-term impact on Hong Kong’s status as a global financial centre”.|author-link=Nicholas Shaxson|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190430194810/https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/oct/24/britain-cant-prosper-tax-haven-hollow-threats-brexiteers-offshore-eu|archive-date=30 April 2019|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref name="shaxson20">{{cite web | url=https://www.taxjustice.net/2015/11/11/how-ireland-became-an-offshore-financial-centre/ | title=How Ireland became an offshore financial centre | quote=But on another level this is an Irish version of a phenomenon we’ve encountered across the tax haven world: the state ‘captured’ by offshore financial services. | publisher=[[Tax Justice Network]] | author=Nicholas Shaxson | date=November 2015 | access-date=29 April 2019 | author-link=Nicholas Shaxson | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180612141245/https://www.taxjustice.net/2015/11/11/how-ireland-became-an-offshore-financial-centre/ | archive-date=12 June 2018 | url-status=live | df=dmy-all }}</ref> [[Ronen Palan]] has noted that even where tax havens started out as "trading centres", they can eventually become "captured" by "powerful foreign finance and legal firms who write the laws of these countries which they then exploit".<ref>{{cite book|url=http://web.isanet.org/Web/Conferences/FLACSO-ISA%20BuenosAires%202014/Archive/dded4bd2-a6e0-49b9-b7cf-be588dd654a4.pdf|quote=Chapter 21. Troubling tax havens: Tax footprint reduction and jurisdictional arbitrage | author1=Ronen Palan |author2= Giovanni Mangraviti|publisher=[[Edward Elgar Publishing]]|isbn=978-1783474035|title=Handbook on Wealth and the Super-Rich |author1-link=Ronen Palan |year=2016 }}</ref> Tangible examples include the public disclosure in 2016 of [[Amazon Inc]]'s Project Goldcrest tax structure, which showed how closely the State of Luxembourg worked with Amazon for over two years to help it avoid global taxes.<ref name="amzn">{{cite news|title=Revealed: Project Goldcrest, how Amazon worked with the Luxembourg Government to avoid huge sums in tax with IP|url=https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/feb/18/revealed-project-goldcrest-amazon-avoid-huge-sums-tax|newspaper=[[The Guardian]]|date=18 February 2016|author1=Harry Davies|author2=Simon Marks|access-date=30 April 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190430202123/https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/feb/18/revealed-project-goldcrest-amazon-avoid-huge-sums-tax|archive-date=30 April 2019|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.financialsecrecyindex.com/PDF/Luxembourg.pdf|title=Narrative Report on Luxembourg|publisher=[[Tax Justice Network]]|date=2018|quote=As already noted, one of Luxembourg’s key selling points for the world’s mobile hot money has long been Luxembourg’s role as a state ‘captured’ by offshore financial services, which has effectively removed the possibility of democratic opposition to the sector.|access-date=2 May 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190501094738/https://www.financialsecrecyindex.com/PDF/Luxembourg.pdf|archive-date=1 May 2019|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> Other examples include how the Dutch Government removed provisions to prevent corporate tax avoidance by creating the [[Dutch Sandwich]] BEPS tool, which Dutch law firms then marketed to US corporations:

{{blockquote|[When] former venture-capital executive at ABN Amro Holding NV [[Joop Wijn]] becomes State Secretary of Economic Affairs in May 2003 [, ... it is] not long before the Wall Street Journal reports about his tour of the US, during which he pitches the new Netherlands tax policy to dozens of American tax lawyers, accountants, and corporate tax directors. In July 2005, he decides to abolish the provision that was meant to prevent tax dodging by American companies, in order to meet criticism from tax consultants.|author=[[Oxfam]]/[[De Correspondent]], "How the Netherlands became a Tax Haven", 31 May 2017.<ref name="oxf">{{cite web|url=https://maketaxfair.net/decorrespondent-reveals-netherlands-became-tax-haven/|title=DE CORRESPONDENT REVEALS HOW THE NETHERLANDS BECAME TAX HAVEN|author=Jesse Frederik|publisher=[[Oxfam]]/[[De Correspondent]]|date=May 2017|access-date=30 April 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190430203208/https://maketaxfair.net/decorrespondent-reveals-netherlands-became-tax-haven/|archive-date=30 April 2019|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref name="dec">{{cite web|url=https://decorrespondent.nl/6825/zo-werd-nederland-het-grootste-belastingparadijs-voor-amerikaanse-multinationals/410600865675-af3e00af|title=Zo werd Nederland het grootste belastingparadijs voor Amerikaanse multinationals|author=Jesse Frederik|work=De Correspondent |publisher=[[De Correspondent]]|date=1 June 2017|access-date=30 April 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190430203157/https://decorrespondent.nl/6825/zo-werd-nederland-het-grootste-belastingparadijs-voor-amerikaanse-multinationals/410600865675-af3e00af|archive-date=30 April 2019|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>}}

===Preferential tax ruling===
Preferential tax rulings (PTR) can be used by a jurisdiction for benign reasons, for example, tax incentives to encourage urban renewal. However, PTRs can also be used to provide aspects of tax regimes normally found in traditional tax havens.<ref name="ronen.palan"/> For example, while British citizens pay full taxes on their assets, foreign citizens legally resident in the UK pay no taxes on their global assets, as long as they are left outside the UK; thus, for a foreign resident, the UK behaves in a similar way to a traditional tax haven.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/financial-services/currency-exchange/international-money-transfers/expat-taxes-uk/|title=What taxes do expats pay in the UK?|newspaper=[[Daily Telegraph]]|date=28 February 2018|access-date=25 April 2019|author=Telegraph Financial Solutions|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190425123648/https://www.telegraph.co.uk/financial-services/currency-exchange/international-money-transfers/expat-taxes-uk/|archive-date=25 April 2019|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> Some tax academics say that PTRs make the distinction with traditional tax havens "matter of degree more than anything else".<ref name="ronen.palan"/><ref>{{cite journal|author=Charles Irish|journal=Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law | volume=15 | issue=3 | pages=449–510 | title=Tax Havens}}</ref> The OECD has made the investigation of PTRs a key part of its long-term project of combatting ''Harmful Tax Practices'', started in 1998; by 2019, the OECD had investigated over 255 PTRs.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/harmful-tax-practices-2018-progress-report-on-preferential-regimes-9789264311480-en.htm|title=Harmful Tax Practices - 2018 Progress Report on Preferential Regimes|date=29 January 2019|access-date=24 April 2019|publisher=[[OECD]]|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190424111153/https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/harmful-tax-practices-2018-progress-report-on-preferential-regimes-9789264311480-en.htm|archive-date=24 April 2019|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> The 2014 ''[[Lux Leaks]]'' disclosure revealed 548 PTRs issued by the Luxembourg authorities to corporate clients of PriceWaterhouseCoopers.  When the [[EU illegal State aid case against Apple in Ireland|EU Commission fined Apple US$13 billion in 2016]], the largest tax fine in history, they claimed Apple had received "preferential tax rulings" in 1991 and 2007.<ref name="eu1"/><ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/press-centre/press-releases/20170130-eu-commissioner-to-brief-finance-committee-on-apple-tax-ruling/ | title=EU Commissioner to brief Finance Committee on Apple tax ruling | date=30 January 2017 | access-date=24 April 2019 | publisher=Oireachtas.ie | quote=EU State Aid Rules and the investigation into preferential tax ruling involving Apple Inc. will be on the agenda when the Committee on Finance, Public Expenditure and Reform, and Taoiseach meets tomorrow [..] | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190424140451/https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/press-centre/press-releases/20170130-eu-commissioner-to-brief-finance-committee-on-apple-tax-ruling/ | archive-date=24 April 2019 | url-status=live | df=dmy-all }}</ref>

===Tax inversion===
{{Main|Tax inversion}}

Corporations can move their legal headquarters from a higher-tax home jurisdiction to a tax haven by executing a [[tax inversion]]. A "[[naked tax inversion]]" is where the corporate had little prior business activities in the new location. The first tax inversion was the "naked inversion" of [[McDermott International]] to Panama in 1983.<ref name="bloomberg1">{{cite web|url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2014-12-18/i-hear-america-singing-never-pay-taxes-the-inversion-operetta|title=McDermott International: The Greatest Tax Story Ever Told|publisher=[[Bloomberg News]]|author=Zachary Mider|date=18 December 2014|access-date=15 April 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190415212039/https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2014-12-18/i-hear-america-singing-never-pay-taxes-the-inversion-operetta|archive-date=15 April 2019|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref name="hallCBO">{{cite report | url=https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/115th-congress-2017-2018/reports/53093-inversions.pdf | title=An Analysis of Corporate Tax Inversions | last1=Hall | first1=Keith | publisher=[[Congressional Budget Office]] | year=2017 | access-date=28 April 2019 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171208100338/https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/115th-congress-2017-2018/reports/53093-inversions.pdf | archive-date=8 December 2017 | url-status=live | df=dmy-all }}</ref> The US Congress effectively banned "naked inversions" for US corporates by introducing IRS regulation 7874 in the [[American Jobs Creation Act of 2004]].<ref name="hallCBO"/> A "[[merger tax inversion]]" is where the corporate overcomes IRS 7874 by merging with a corporation that has a "substantive business presence" in the new location.<ref name="hallCBO"/> The requirement for a substantive business presence meant that US corporations could only invert to larger tax havens, and particularly OECD tax havens and EU tax havens. Further tightening of regulations by the US Treasury in 2016, as well as the 2017 TCJA US tax reform, reduced the tax benefits of a US corporation inverting to a tax haven.<ref name="hallCBO"/>

===Base erosion and profit shifting===
Even when a corporation executes a tax inversion to a tax haven, it also needs to ''shift'' (or [[earnings stripping|earnings strip]]) its untaxed profits to the new tax haven.<ref name="hallCBO"/> These are called base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) techniques.<ref name="be"/> Notable BEPS tools like the Double Irish with a [[Dutch Sandwich]] were used by US corporations to build up untaxed offshore cash reserves of US$1–2 trillion in tax havens like Bermuda (e.g., Apple's [[Bermuda Black Hole]]) from 2004 to 2017.<ref name=ThurmLinebaugh>{{cite news|title=More U.S. Profits Parked Abroad, Saving on Taxes|url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324034804578348131432634740|access-date=19 March 2013|newspaper=[[Wall Street Journal]]|date=10 March 2013|author=Scott Thurm|author2=Kate Linebaugh|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150213023222/http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324034804578348131432634740|archive-date=13 February 2015|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> As discussed in {{slink||Financial scale}}, in 2017, the OECD estimated that BEPS tools shielded US$100 to US$200 billion in annual corporate profits from tax; while in 2018, Zucman estimated that the figure was closer to US$250 billion per annum. This was despite the 2012–2016 OECD BEPS Project. In 2015, Apple executed the largest recorded BEPS transaction in history when it moved US$300 billion of its IP to Ireland, in what was called a hybrid-tax inversion.

The largest BEPS tools are the ones that use [[intellectual property]] (IP) accounting to ''shift'' profits between jurisdictions. The concept of a corporation charging its costs from one jurisdiction against its profits in another jurisdiction (i.e. [[transfer pricing]]) is well understood and accepted. However, IP enables a corporation to "revalue" its costs dramatically. For example, a major piece of software might have cost US$1 billion to develop in salaries and overheads. IP accounting enables the legal ownership of the software to be relocated to a tax haven where it can be revalued to being worth US$100 billion, which becomes the new price at which it is charged out against global profits. This creates a ''shifting'' of all global profits back to the tax haven. IP has been described as "the leading corporate tax avoidance vehicle".<ref name="ucla">{{cite journal | url=https://www.uclalawreview.org/pdf/62-1-1.pdf | page=4 | title=Intellectual Property Law Solutions to Tax Avoidance | journal=UCLA Law Review | volume=62 | issue=2 | date=2015 | author=Andrew Blair-Stanek | quote=Intellectual property (IP) has become the leading tax avoidance vehicle in the world today. | access-date=2 May 2019 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150316232500/http://www.uclalawreview.org/pdf/62-1-1.pdf | archive-date=16 March 2015 | url-status=live | df=dmy-all }}</ref><ref name="fordam">{{cite web | url=http://www.fordhamiplj.org/2016/08/30/ip-tax-avoidance-ireland/ | author=Ted Mulvany | title=Intellectual Property and Tax Avoidance in Ireland | publisher=[[Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal]] | date=30 August 2016 | access-date=27 April 2019 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190502112434/http://www.fordhamiplj.org/2016/08/30/ip-tax-avoidance-ireland/ | archive-date=2 May 2019 | url-status=live | df=dmy-all }}</ref>

===Corporate tax haven===
[[File:GIPC Intellectual Property 2018 (Patents Sub-Category).png|thumb|2018 [[Global Intellectual Property Center|Global Innovation Property Centre]] (GIPC) Legal Systems League Table: ''Patents'' Sub-Category<ref name="gipc1">{{cite web|url=https://www.theglobalipcenter.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/GIPC_IP_Index_2018.pdf|title=U.S. Chamber International IP Index, 6th Edition, 2018|publisher=[[Global Intellectual Property Center]]|date=February 2018|page=6|access-date=2 May 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181218015504/http://www.theglobalipcenter.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/GIPC_IP_Index_2018.pdf|archive-date=18 December 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>]]
Traditional OFCs, such as Cayman, BVI, Guernsey or Jersey are clear about their corporate tax neutrality. Because of this, they tend not to sign full bilateral [[tax treaties]] with other higher-tax jurisdictions. Instead, the receipts from investment structures in those jurisdictions are subject to full withholding tax set by the relevant onshore jurisdiction. The British Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies all provide full tax transparency and automatic tax reporting to onshore tax authorities via CRS, FACTA.

Other tax havens, for example in Europe or Asia, maintain higher non-zero "headline" rates of corporate taxation, but instead provide complex and confidential BEPS tools and PTRs that bring the "effective" corporate tax rate closer to zero; they all feature prominently in the leading jurisdictions for IP law (see graphic). These "corporate tax havens" (or Conduit OFCs), further increase respectability by requiring the corporate using their BEPS tools/PTRs to maintain a "substantial presence" in the haven; this is called an [[Corporate tax haven#employment tax|employment tax]], and can cost the corporate circa 2–3% of revenues. However, these initiatives enable the corporate tax haven to maintain large networks of full bilateral tax treaties, that allow corporates based in the haven to ''shift'' global untaxed profits back to the haven (and on to Sink OFCs, as shown above). These "corporate tax havens" strongly deny any association with being a tax haven and maintain high levels of compliance and transparency, with many being OECD-whitelisted (and are OECD or EU members). Many of the {{slink||Top 10 tax havens}} are "corporate tax havens".

===Conduits and Sinks===
{{Main|Conduit and Sink OFCs}}
In 2017, the [[University of Amsterdam]]'s [[CORPNET]] research group published the results of their multi-year [[big data]] analysis of over 98 million global corporate connections.  CORPNET ignored any prior definition of a tax haven or any legal or tax structuring concepts, to instead follow a purely quantitative approach.  CORPNET's results split the understanding of tax havens into [[Sink OFC]]s, which are traditional tax havens to which corporates route untaxed funds, and [[Conduit OFC]]s, which are the jurisdictions that create the OECD-compliant tax structures that enable the untaxed funds to be routed from the higher-tax jurisdictions to the Sink OFCs. Despite following a purely quantitative approach, CORPNET's top 5 Conduit OFCs and top 5 Sink OFCs closely match the other academic {{slink||Top 10 tax havens}}.  CORPNET's Conduit OFCs contained several major jurisdictions considered OECD and/or EU tax havens, including the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, and Ireland.<ref name="xx"/><ref name="RTEconduit"/><ref name="WPaidan.regan"/>  Conduit OFCs are strongly correlated with modern "corporate tax havens" and Sink OFCs with "traditional tax havens".

===Tax-free wrapper===
As well as corporate structures, tax havens also provide tax-free (or "tax neutral") legal wrappers for holding assets, also known as [[special purpose vehicles]] (SPVs) or [[special purpose companies]] (SPCs).<ref name="nicholas.shaxson"/> These SPVs and SPCs are not only free of all taxes, duties, and VAT, but are tailored to the regulatory requirements, and the banking requirements of specific segments.<ref name="nicholas.shaxson"/>  For example, the zero-tax [[Section 110 SPV]] is a major wrapper in the global securitization market.<ref name="WPaidan.regan">{{cite news|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/04/25/ireland-is-tax-haven-thats-becoming-controversial-home/?noredirect=on|title=Ireland is a tax haven — and that's becoming controversial at home|author=Aidan Regan|newspaper=[[Washington Post]]|date=25 April 2019|access-date=25 April 2019}}</ref> This SPV offers features including [[orphan structures]], which is facilitated to support requirements for [[bankruptcy remote]]ness, which would not be appropriate in larger [[financial centres]], as it could damage the local tax base, but are needed by banks in securitizations. The [[Cayman Islands company law|Cayman Islands SPC]] is a structure used by asset managers as it can accommodate asset classes such as intellectual property ("IP") assets, cryptocurrency assets, and carbon credit assets; competitor products include the Irish QIAIF and Luxembourg's [[SICAV]].<ref name="cay">{{cite web|url=https://files.irishfunds.ie/1447891863-NY-Nov-2015.pdf|title=IRISH FUNDS ASSOCIATION: ICAV Breakfast Seminar New York|publisher=Irish Funds Association|date=November 2015|page=16|quote=ANDREA KELLY (PwC Ireland): "We expect most Irish QIAIFs to be structured as ICAVs from now on and given that ICAVs are superior tax management vehicles to the Cayman Island SPCs, Ireland should attract substantial re-domiciling business|access-date=28 April 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171202122946/https://files.irishfunds.ie/1447891863-NY-Nov-2015.pdf|archive-date=2 December 2017|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>

==Data leaks==
Some businesses in tax havens have been subject to the illegal obtaining and either public or non-public disclosures of client account data, the most notable being:

===Liechtenstein tax affair (2008)===
{{Main|2008 Liechtenstein tax affair}}
In 2008, the German [[Federal Intelligence Service]] paid €4.2 million to Heinrich Kieber, a former IT data archivist of [[LGT Bank|LGT Treuhand]], a Liechtenstein bank, for a list of 1,250 customer account details of the bank.<ref>{{cite magazine|url=http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/liechtenstein-s-shadowy-informant-tax-whistleblower-sold-data-to-the-us-a-537640.html|title=Liechtenstein's Shadowy Informant: Tax Whistleblower Sold Data to the US|first=SPIEGEL|last=Staff|date=25 February 2008|access-date=24 April 2019|magazine=[[Der Spiegel]]|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180815150755/http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/liechtenstein-s-shadowy-informant-tax-whistleblower-sold-data-to-the-us-a-537640.html|archive-date=15 August 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> Investigations and arrests followed relating to charges of illegal tax evasion.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.theguardian.com/business/2008/feb/21/globaleconomy.europeanbanks|title=Merkel challenges Liechtenstein over tax evasion|author=Kate Connelly|newspaper=[[The Guardian]]|date=21 February 2008|access-date=24 April 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190424195724/https://www.theguardian.com/business/2008/feb/21/globaleconomy.europeanbanks|archive-date=24 April 2019|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> The German authorities shared the data with US [[IRS]], and the British [[HMRC]] paid GBP£100,000 for the same data.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.theguardian.com/business/2008/mar/02/tax.personalfinancenews|title=A journey from haven to hell|author=Nick Mathiason|newspaper=[[The Guardian]]|access-date=24 April 2019|date=21 February 2008|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181105205402/https://www.theguardian.com/business/2008/mar/02/tax.personalfinancenews|archive-date=5 November 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> The authorities in several other European countries, Australia and Canada also received the data. Liechtenstein's authorities strongly protested the case and issued an arrest order against the man suspected of having leaked the data.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/13/business/worldbusiness/13tax.html|title=Liechtenstein Issues Warrant for Tax Informant|author=Mark Lander|date=13 March 2008|access-date=24 April 2019|newspaper=[[New York Times]]|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190424200126/https://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/13/business/worldbusiness/13tax.html|archive-date=24 April 2019|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>

===British Virgin Islands offshore leaks (2013)===
{{Main|Offshore Leaks}}
In April 2013, the [[International Consortium of Investigative Journalists]] (ICIJ) released a searchable 260-gigabyte database of 2.5 million tax haven client files anonymously leaked to the ICIJ and analyzed by 112 journalists in 58 countries.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.icij.org/investigations/offshore/icij-releases-offshore-leaks-database-revealing-names-behind-secret-companies-trusts/|title=ICIJ Releases Offshore Leaks Database Revealing Names Behind Secret Companies, Trusts|publisher=[[International Consortium of Investigative Journalists]]|author=Marina Walker Guevara|date=12 June 2013|access-date=24 April 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190327010532/https://www.icij.org/investigations/offshore/icij-releases-offshore-leaks-database-revealing-names-behind-secret-companies-trusts/|archive-date=27 March 2019|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/jun/15/database-app-icij-tax-havens|title=Offshore Leaks app puts secret users of tax havens in the public eye|author=Ben Quinn|newspaper=[[The Guardian]]|date=15 June 2013|access-date=24 April 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181106171151/https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/jun/15/database-app-icij-tax-havens|archive-date=6 November 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> The majority of clients came from mainland China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, the Russian Federation, and former Soviet republics; with the British Virgin Islands identified as the most important tax haven for Chinese clients, and Cyprus an important tax haven location for Russian clients.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/apr/04/offshore-secrets-data-emails-icij|title=Offshore secrets: unravelling a complex package of data|author=Duncan Campbell|date=4 April 2014|access-date=24 April 2019|newspaper=[[The Guardian]]|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190424191833/https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/apr/04/offshore-secrets-data-emails-icij|archive-date=24 April 2019|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> Various prominent names were contained in the leaks including [[François Hollande]]'s campaign manager, [[Jean-Jacques Augier]]; Mongolia's finance minister, Bayartsogt Sangajav; the president of Azerbaijan; the wife of Russia's Deputy Prime Minister; and Canadian politician [[Anthony Merchant]].<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/apr/03/offshore-secrets-offshore-tax-haven|title=Leaks reveal secrets of the rich who hide cash offshore|newspaper=[[The Guardian]]|author=David Leigh|date=3 April 2013|access-date=24 April 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190424191835/https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/apr/03/offshore-secrets-offshore-tax-haven|archive-date=24 April 2019|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>

===Luxembourg leaks (2014)===
{{Main|Lux Leaks}}

In November 2014, the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) released 28,000 documents totalling 4.4 gigabytes of confidential information about Luxembourg's confidential private tax rulings given to PricewaterhouseCoopers from 2002 to 2010 to the benefit of its clients in Luxembourg. This ICIJ investigation disclosed 548 tax rulings for over 340 multinational companies based in Luxembourg. The LuxLeaks' disclosures attracted international attention and comment about corporate tax avoidance schemes in Luxembourg and elsewhere. This scandal contributed to the implementation of measures aiming at reducing tax dumping and regulating tax avoidance schemes beneficial to multinational companies.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.theguardian.com/business/gallery/2014/nov/07/12-luxleaks-diagrams-that-will-make-your-head-spin|title=12 LuxLeaks diagrams that will make your head spin|date=7 November 2014|newspaper=[[The Guardian]]|access-date=24 April 2019|author=Editorial Special|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190424211520/https://www.theguardian.com/business/gallery/2014/nov/07/12-luxleaks-diagrams-that-will-make-your-head-spin|archive-date=24 April 2019|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/nov/05/-sp-luxembourg-tax-files-tax-avoidance-industrial-scale|title=Luxembourg tax files: how tiny state rubber-stamped tax avoidance on an industrial scale|author=Simon Bowers|date=5 November 2014|access-date=24 April 2019|newspaper=[[The Guardian]]|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151026015809/http://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/nov/05/-sp-luxembourg-tax-files-tax-avoidance-industrial-scale|archive-date=26 October 2015|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>

===Swiss leaks (2015)===
{{Main|Swiss Leaks}}
In February 2015, French newspaper {{lang|fr|[[Le Monde]]}}, was given over 3.3 gigabytes of confidential client data relating to a tax evasion scheme allegedly operated with the knowledge and encouragement of the British multinational bank [[HSBC]] via its Swiss subsidiary, [[HSBC Private Bank#HSBC Private Bank .28Suisse.29|HSBC Private Bank (Suisse)]]. The source was French computer analyst [[Hervé Falciani]] who provided data on accounts held by over 100,000 clients and 20,000 offshore companies with HSBC in Geneva; the disclosure has been called "the biggest leak in Swiss banking history". Le Monde called upon 154 journalists affiliated with 47 different media outlets to process the data, including ''[[The Guardian]]'', ''[[Süddeutsche Zeitung]]'', and the ICIJ.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.theguardian.com/news/2015/feb/18/hsbc-swiss-bank-searched-as-officials-launch-money-laundering-inquiry|title=HSBC: Swiss bank searched as officials launch money-laundering inquiry|author=Jill Treanor|newspaper=[[The Guardian]]|date=18 February 2015|access-date=24 April 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190323004128/https://www.theguardian.com/news/2015/feb/18/hsbc-swiss-bank-searched-as-officials-launch-money-laundering-inquiry|archive-date=23 March 2019|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.theguardian.com/news/2015/nov/27/hsbc-whistleblower-jailed-five-years-herve-falciani|title=HSBC whistleblower given five years' jail over biggest leak in banking history|author=Juliette Garside|date=27 November 2015|access-date=24 April 2019|newspaper=[[The Guardian]]|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190424214505/https://www.theguardian.com/news/2015/nov/27/hsbc-whistleblower-jailed-five-years-herve-falciani|archive-date=24 April 2019|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>

===Panama papers (2015)===
{{Main|Panama Papers}}
[[File:Countries implicated in the Panama Papers.svg|thumb|260px|Countries with politicians, public officials or close associates named in the leak in April 2016]]
In 2015, 11.5 million documents totalling 2.6 terabytes, detailing financial and attorney-client information for more than 214,488 offshore entities, some dating back to the 1970s, that were taken from the Panamanian law firm [[Mossack Fonseca]], were anomalously leaked to German journalist [[Bastian Obermayer]] in ''[[Süddeutsche Zeitung]]'' (SZ). Given the unprecedented scale of the data, SZ worked with the ICIJ, as well as journalists from 107 media organizations in 80 countries who analyzed the documents. After more than a year of analysis, the first news stories were published on 3 April 2016. The documents named prominent public figures from around the globe including British Prime Minister [[David Cameron]] and the Icelandic Prime Minister [[Sigmundur Davíð Gunnlaugsson]].<ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.theguardian.com/news/2016/apr/03/what-you-need-to-know-about-the-panama-papers |title=What are the Panama Papers? A guide to history's biggest data leak |author=Luke Harding |newspaper=[[The Guardian]] |date=5 April 2016 |access-date=24 April 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160404234544/http://www.theguardian.com/news/2016/apr/03/what-you-need-to-know-about-the-panama-papers |archive-date=4 April 2016 |url-status=live |df=dmy-all }}</ref>

===Paradise papers (2017)===
{{Main|Paradise Papers}}
In 2017, 13.4 million documents totalling 1.4 terabytes, detailing both personal and major corporate client activities of the [[offshore magic circle]] law firm [[Appleby (law firm)|Appleby]], covering 19 tax havens, were leaked to the German reporters [[Frederik Obermaier]] and [[Bastian Obermayer]] in ''[[Süddeutsche Zeitung]]'' (SZ). As with the Panama Papers in 2015, SZ worked with the ICIJ and over 100 media organizations to process the documents. They contain the names of more than 120,000 people and companies including Apple, AIG, Prince Charles, Queen Elizabeth II, the President of Colombia Juan Manuel Santos, and then-U.S. Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross. At 1.4 terabytes in size, this is second only to the Panama Papers of 2016 as the biggest data leak in history.<ref>{{cite news | url=https://www.theguardian.com/news/2017/nov/05/paradise-papers-leak-reveals-secrets-of-world-elites-hidden-wealth | title=Paradise Papers leak reveals secrets of the world elite's hidden wealth | date=5 November 2017 | author=Juliette Garside | access-date=24 April 2019 | newspaper=[[The Guardian]] | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171111031347/https://www.theguardian.com/news/2017/nov/05/paradise-papers-leak-reveals-secrets-of-world-elites-hidden-wealth | archive-date=11 November 2017 | url-status=live | df=dmy-all }}</ref>

===Pandora Papers (2021)===
{{Main|Pandora Papers}}

In October 2021, 11.9 million leaked documents with 2.9 terabytes of data were leaked by the [[International Consortium of Investigative Journalists]] (ICIJ). The leak exposed the secret offshore accounts of 35 world leaders, including current and former presidents, prime ministers, and heads of state as well as more than 100 billionaires, celebrities, and business leaders.

In a report dated 15 June 2023,<ref>{{Cite web |title=Texts adopted - Lessons learnt from the Pandora Papers and other revelations - Thursday, 15 June 2023 |url=https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2023-0249_EN.html |access-date=2023-06-29 |website=www.europarl.europa.eu |language=en}}</ref> certain chilling admissions were made by the [[Parliament of the European Union]] regarding the conduct and publicity surrounding the Pandora Papers data breach:

<blockquote>[The Parliament] Stresses the importance of defending the freedom of journalists to report on issues of public interest without facing the threat of costly legal action, including when they receive confidential, secret or restricted documents, datasets or other materials, regardless of their origin. (§2)</blockquote>

<blockquote>[The Parliament] Regrets the lack of democratic accountability in the process of drawing up the "EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes"; recalls that the Council seems sometimes to be guided by diplomatic or political motives rather than objective assessments when deciding to move countries from the "grey list" to the "black list" and vice-versa; stresses that this undermines the credibility, predictability and usefulness of the lists; calls for Parliament to be consulted in the preparation of the list and for an extensive revision of the screening criteria (§78)</blockquote>

<blockquote>[The Parliament] notes that despite the implementation of European and national legislation on beneficial ownership transparency, as reported by non-governmental organisations, the quality of data in some EU public registers requires improvement (§60)</blockquote>

==Countermeasures==
The various countermeasures that higher-tax jurisdictions have taken against tax havens can be grouped into the following types:
* Transparency. Actions that promote visibility into the entities operating within the tax haven, and including data and information sharing.
* Blacklists. A coercive tool used by both the OECD and the EU to encourage cooperation by tax havens with their transparency initiatives.
* Specific. Sets of legislative and/or regulatory actions targeted at specifically identified issues regarding tax havens.
* Fundamental. Where the higher-tax jurisdictions conduct a reform of their taxation systems to remove the incentives to use tax havens.
* International. Where multiple countries decide to change the basis of fair taxation.

===Transparency===
====US FATCA====
{{Main|Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act}}

In 2010, Congress passed the [[Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act]] (FATCA), which requires foreign financial institutions (FFI) of broad scope – banks, stock brokers, hedge funds, pension funds, insurance companies, trusts – to report directly to the US [[Internal Revenue Service]] (IRS) all clients who are [[U.S. person]]s. Starting January 2014, FATCA requires FFIs to provide annual reports to the IRS on the name and address of each U.S. client, as well as the largest account balance in the year and total debits and credits of any account owned by a U.S. person.<ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=242164,00.html | title=Treasury and IRS Issue Guidance Outlining Phased Implementation of FATCA Beginning in 2013 | author=U.S. Internal Revenue Service | date=2011-07-14 | access-date=2011-08-25 | author-link=U.S. Internal Revenue Service | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120814151335/http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=242164,00.html | archive-date=14 August 2012 | url-status=live | df=dmy-all }}</ref> In addition, FATCA requires any foreign company not listed on a stock exchange or any foreign partnership that has 10% U.S. ownership to report to the IRS the names and [[Taxpayer Identification Number|tax identification number]] (TIN) of any U.S. owner. FATCA also requires U.S. citizens and [[Permanent residence (United States)|green card holders]] who have foreign financial assets in excess of $50,000 to complete a new [[Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act|Form 8938]] to be filed with the [[IRS tax forms|1040 tax return]], starting with fiscal year 2010.<ref>"For most individual taxpayers, this means they will start filing Form 8938 with their 2011 income tax return to be filed this coming tax filing season."{{cite web | url=https://www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations/article/0,,id=251217,00.html | title=Do I need to file Form 8938, "Statement of Specified Foreign Financial Assets"? | author=U.S. Internal Revenue Service | date=2012-01-25 | access-date=2012-07-03 | author-link=U.S. Internal Revenue Service | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120804120808/http://www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations/article/0,,id=251217,00.html | archive-date=4 August 2012 | url-status=live | df=dmy-all }}</ref>

====OECD CRS====
{{main|Common Reporting Standard}}
In 2014, the OECD followed FATCA with the [[Common Reporting Standard]], an information standard for the automatic exchange of tax and financial information on a global level (which would already be needed by FATCA to process data). Participating in the CRS from 2017 onwards are Australia, the Bahamas, Bahrain, Bermuda, Brazil, British Virgin Islands, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Cayman Islands, Chile, China, the Cook Islands, Guernsey, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Jersey, Kuwait, Lebanon, Macau, Malaysia, Mauritius, Monaco, New Zealand, Panama, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and Uruguay.<ref>{{Cite web |title=OECD: CRS participating jurisdictions |url=https://www.oecd.org/tax/automatic-exchange/crs-implementation-and-assistance/crs-by-jurisdiction/ |website=www.oecd.org }}</ref>

===Blacklists===
====OECD====
<!---
Commenting out this quote, as reference is dated 2008. It may be valid, but needs verification. [[User:Wwheaton|Wwheaton]]
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At the [[2009 G-20 London summit|London G20 summit]] on 2 April 2009, [[G20]] countries agreed to define a [[blacklist]] for tax havens, to be segmented according to a four-tier system, based on compliance with an "internationally agreed tax standard".<ref name=Guardian>{{cite news|url= https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/apr/02/g20-summit-tax-havens|title= G20 declares door shut on tax havens|work= The Guardian|date= 2 April 2009|first1= Nicholas|last1= Watt|first2= Larry|last2= Elliott|first3= Julian|last3= Borger|first4= Ian|last4= Black|access-date= 13 December 2016|archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20160721220651/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/apr/02/g20-summit-tax-havens|archive-date= 21 July 2016|url-status= live|df= dmy-all}}</ref> The list as per 2 April 2009 can be viewed on the OECD website.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.oecd.org/ctp/42497950.pdf |title=A Progress Report on The Jurisdictions Surveyed by The OECD Global Forum in Implementing The Internationally Agreed Tax Standard |date=2009-04-02 |publisher=OECD |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140812004348/http://www.oecd.org/ctp/42497950.pdf |archive-date=12 August 2014 |url-status=live |df=dmy-all }}</ref> The four tiers were:

# Those that have substantially implemented the standard (includes most countries but [[China]] still excludes [[Hong Kong]] and [[Macau]]).
# Tax havens that have committed to – but not yet fully implemented – the standard (includes [[Montserrat]], [[Nauru]], [[Niue]], [[Panama]], and [[Vanuatu]])
# Financial centres that have committed to – but not yet fully implemented – the standard (includes [[Guatemala]], [[Costa Rica]] and [[Uruguay]]).
# Those who have not committed to the standard (an empty category)

Those countries in the bottom tier were initially classified as being 'non-cooperative tax havens'. Uruguay was initially classified as being uncooperative. However, upon appeal the OECD stated that it did meet tax transparency rules and thus moved it up. The Philippines took steps to remove itself from the blacklist and [[Prime Minister of Malaysia|Malaysian Prime Minister]] [[Najib Razak]] had suggested earlier that Malaysia should not be in the bottom tier.<ref>{{cite news |title=OECD names and shames tax havens |work=BBC News |date=2009-04-03 |url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/7980848.stm |access-date=2009-04-04 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090404232656/http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/7980848.stm |archive-date=4 April 2009 |url-status=live |df=dmy-all }}</ref>

In April 2009 the OECD announced through its chief Angel Gurria that Costa Rica, Malaysia, the Philippines and Uruguay have been removed from the blacklist after they had made "a full commitment to exchange information to the OECD standards."<ref name="bbc2009-04-07">{{cite news |title=OECD removes tax havens from list |author=BBC |url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7987417.stm |work=BBC News |date=2009-04-07 |access-date=2009-04-07 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090410015052/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7987417.stm |archive-date=10 April 2009 |url-status=live |df=dmy-all }}</ref> Despite calls from former [[French President]] [[Nicolas Sarkozy]] for [[Hong Kong]] and [[Macau]] to be included on the list separately from China, they are as yet not included independently, although it is expected that they will be added at a later date.<ref name="Guardian" />

Government response to the crackdown has been broadly supportive, although not universal.<ref>{{cite news |title=Save the tax havens – we need them |newspaper=[[The Times]] |date=2009-04-12 |url=http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_contributors/article6078115.ece |access-date=2009-04-14 |location=London |first=Eamonn |last=Butler |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110430101937/http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_contributors/article6078115.ece |archive-date=30 April 2011 |url-status=dead |df=dmy-all }}</ref> [[List of Prime Ministers of Luxembourg|Luxembourg Prime Minister]] [[Jean-Claude Juncker]] has criticised the list, stating that it has "no credibility", for failing to include various states of the USA which provide incorporation infrastructure that are indistinguishable from the aspects of pure tax havens to which the G20 object.<ref>{{cite news |title=Welcome to tax-dodge city, USA |newspaper=The Guardian |date=2009-04-10 |url=https://www.theguardian.com/business/2009/apr/10/tax-havens-blacklist-us-delaware |access-date=2009-04-14 |location=London |first=Andrew |last=Clark |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161224033144/https://www.theguardian.com/business/2009/apr/10/tax-havens-blacklist-us-delaware |archive-date=24 December 2016 |url-status=live |df=dmy-all }}</ref> As of 2012, 89 countries have implemented reforms sufficient to be listed on the OECD's white list.<ref>[http://in.reuters.com/article/tax-offshore-idINDEE86P04L20120726 "Tax haven clampdown yields cash but secrecy still thrives."] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121022175535/http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/07/26/tax-offshore-idINDEE86P04L20120726 |date=22 October 2012 }} ''Reuters'', 26 July 2012.</ref>

====European Union====
{{Main|European Union tax haven blacklist}}
In December 2017, [[EU Commission]] adopted a "blacklist" of territories to encourage compliance and cooperation: [[American Samoa]], [[Bahrain]], [[Barbados]], [[Grenada]], [[Guam]], [[South Korea]], [[Macau]], [[the Marshall Islands]], [[Mongolia]], [[Namibia]], [[Palau]], [[Panama]], [[Saint Lucia]], [[Samoa]], [[Trinidad and Tobago]], [[Tunisia]], [[United Arab Emirates]].<ref name="eu havens"/> In addition, the Commission produced a "greylist" of 47 jurisdictions that had already committed to cooperate with the EU to change their rules on tax transparency and cooperation.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/dec/05/eu-blacklist-names-17-tax-havens-and-puts-caymans-and-jersey-on-notice|title=EU blacklist names 17 tax havens and puts Caymans and Jersey on notice|newspaper=The Guardian|date=5 December 2017|access-date=1 May 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190407180336/https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/dec/05/eu-blacklist-names-17-tax-havens-and-puts-caymans-and-jersey-on-notice|archive-date=7 April 2019|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> Only one of the EU's 17 blacklisted tax havens, namely Samoa, was in {{slink||Top 20 tax havens}} above.  The EU lists did not include any OECD or EU jurisdictions, or any of the {{slink||Top 10 tax havens}}.<ref name="ced"/><ref name="ft.com"/><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/business-42237315|title=First tax havens blacklist published by EU|first=Jamie|last=Robertson|date=5 December 2017|access-date=17 April 2018|website=Bbc.com|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180429072258/http://www.bbc.com/news/business-42237315|archive-date=29 April 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref name="aa2">{{cite web|url=https://www.icij.org/investigations/paradise-papers/bermuda-luxembourg-new-eu-blacklist-omits-major-tax-havens/|title=Where is Luxembourg, Ireland and the Netherlands on the new EU blacklist|publisher=The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists|date=5 December 2017|access-date=1 May 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190328142712/https://www.icij.org/investigations/paradise-papers/bermuda-luxembourg-new-eu-blacklist-omits-major-tax-havens/|archive-date=28 March 2019|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> A few weeks later in January 2018, EU Taxation Commissioner [[Pierre Moscovici]], called Ireland and the Netherlands, "tax black holes".<ref name="blackhole">{{cite web|url=https://www.france24.com/en/20180118-eus-moscovici-slams-ireland-netherlands-tax-black-holes|title=EU's Moscovici slams Ireland, Netherlands as tax 'black holes'|publisher=France 24 News|date=18 January 2018|access-date=1 May 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190501195524/https://www.france24.com/en/20180118-eus-moscovici-slams-ireland-netherlands-tax-black-holes|archive-date=1 May 2019|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.thetimes.com/world/ireland-world/article/ireland-labelled-a-tax-policy-black-hole-bzgcrph3m|title=Ireland labelled a tax "black hole"|date=19 January 2018|quote="Obviously many countries in the European Union are places where aggressive tax optimisation finds its place," Pierre Moscovici, the European commissioner for economic affairs and taxation, told reporters in Brussels yesterday. "Some European countries are black holes. . . I want to address this."|newspaper=[[The Sunday Times]]|access-date=1 May 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190501195530/https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/ireland-labelled-a-tax-policy-black-hole-bzgcrph3m|archive-date=1 May 2019|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> After only a few months the EU reduced the blacklist further,<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-tax-blacklist/eu-tax-haven-blacklist-set-to-shrink-further-causing-outcry-idUSKCN1GI1F4|title=EU tax haven blacklist set to shrink further, causing outcry|first=Francesco|last=Guarascio|access-date=17 April 2018|work=[[Reuters]]|date=4 March 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180308231354/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-tax-blacklist/eu-tax-haven-blacklist-set-to-shrink-further-causing-outcry-idUSKCN1GI1F4|archive-date=8 March 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> and by November 2018, it contained only five jurisdictions: American Samoa, Guam, Samoa, Trinidad & Tobago, and the US Virgin Islands.<ref>{{cite web|quote=The move brought the list down to five non-cooperative jurisdictions - Samoa, Trinidad and Tobago and the three US territories of American Samoa, Guam, and the US Virgin Islands.|title=EU tax haven blacklist drops to five as Namibia removed|publisher=[[RTE News]]|date=6 November 2018|access-date=1 May 2019|url=https://www.rte.ie/news/business/2018/1106/1009014-eu-tax-haven-list/|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190501202412/https://www.rte.ie/news/business/2018/1106/1009014-eu-tax-haven-list/|archive-date=1 May 2019|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> However, by March 2019, the EU blacklist was expanded to 15 jurisdictions including Bermuda, a [[#Top 10 tax havens|Top 10 tax haven]] and the 5th largest [[Sink OFC]].<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.rte.ie/news/business/2019/0312/1035942-eu-adds-10-countries-to-tax-blacklist/|title=EU adds 10 countries, including UAE, to tax blacklist|publisher=[[RTE News]]|date=12 March 2019|access-date=1 May 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190318050008/https://www.rte.ie/news/business/2019/0312/1035942-eu-adds-10-countries-to-tax-blacklist/|archive-date=18 March 2019|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>

On 27 March 2019, the [[European Parliament]] voted 505 in favour to 63 against accepting a new report that likened [[Luxembourg]], [[Malta]], [[Ireland]] and the [[Netherlands]], and [[Cyprus]] to "display[ing] traits of a tax haven and facilitate aggressive tax planning".<ref name="Simon Bowers">{{cite web | url=https://www.icij.org/investigations/luxembourg-leaks/seven-eu-countries-labeled-tax-havens-in-parliament-report/ | title=Seven EU Countries Labeled 'Tax Havens' in Parliament Report | publisher=[[International Consortium of Investigative Journalists]] | author=Simon Bowers | date=4 March 2019 | access-date=20 April 2019 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190420102822/https://www.icij.org/investigations/luxembourg-leaks/seven-eu-countries-labeled-tax-havens-in-parliament-report/ | archive-date=20 April 2019 | url-status=live | df=dmy-all }}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.rte.ie/news/business/2019/0326/1038812-ireland-european-report/|title=Ireland likened to tax haven in report accepted in European Parliament|publisher=[[RTE News]]|date=26 March 2019|access-date=27 March 2019|quote=Ireland has been likened to a tax haven in a new report which was overwhelmingly accepted by the European Parliament.|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190326223608/https://www.rte.ie/news/business/2019/0326/1038812-ireland-european-report/|archive-date=26 March 2019|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> However, despite this vote, the EU Commission is not obliged to include these EU jurisdictions on the blacklist.<ref name="dutchnl">{{cite web|url=https://www.dutchnews.nl/news/2019/03/the-netherlands-is-a-tax-haven-alongside-ireland-malta-and-cyprus-say-meps/|title=The Netherlands is a tax haven alongside Ireland, Malta, and Cyprus, say MEPs|date=27 March 2019|access-date=20 April 2019|quote=Members of the European Parliament have voted to include the Netherlands, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta and Cyprus on the official EU tax haven blacklist.|publisher=DutchNews.nl|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190331154110/https://www.dutchnews.nl/news/2019/03/the-netherlands-is-a-tax-haven-alongside-ireland-malta-and-cyprus-say-meps/|archive-date=31 March 2019|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>

==== Portugal ====
{{Main|Portugal's List of Tax Havens}}
Since the early 2000s [[Portugal]] has adopted a specific list of jurisdictions deemed as tax havens by the Government, associated to the said list is a set of tax penalties on Portuguese resident taxpayers. Nevertheless, the list has been critiqued<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.jm-madeira.pt/opinioes/ver/2761/Hipocrisia_Tributaria|title=Hipocrisia Tributária|date=2019-08-01|website=JM Madeira|language=pt-PT|access-date=2019-11-13}}</ref> for not being objective nor rational from an economic standpoint.

===Specific===
====Anti-inversion====
{{main|Tax inversion#Countermeasures}}
To prevent [[naked tax inversion]]s of US corporations to mostly Caribbean-type tax havens (e.g. Bermuda and the Cayman Islands), the US Congress added Regulation 7874 to the IRS code with the passing of the [[American Jobs Creation Act of 2004]]. Although the legislation was effective, further US Treasury regulations were required in 2014–2016 to prevent the much larger [[merger tax inversion]]s, which culminated with the effective block of the proposed 2016 US$160 billion of Pfizer-Allergan in Ireland. Since these changes, there have been no further material US tax inversions.

====Anti-BEPS====
At the [[2012 G20 Los Cabos summit]], it was agreed that the OECD undertake a project to combat base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) activities by corporates. An OECD BEPS [[Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting|Multilateral Instrument]], consisting of "15 Actions" designed to be implemented domestically and through bilateral tax treaty provisions, was agreed upon at the [[2015 G20 Antalya summit]]. The OECD BEPS Multilateral Instrument ("MLI"), was adopted on 24 November 2016 and has since been signed by over 78 jurisdictions; it came into force in July 2018. The MLI has been criticised for "watering down" several of its proposed initiatives, including country–by–country–reporting ("CbCr"), and for providing several opt-outs which several OECD and EU tax havens availed of. The US did not sign the MLI.

====Anti-Double Irish====
The Double Irish was the largest BEPS tool in history which by 2015, was shielding over US$100 billion in mostly US corporate profits from US taxation. When the EU Commission [[EU illegal State aid case against Apple in Ireland|fined Apple €13 billion for using an illegal hybrid-Double Irish structure]], their report noted that Apple had been using the structure from at least as far back as 1991.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C_.2014.369.01.0022.01.ENG&toc=OJ:C:2014:369:TOC|title=State aid SA.38373 (2014/C) (ex 2014/NN) — Alleged aid to Apple|website=eur-lex.europa.eu|access-date=14 November 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161116115619/http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C_.2014.369.01.0022.01.ENG&toc=OJ:C:2014:369:TOC|archive-date=16 November 2016|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> Several Senate and congressional inquiries in Washington cited public knowledge of the Double Irish from 2000 onwards. However, it was not the US that finally forced Ireland to close the structure in 2015, but the EU Commission;<ref name="euclose">{{cite news|url=https://www.ft.com/content/ba95cff0-4fcd-11e4-a0a4-00144feab7de|title=Brussels in crackdown on 'Double Irish' tax loophole|newspaper=[[The Financial Times]]|date=October 2014|author1=Alex Barker|author2=Vincent Boland|author3=Vanessa Houlder|quote=Brussels is challenging the “Double Irish” tax avoidance measure prized by big U.S. tech and pharma groups, putting pressure on Dublin to close it down or face a full-blown investigation. [..] The initial enquiries have signalled that Brussels wants Dublin to call time on the tax gambit, which has helped Ireland become a hub for American tech and pharma giants operating in Europe.|access-date=3 May 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180722112759/https://www.ft.com/content/ba95cff0-4fcd-11e4-a0a4-00144feab7de|archive-date=22 July 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> and existing users were given until 2020 to find alternative arrangements, two of which (e.g. [[Single malt arrangement]]) were already operating.<ref name="guardian">{{cite web| url=https://theconversation.com/irelands-move-to-close-the-double-irish-tax-loophole-unlikely-to-bother-apple-google-33011| title=Ireland's move to close the 'Double Irish' tax loophole unlikely to bother Apple, Google| publisher=The Guardian and University of Sydney| author=Anthony Ting| date=October 2014| access-date=3 May 2019| archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180722114227/http://theconversation.com/irelands-move-to-close-the-double-irish-tax-loophole-unlikely-to-bother-apple-google-33011| archive-date=22 July 2018| url-status=live| df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref name="googledi">{{cite news|url=https://www.thejournal.ie/google-ireland-tax-3-3-4367701-Dec2018/|title=Two years after the 'double Irish' was shelved, Google used it to shift billions to Bermuda|date=28 November 2018|newspaper=[[TheJournal.ie]]|quote=TWO YEARS AFTER the controversial ‘double Irish’ loophole was closed to new entrants, Google continued using the system to funnel billions in untaxed profits to Bermuda.|access-date=3 May 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190503133827/https://www.thejournal.ie/google-ireland-tax-3-3-4367701-Dec2018/|archive-date=3 May 2019|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> The lack of action by the US, similar to their position with the OECD MLI (above), has been attributed to the {{slink||U.S. as the largest user and beneficiary}} of tax havens. However, some commentators note the {{slink||Fundamental}} reform of the US corporate tax code by the 2017 TCJA may change this.<ref name="hbr">{{cite magazine|url=https://hbr.org/ideacast/2017/12/breaking-down-the-new-u-s-corporate-tax-law|title=Breaking Down the New U.S. Corporate Tax Law|magazine=[[Harvard Business Review]]|author=Mihir A. Desai|date=26 December 2017|quote=So, if you think about a lot of technology companies that are housed in Ireland and have massive operations there, they’re not going to maybe need those in the same way, and those can be relocated back to the U.S.|author-link=Mihir A. Desai|access-date=3 May 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180722112253/https://hbr.org/ideacast/2017/12/breaking-down-the-new-u-s-corporate-tax-law|archive-date=22 July 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>

===Fundamental===
====United Kingdom====
After losing 22 tax inversions from 2007 to 2010, mostly to Ireland, the UK decided to completely reform its corporate tax code.<ref name="mcbridetaxfoundation"/> From 2009 to 2012 the UK reduced its headline corporate tax rate from 28% to 20% (and eventually to 19%), changed the British corporate tax code from a "worldwide tax system" to a "territorial tax system", and created new IP-based BEPS tools including a low-tax [[patent box]].<ref name="mcbridetaxfoundation">{{cite report| url=https://files.taxfoundation.org/legacy/docs/TaxFoundation_FF442.pdf| title=Tax Reform in the UK Reversed the Tide of Corporate Tax Inversions| last1=McBride| first1=Will| publisher=[[Tax Foundation]]| date=Oct 2014| access-date=3 May 2019| archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180417023458/https://files.taxfoundation.org/legacy/docs/TaxFoundation_FF442.pdf| archive-date=17 April 2018| url-status=live| df=dmy-all}}</ref> In 2014, ''[[The Wall Street Journal]]'' reported that "In U.S. tax inversion Deals, U.K. is now a winner".<ref name="wsj1">{{cite news|url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-inversion-tax-deals-u-k-is-a-winner-1406551914|title=In Inversion Deals, U.K. Is a Winner |url-access=subscription |author=Tom Fairless|author2=Shayndi Raice|newspaper=Wall Street Journal|date=28 July 2014|quote="Right now, it's safe to say that the U.K. is the preferred country of destination for inverted companies, given the favorable tax regime and the non-tax attractions of the U.K.," said Mr. Willens, a former managing director at Lehman Brothers.|access-date=2 May 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190423100240/https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-inversion-tax-deals-u-k-is-a-winner-1406551914|archive-date=23 April 2019|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> In a 2015 presentation, [[HMRC]] showed that many of the outstanding British inversions from 2007 to 2010 period had returned to the UK as a result of the tax reforms (most of the rest had entered into subsequent transactions and could not return, including [[Shire (pharmaceutical company)|Shire]]).<ref name="HMRC">{{cite web|url=https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/WILLIAMS_slides.pdf|title=The inversion experience in the US and the UK|publisher=[[HM Revenue and Customs]]|author=Mike Williams |date=23 January 2015|quote=In 2007 to 2009, WPP, United Business Media, Henderson Group, Shire, Informa, Regus, Charter and Brit Insurance all left the UK.  By 2015, WPP, UBM, Henderson Group, Informa and Brit Insurance have all returned |via=Brookings |access-date=3 May 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181115195041/https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/WILLIAMS_slides.pdf|archive-date=15 November 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>

====United States====
The US followed a broadly similar reform to the UK with the passing of the [[Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017]] (TCJA), which reduced the US headline corporate tax rate from 35% to 21%, changed the US corporate tax code from a "worldwide tax system" to a hybrid–"territorial tax system", and created new IP-based BEPS tools such as the FDII tax, as well as other anti-BEPS tools such as the BEAT tax.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://taxfoundation.org/treatment-foreign-profits-tax-cuts-jobs-act/|title=A Hybrid Approach: The Treatment of Foreign Profits under the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act|author=Kyle Pomerleau|date=3 May 2018|access-date=15 April 2019|publisher=[[Tax Foundation]]|quote=While lawmakers generally refer to the new system as a “territorial” tax system, it is more appropriately described as a hybrid system.|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190401141245/https://taxfoundation.org/treatment-foreign-profits-tax-cuts-jobs-act/|archive-date=1 April 2019|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref name="TF1">{{cite web|url=https://taxfoundation.org/inversions-new-tax-law/|title=Inversions under the new tax law|author=Kyle Pomerleau|date=13 March 2018|access-date=15 April 2019|publisher=[[Tax Foundation]]|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190415120425/https://taxfoundation.org/inversions-new-tax-law/|archive-date=15 April 2019|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> In advocating for the TCJA, the President's [[Council of Economic Advisors]] (CEA) heavily relied on the work of academic [[James R. Hines Jr.]] on the US corporate use of tax havens and the likely responses of US corporations to the TCJA.<ref name="CRS2"/> Since the TCJA, Pfizer has guided global aggregate tax rates that are very similar to what they expected in their aborted 2016 inversion with Allergan plc in Ireland.

===International===
In January 2019, the OECD released a policy note regarding new proposals to combat the BEPS activities of multinationals, which commentators labeled "BEPS 2.0".  In its press release, the OECD announced its proposals had the backing of the U.S., as well as China, Brazil, and India. The new proposals contain more fundamental reforms to corporate taxation around the taxing of profits where a product is consumed, rather than where the product's value is created (as currently done). Although the EU had been a long-term advocate of this concept, the US had traditionally blocked it. However, it is believed the passing of the 2017 TCJA has changed Washington's view on US corporate use of tax havens, who still remain the largest users of tax havens in the world. In response to this new OECD initiative, the EU, and the French in particular, dropped their "Digital Tax" proposal in favour of allowing the OECD BEPS 2.0 initiative reach a conclusion, which it is scheduled to do by 2020.

In 2021 the G20 and OECD produced a report suggesting a change in how multinational enterprises (MNE) are taxed. Defining a MNE as a business with global turnover above 20 billion euros and profitability before tax above 10%. The object is to allocate the profit in excess of the 10% permitted between all nations where the MNE derived turnover. The report had been agreed by 139 OECD member jurisdictions as of 9 June 2023.<ref>{{cite web |title=OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project |url=https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/statement-on-a-two-pillar-solution-to-address-the-tax-challenges-arising-from-the-digitalisation-of-the-economy-october-2021.pdf |date=8 October 2021}}</ref>

==See also==
{{Portal|Banks}}
{{div col|colwidth=20em}} <!-- 10em less than default to accommodate Portal template -->
{{no col break|
* [[Asset protection]]
* [[Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions and for Citizens' Action]]
* [[Economic inequality]]
* [[Flag of convenience]]
* [[International taxation]]
* [[List of foundations established in Vaduz]]
* [[List of countries by tax rates]]
* [[Panama as a tax haven]]
* [[Ringfencing]]
* [[Tax noncompliance]]
* [[Tax exile]]
* [[Tax exporting]]
* [[Tax justice]]
* [[Tax residence]]
}}
{{no col break|
===Similar idioms===
* [[Corporate haven]]
* [[Pirate haven]]
* [[Tax shelter]]
* [[Tax hell]]
* [[Vulture fund]]
}}
{{no col break|
===Related types of entities===
* [[Free port]]
* [[Free economic zone]]
* [[International business company]]
* [[Offshore bank]]
* [[Offshore company]]
* [[Offshore trust]]
}}
{{div col end}}

== Explanatory notes ==
{{notelist}}

==Further reading==
=== <span class="anchor" id="Important papers on tax havens"></span> Academic papers ===
The following are the most cited papers on "tax havens", as ranked on the IDEAS/RePEc database of economic papers, at the [[Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis]].<ref name="respec"/>

Papers marked (‡) were cited by the EU Commission 2017 summary as the most important research on tax havens.<ref name="eup"/>

{| class="wikitable sortable" style="text-align:left"
|+ style="text-align: left;" | Papers on [[tax havens]], ranked by academic citations, over the last 25 years.<ref name="respec"/>
|-
!style="width:30px;text-align:left"|Rank
!style="width:160px;text-align:left"|Paper
!style="width:100px;text-align:left"|Journal
!style="width:80px;text-align:left"|Vol-Issue-Page
!style="width:100px;text-align:left"|Author(s)
!style="width:30px;text-align:left"|Year
|-
|1‡
|"Fiscal Paradise: Foreign Tax Havens and American Business"<ref name="h3"/>
|''[[Quarterly Journal of Economics]]''
|109 (1) 149–182
|[[James R. Hines Jr.|James Hines]], Eric Rice
|1994
|-
|2‡
|"The Demand for Tax Haven Operations"<ref name="desai">{{cite journal|author1=Mihir A. Desai|author2=C Fritz Foley|author3-link=James R. Hines Jr|author3=James R. Hines Jr.|title=The demand for tax haven operations | journal=[[Journal of Public Economics]] | volume=90 | issue=3 | pages=513–531 | date=February 2006|quote=Examples of such tax havens include Ireland and Luxembourg in Europe, Hong Kong and Singapore in Asia, and various Caribbean island nations in the Americas|doi=10.1016/j.jpubeco.2005.04.004|author1-link=Mihir A. Desai}}</ref>
|''[[Journal of Public Economics]]''
|90 (3) 513–531
|[[Mihir A. Desai|Mihir Desai]], C F Foley, [[James R. Hines Jr.|James Hines]]
|2006
|-
|3‡
|"Which Countries Become Tax Havens?"<ref name="dhar"/>
|''[[Journal of Public Economics]]''
|93 (9–10) 1058–1068
|[[Dhammika Dharmapala]], [[James R. Hines Jr.|James Hines]]
|2009
|-
|4‡
|"The Missing Wealth of Nations: Are Europe and the U.S. Net Debtors or Net Creditors?"<ref name="missing profits"/>
|''[[Quarterly Journal of Economics]]''
|128 (3) 1321–1364
|[[Gabriel Zucman]]
|2013
|-
|5‡
|"Tax Competition with Parasitic Tax Havens"<ref name="slemrod"/>
|''[[Journal of Public Economics]]''
|93 (11–12) 1261–1270
|[[Joel Slemrod]], John D. Wilson
|2006
|-
|6
|"What Problems and Opportunities Are Created by Tax Havens?"<ref name="dhh"/>
|''[[Oxford Review of Economic Policy]]''
|24 (4) 661–679
|[[Dhammika Dharmapala]], [[James R. Hines Jr.|James Hines]]
|2008
|-
|7
|"In Praise of Tax Havens: International Tax Planning"<ref name="praise"/>
|''[[European Economic Review]]''
|54 (1) 82–95
|Qing Hong, Michael Smart
|2010
|-
|8‡
|"End of Bank Secrecy: An Evaluation of the G20 Tax Haven Crackdown"
|''[[American Economic Journal]]''
|6 (1) 65–91
|Niels Johannesen, [[Gabriel Zucman]]
|2014
|-
|9‡
|"Taxing Across Borders: Tracking Wealth and Corporate Profits"<ref name=Zucman/>
|''[[Journal of Economic Perspectives]]''
|28 (4) 121–148
|[[Gabriel Zucman]]
|2014
|-
|10‡
|"Treasure Islands"<ref name="h1"/>
|''[[Journal of Economic Perspectives]]''
|24 (4) 103–26
|[[James R. Hines Jr.|James Hines]]
|2010
|}

===Major books===
(With at least 300 citations on [[Google Scholar]])

* {{Cite book |author=Raymond W. Baker |year=2005 |title=Capitalism's Achilles' Heel: Dirty Money, and How to Renew the Free-Market System |publisher=John Wiley & Sons |isbn=978-0471644880 |author-link=Raymond W. Baker |url-access=registration |url=https://archive.org/details/capitalismsachil00raym }}
* {{Cite book |author=Jane G. Gravelle |year=2015 |title=Tax Havens: International Tax Avoidance and Evasion |url=https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40623.pdf |publisher=[[Congressional Research Service]] |isbn=978-1482527681}}
* {{Cite book |author1=Ronen Palan |author2-link=Richard Murphy (tax campaigner) |author2=Richard Murphy |author3=Christian Chavagneux |year=2009 |title=Tax Havens: How Globalization Really Works |author1-link=Ronen Palan  |publisher=[[Cornell University Press]] |isbn=978-0-8014-7612-9}}
* {{Cite book |author=Sol Piccolo |author-link=Sol Piccolo |year=1992 |title=International Business Taxation |url=https://www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/Picciotto%201992%20International%20Business%20Taxation.pdf |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-0899307770}}
* {{Cite book |author=Nicholas Shaxson |author-link=Nicholas Shaxson |year=2011 |title=Treasure Islands: Uncovering the Damage of Offshore Banking and Tax Havens |title-link=Treasure Islands: Tax Havens and the Men Who Stole the World |publisher=Palgrave Macmillan |isbn=978-0-230-10501-0 }}
* {{Cite book |author=Gabriel Zucman |author-link=Gabriel Zucman |year=2016 |title=The Hidden Wealth of Nations: The Scourge of Tax Havens |title-link=The Hidden Wealth of Nations: The Scourge of Tax Havens |publisher=University of Chicago Press |isbn=978-0226422640}}

===Various articles===
* Foremny, D., & Von Hagen, J. (2012). [https://ssrn.com/abstract=2155524 "Fiscal federalism in times of crisis"], CEPR Discussion Papers 9154, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
* {{Cite book |last1=Henry |first1=James S. |date=October 2003 |title=The Blood Bankers: Tales from the Global Underground Economy |url=https://archive.org/details/bloodbankers00jame |url-access=registration |location=New York |publisher=Four Walls Eight Windows |isbn=978-1-56858-254-2}}
* From the [[International Consortium of Investigative Journalists]]:
** [http://www.icij.org/offshore/new-bank-leak-shows-how-rich-exploit-tax-haven-loopholes "New Bank Leak Shows How Rich Exploit Tax Haven Loopholes"] (2014-07-08) 
** [http://www.icij.org/offshore/hidden-plain-sight-new-york-just-another-island-haven "Hidden in Plain Sight: New York Just Another Island Haven"] (2014-07-03) 
** [http://www.icij.org/offshore/sun-and-shadows-how-island-paradise-became-haven-dirty-money "Sun and Shadows: How an Island Paradise Became a Haven for Money"] (2014-06-09) 
** [http://www.icij.org/offshore/leaked-records-reveal-offshore-holdings-chinas-elite "Leaked Records Reveal Offshore Holdings of China's Elite"] (2014-01-21) 
** [http://www.icij.org/offshore/secret-files-expose-offshores-global-impact Secret "Files Expose Offshore's Global Impact"] (2013-04-03)
* {{Cite book |last1=Morriss| first1=Andrew P. |year=2010 |title=Offshore Financial Centers and Regulatory Competition |location=Washington, D.C. |publisher=The AEI Press |isbn=978-0-8447-4324-0 }}
* {{Cite book |last1=Scevola |first1=Carlo |last2=Sneiderova |first2=Karina |date=January 2010 |title=Offshore Jurisdictions Guide |location=Geneva, Switzerland |publisher=CS&P Fiduciaire |isbn=978-1-60594-433-3 }}
* [[Alan Rusbridger]] (27 October 2016). [http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2016/10/27/panama-the-hidden-trillions/ "Panama: The Hidden Trillions"] (part 1 of 2), ''[[The New York Review of Books]]''.

==References==
{{Reflist}}

==External links==
{{Wiktionary}}
{{Scholia}}
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20110410135132/http://www.ifcforum.org/ International Financial Centres Forum (IFC Forum)]
* [http://www.imf.org/external/ns/cs.aspx?id=55 IMF – Offshore Banking and Financial Centers]
* [https://www.imf.org/external/np/mae/oshore/2000/eng/back.htm Offshore Financial Centers – IMF Background Paper]
* [https://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/ Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes, OECD]
* [https://gfintegrity.org/ Global Financial Integrity]
* [https://financialtransparency.org/ Task Force on Financial Integrity & Economic Development]
* {{unfit|1=[https://web.archive.org/web/20100319093312/http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2000/09/OECD-Proposal-To-Eliminate-Tax-Competition An OECD Proposal to Eliminate Tax Competition Would Mean Higher Taxes and Less Privacy]}}—Heritage Foundation, Washington D.C.
* [http://freedomandprosperity.org/2008/videos/the-economic-case-for-tax-havens/ The Economic Case for Tax Havens]
* [https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/why-tax-havens-are-blessing "Why Tax Havens Are a Blessing"]—the [[Cato Institute]]
* [https://www.cmi.no/publications/file/3537-profiting-from-corruption.pdf "Profiting from Corruption: The Role and Responsibility of Financial Institutions" – U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre]
* [http://explainedwithmaps.com/tax-havens/ Tax Havens] at Explained with Maps (Documentary) ({{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210121102400/https://explainedwithmaps.com/tax-havens/ |date=21 January 2021 }})
* [https://www.sourcewatch.org/images/8/87/Corporate_Pirates_-_IPS_Report_-_06-12-2013.pdf Corporations Seek to Widen Tax Haven Loophole]—Institute for Policy Studies (IPS; June 12, 2013])
* [https://ips-dc.org/corporate_pirates/ CEOs Who Seek to Widen Tax Haven Loopholes]—Sarah Anderson, Scott Klinger, Javier Rojo (June 12, 2013)

{{Corruption}}
{{Globalization}}
{{Tax resistance}}
{{Authority control}}

{{DEFAULTSORT:Tax Haven}}
[[Category:International taxation]]
[[Category:Economic globalization]]
[[Category:International finance]]
[[Category:Offshore finance]]
[[Category:Tax avoidance]]
[[Category:Taxation-related lists]]
[[Category:Corporate tax avoidance]]
[[Category:Tax evasion]]
[[Category:Global issues]]
[[Category:Offshore magic circle]]
[[Category:Corporate taxation in the United States]]